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Chapter 1
Introduction
• “In 2008, a Quantas Airbus A330-303 pitched downward twice in rapid succession,
diving first 650 feet and then 400 feet. ... The cause has been traced to errors in an
on-board computer suspected to have been induced by cosmic rays.” [7]
• “Canadian-based St. Jude Medical issued an advisory to doctors in 2005, warning
that single bit-flips in the memory of its implantable cardiac defibrillators could cause
excessive drain on the unit’s battery.” [8]
This list could be continued by other examples of drastic consequences of fault occur-
rences. Proper circuit functionality even under perturbations and faults has been always
crucial in aerospace, defense, medical, and nuclear applications. Circuit tolerance towards
transient faults (non-destructive, non-permanent) is an important research topic and an un-
avoidable characteristic of any circuit used in safety critical applications. Common sources
of faults are natural radiation, such as neutrons of cosmic rays and alpha particles of packing
or solder materials, capacitive coupling, electromagnetic interference, etc [7, 9]. Nowadays,
technology shrinking and voltage scaling increase electronics susceptibility and the risk of
fault occurrences.
Circuit engineers use fault-tolerance techniques to mask or, at least, to detect faults.
Regardless of the chosen technique, this step increases the level of complexity of the whole
design. Commonly used simulation-based methodologies are not able to fully verify even the
functional correctness due to the huge number of possible execution cases. The verification
of fault-tolerance properties by checking all fault injection scenarios raises the order of com-
plexity. Non-exhaustive manual checks or simulation-based techniques are error-prone and
may miss a circuit corruption scenario that leads to the loss of the circuit functionality or to
degraded quality of service.
Since engineers need their implementations to be simple and correct, they mostly use
Triple-Modular Redundancy (TMR), a technique that triplicates the circuit and introduces
majority voters. Modern EDA tools support TMR, as well as other basic techniques such as
Finite State Machine (FSM) encoding [10–12], through automatic circuit transformations.
While there are other more elegant and optimized fault-tolerance techniques [13, 14], their
functional correctness and fault-tolerance properties are often not guaranteed.
Ensuring correctness of fault-tolerance techniques requires mathematically based tech-
niques for the specification, development, and verification. Formalization of fault-models,
circuit designs, and specifications gives a vast opportunity to create, to optimize, and to check
the correctness of fault-tolerance techniques. Showing fault-tolerance properties w.r.t. the
chosen fault-model eliminates all doubts about the circuit functionality under the faults
whose occurrence and type are specified by the fault-model. Thanks to this formal verifica-
tion, the overall probability of the system failure is purely the probability of faults occurring
outside of the fault-model.
There are many different formal methods to verify properties of systems or circuits. In
this dissertation, we mainly use static symbolic analysis and theorem proving.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Problems and Contributions
Throughout the dissertation, we work with circuits described at the gate level (i.e., netlists
of AND, OR, NOT gates plus flip-flops (FFs) – also called memory cells). This decision
offers two main advantages:
• gate-level netlists can be captured in an elementary language, which simplifies formal
circuit representations (e.g., as a transition system) and correctness proofs;
• it is easier to prevent synthesis tools from optimizing (undoing) our transformations at
this late stage, as well as to integrate the circuit transformations in commercial logic
synthesis tools that we use for benchmarking.
We address three problems of circuit fault-tolerance: an optimization of a standard fault-
tolerance technique based on static analyses, the design of several new fault-tolerance tech-
niques based on time redundancy, and the formal proof of their functional and fault-tolerance
properties.
Verification-based optimization of fault-tolerance techniques. Making a circuit
fault-tolerant always leads to overheads in terms of performance and hardware resources.
The circuit transformations for fault-tolerance usually do not take into account any pecu-
liarities and functionality of the original circuit. Moreover, they do not take into account
neither how the circuit is used nor what fault-tolerance properties are indeed needed. There
is significant room for optimizations if we take into account the circuit original design, its
utilization, and the expected fault rate. For instance, if it is known that faults are less fre-
quent than one fault per K clock cycles, it may be possible to suppress some fault-tolerance
mechanisms which would be overkill for the required fault-tolerance property. A crucial point
is that, while optimizing a fault-tolerant design, we have to be sure that the fault-tolerance
and functional properties are not violated. The guarantees can be given if the design, its
properties, the fault-model, and the optimization procedure are formally defined and taken
into account.
Our first step is to consider error-masking mechanisms in fault-tolerance techniques as an
object of optimization and to develop a verification-based approach to suppress them. For
instance in TMR, error-masking mechanisms are majority voters introduced after triplicated
memory cells. We propose an approach to minimize the number of voters in TMR with
guarantees that, after this optimization, the circuit is still tolerant w.r.t. the given fault-
model [15]. While the final goal is to suppress as many voters as possible, the developed
methodology clarifies how to take into account the original circuit functionality and the
circuit typical use. Many circuits have native error-masking capabilities due to the structure
of its combinational part, embedded FSMs, or due to the way the circuit is commonly used
and communicates with the surrounding device. The developed methods take these native
error-masking properties into account and identify useless voters that can be suppressed
without violation of the fault-tolerance properties. We demonstrate how to consider large
class of fault-models of the form “at most one bit-flip or one wire-glitch every K clock cycle”,
where K is a chosen parameter.
The formalization of a circuit, its typical utilization, the fault-model as well as opti-
mization steps using static analysis distinguish this work from [16–18] where probabilistic
simulation-based approaches are followed. In our case, the circuit fault-tolerance is guaran-
teed w.r.t. its fault-model before and after optimizations.
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Universal time-redundant techniques as circuit transformations. TMR has multi-
ple advantages as a throughput comparable to the original one and unchanged input/ouput
interfaces. However, the triple permanent hardware overhead is often prohibitive. Time-
redundant techniques could produce circuits several times smaller than their TMR coun-
terparts but would obviously reduce the circuit performance. However, many safety-critical
applications may accept the reduced throughput to obtain strong fault-tolerance guaran-
tees, small hardware overhead, and flexibility. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no simple and trusted alternative to TMR among time-redundant fault-tolerance
techniques.
We propose a circuit transformation, called Triple-Time Redundant Transformation (TTR),
that automatically makes any sequential circuit triple-time redundant and capable to mask
any effect of a glitch occurrence. We explain that TTR circuits can also be optimized with
the aforementioned voter minimization analysis because the error-masking analysis stays the
same regardless of redundancy type (hardware redundancy in TMR and time redundancy in
TTR).
Second, we introduce the notion of dynamic time redundancy, a circuit property that
allows it to dynamically change the level of redundancy without interrupting the computa-
tion [19]. We also propose a family of circuit transformations that implements this property.
The transformed circuit may dynamically adapt the throughput/fault-tolerance trade-off by
changing its redundancy level. Therefore, time-redundancy can be used only in critical sit-
uations (e.g., above the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) or Earth poles where the radiation
level increases), during the processing of crucial data (e.g., encryption of selected data), or
critical processes (e.g., a satellite computer reboot). When hardware size is limited and
fault-tolerance is only occasionally needed, the proposed scheme is a better choice than
TMR, which incurs a constant hardware area overhead, or than TTR which has a constant
throughput cost.
Third, we merge the proposed principle of dynamic time redundancy and a checkpointing-
rollback mechanism to obtain the Double-Time Redundant Transformation (DTR). DTR is
capable to recover from any transient fault consequences with only a double redundancy and
without disturbing the input/output streams [20]. The recovery process remains transparent
for the surrounding circuit. While TTR has similar error-masking properties, it introduces
a higher throughput overhead than DTR. It allows us to state that DTR is an interesting
logic-level time-redundant alternative to TMR in applications where a reduced throughput
is tolerable.
All presented circuit transformations are technologically independent, do not require any
specific hardware support, and are applicable to any circuit. Moreover, their fault-tolerance
properties are formally provable which is crucial for safety-critical systems.
Formal proof of circuit transformation correctness. Universal fault-tolerance tech-
niques have to be applicable to any circuit and, thus, are defined independently from a par-
ticular circuit implementation. The circuit transformations to implement these techniques
are defined on the syntax of a Hardware Description Language (HDL). The functional cor-
rectness of the transformation as well as its fault-tolerance properties have to be assured
independently from the circuit the transformation is applied to. The fault-tolerance proper-
ties rely on the notion of fault model that is formalized in the semantics of HDL. However,
modern hardware description languages, like Verilog or VHDL, do not have formal semantics.
We propose a language-based approach to formally certify the functional and fault-
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tolerance properties of circuit transformations using the Coq proof assistant [21]. We define
the syntax and semantics of a simple gate-level functional HDL, called lddl, to describe cir-
cuits. We focus on the DTR transformation whose complexity made it necessary to provide
a formal proof for full assurance of its correctness. While we relied on many manual checks
to design all presented transformations, only Coq allowed us to get complete correctness
guarantees. The DTR transformation is defined as a recursive function on the lddl syntax.
The fault-model of the form “at most one transient fault every K cycle” is formalized in
the language semantics. Proofs rely mainly on relating the execution of the source circuit
without faults to the execution of the DTR circuit w.r.t. the fault-model.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to certify automatic circuit transfor-
mations for fault-tolerance.
1.2 Outline
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 starts by presenting background information
on circuit fault tolerance (Section 2.1). It provides details about faults, their characteristics,
and the techniques to make circuits fault-tolerant. Later (Section 2.2), we give an overview
of the main approaches in formal hardware verification including model checking, symbolic
simulation, and theorem proving. We focus on these formal techniques and their applica-
tions because they are used throughout the dissertation. The rest of the work is structured
according to the problems-contributions list presented above.
Chapter 3 presents our formal solution to minimize the number of voters in TMR se-
quential circuits, keeping the required fault-tolerance properties. Chapter 4 starts with the
presentation of the TTR circuit transformation explaining the main principle of any time-
redundant transformation proposed in this dissertation. Then, it presents the idea of dy-
namic time redundancy and the corresponding circuit transformations with their properties.
Chapter 4 ends by proposing the DTR transformation capable to mask any transient fault
which makes it an interesting alternative to hardware redundant solutions. In Chapter 5,
we present a language-based solution to certify circuit transformations for fault-tolerance
in digital circuits. We focus on the details of the DTR correctness proof in the Coq proof
assistant.
Finally, the thesis is summarized in Chapter 6, where contributions and future work
perspectives are discussed.
Chapter 2
Circuits Fault-Tolerance and
Formal Methods
Fault-tolerance has become a design characteristic of circuits as important as performance
and power consumption [22]. Proper circuit functionality even under perturbations and faults
has been always a crucial characteristic for safety-critical systems (e.g., aerospace, defense,
and nuclear plants applications). Nowadays, circuit fault-tolerance is a research topic for
many more devices due to the increased fault sensitivity caused by shrinking transistor sizes.
The integration of fault-tolerance techniques represents a new design step to already con-
voluted functional circuit design. These techniques can be implemented manually and the
final system properties can be checked by simulations. However, as the design complexity
increases, an even smaller percentage of circuit behavior scenarios can be covered by simula-
tion methods. Consequently, it does not provide confidence in the design correctness, which
is unacceptable for safety-critical applications. It is even a more challenging task to cover
all possible system behaviors under faults due to the high number of fault injection cases.
Formal hardware verification methods attempt to overcome the weakness of non-exhaustive
simulation-based methods by proving the correspondence between the desired properties ex-
pressed in the specification and the implemented circuit design. Overall, formal methods are
mathematically rigorous techniques for the specification, design, analysis, and verification of
systems.
Section 2.1 provides a brief background on the topic of fault tolerance and its terminol-
ogy. Section 2.1.1 explains the roots of the research domain and Section 2.1.2 provides details
about faults, their classification, characteristics, and ways of modelling them. The funda-
mental principles and modern techniques to tolerate faults are presented in Section 2.1.3.
We give an overview of the main approaches in formal hardware verification in Section 2.2:
model checking and symbolic simulation in Section 2.2.1; theorem proving in Section 2.2.2.
We outline the underlying theory behind these approaches and illustrate them on simple
examples.
Section 2.3 concludes this chapter by explaining the research directions and motivations
of the dissertation.
2.1 Circuits Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance is the ability of a system to operate according to its specification in the
presence of faults [23].
The term fault is used to identify the initiating physical event whereas the term error
identifies the undesired system state. The way how we model faults and their consequences
is defined by a fault-model. A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service
deviates from correct one [23]. In these terms, fault tolerance is the ability to avoid failures
in the presence of faults and, thus, to deliver the specified service and correct results. The
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correctness of a computational process is defined by the absence of incorrect outputs. The
correctness of the output result stays the most important characteristic of any computation
performed by a system.
The only reason why a correctly designed system can return incorrect results and violate
its specification is the existence of physical faults. They can be often avoided or their risk can
be minimized by a range of measures, such as the use of highly reliable materials during the
device manufacturing, the increase of voltage and frequency margins, etc. These measures
form the fault-avoidance technique category [23]. Unfortunately, these techniques either
cannot fully guarantee the absence of faults or they are not cost effective.
Nevertheless, the computational correctness under specific fault-models can be provided
using fault-tolerance techniques [24]. The large range of fault-tolerance techniques has been
developed at different abstraction levels of system design but all of them can be classified
according to the redundancy type they rely on: hardware, time, or information redundancy.
The most common techniques are discussed in Section 2.1.3.
The main principles and fault-tolerance techniques appeared with the first computers.
We introduce fault tolerance from its historical retrospective in Section 2.1.1. Section 2.1.2
explains the difference between different fault types showing the main peculiarities of soft-
errors. The vast research on fault-tolerance techniques is presented in Section 2.1.3 where
the three fundamental redundancy types are introduced.
2.1.1 Historical Roots of Fault-Tolerance
The lack of reliability in early computers of the 1940s-1950s [25, 26] gave rise to the fault-
tolerance domain. Unreliable hardware components were the main issue. For instance,
ENIAC [27] had only 54% of correct computations due to reliability-related issues. The
EDAVAC computer of 1949 was the first one with an error-detection implemented with
duplicated Arithmetic Logic Units (ALUs) [26]. Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) for memory
scrubbing and parity checking have been integrated later in 1951 in Univac I architecture [28]
as well as in IBM 650 which used multiple redundant components.
New challenges for fault-tolerance research came when computers appeared in aerospace,
military, and other safety critical applications in the 1960s [29]. The space programs and
artificial satellites needed fault-tolerance techniques for electronics protection from harsh
radiation environment. Hardware redundancy was extensively used to avoid potential costs
of mission failures [30,31].
Since the 1980s, the fourth computer generation gave birth to Very-Large-Scale Integra-
tion (VLSI) and the corresponding technological trend of feature size and power consumption
minimization [32]. It leaded to an increased risk of soft errors in logic components [33,34]. If
fault-tolerance techniques against soft errors could be found before only in special-purpose
expensive computers (e.g., controlling aerospace missions), from now on, the increasing in-
tegration has raised the fault probability in any general-purpose system [35]. As a result,
fault-tolerance techniques are nowadays used in a wide range of computer systems, from per-
sonal computers and corporate servers to embedded systems in automotive, health, railway,
energy, and production industries.
2.1.2 Taxonomy of Faults
Avizienis [23] classified all kind of existing faults in several subcategories (software or hard-
ware, natural or human-made, etc). In the context of circuit fault tolerance, we consider the
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subcategory of natural operational hardware faults. Natural faults, by definition, are caused
by natural phenomena without human participation (versus human-made faults). Opera-
tional faults occur during the service delivery of a circuit. Thus, the development faults,
caused by design mistakes, are commonly out of the scope of the fault-tolerance research
domain.
Faults can be classified according to their source: internal and external ones. For in-
stance, noise-related faults [32] or cross talks between wires can be considered as internal
because their original cause is electrical disturbances inside the circuit. On the other hand,
the sources of external faults exist outside of the system such as external electromagnetic
fields, natural radiation in the form of neutrons of cosmic rays [36] and alpha particles emitted
by packing or solder materials [37–40].
Moreover, faults can be further divided according to their persistence: they are either
permanent or transient. A permanent fault is a hardware damage that is continuous in time
(e.g., a wire break). Transient faults have non-destructive and non-permanent hardware
effects. They manifest themselves as soft-errors and they can be represented as some in-
formation loss or a system incorrect state. Integrated Circuits (ICs) are now increasingly
susceptible to transient faults [7, 9].
A typical representative of natural operational hardware faults are faults caused by radi-
ation. The increased risk of these faults results from the continuous shrinking of transistor
size that makes components more sensitive to radiation [9]. Having been an object of atten-
tion in space and medical industries for many years [41], these faults represent a danger for
all circuits manufactured at 90nm and smaller [22].
Space-based radiation comprises atomic particles that have been spread by stellar events
within the solar system or beyond it [42]. The statistical correlation between radiation-
induced faults in satellite electronics and solar activities was revealed by the Hiten satellite
mission [43]. Earth’s magnetosphere traps, slows, or deflects electrons, protons, and heavy
ions (isotopes of atom from helium to uranium) emitted during solar events such as solar
flares and mass coronal ejection, which reduces the rate and the impact of radiation particles
on electronic devices used in the atmosphere. However, there is a region, called South
Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), where the magnetic field extends downwards the Earth. High
concentration of protons is observed in this region at lower altitudes, which constitutes a
danger for satellites and planes.
But even on the ground radiation-related faults are common. Electronics materials con-
tain high-density atoms due to their impurities. These atoms emit alpha particles that inject
charges leading to soft errors [44]. Package materials are also a source of alpha particle emis-
sion and should be chosen carefully for safety-critical applications. Other sources of faults
include energetic neutrons: if a neutron is captured by the nucleus of an atom in an electronic
device, an alpha particle and oxygen nuclei are produced. There is a 0.95 probability that
this will cause a soft error [45]. Since neutron flux is a function of altitude, neutron-based
faults are more frequent for aerospace applications. For instance, computers at mountain-
tops experience over 10 times more soft error than at sea level [46], and electronics devices
in airplanes 300 times more.
All radiation-related faults have the same physical nature, which consists in the material
ionization caused by a high energetic particle hit. In particular, when a charged particle is
passing through an electronic device, it ionizes the material along its path. Because of such
ionization, free carriers are created around the particle track. In interaction with the internal
electric field of the device, it may result in an electrical pulse or a glitch that disrupts normal
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device operation. Such an effect, called a soft error, does not cause any permanent damage
of the hardware but leads to a wrong system state. Since both supply voltage levels VDD and
the circuit nodes capacitance C are reducing with newer technologies, the charge stored on
a circuit node (Q = VDDxC) is decreasing. It reduces the required charge from a radiation
particle to reverse the node value. As a result, the increasing sensitivity is observed in both
memory cells and logic network.
On the other hand, a large energy deposition by a passing particle can influence memory
cells such that they loss their ability to change the state. Such permanent faults lead to
hardware lasting rupture: Single-Event Latchup (SEL), Single Hard Error (SHE), Single
Event Gate Rupture (SEGR), etc. SEL is a type of short circuit that may cause the loss of
device functionality. High current may cause permanent device damage if the device is not
power cycled as soon as high power consumption is detected. SHE leads to a stuck bit in a
memory device. The output of such bit is stuck at logic 0 or 1, regardless of the input.
We focus in this dissertation on transient faults. The effects of all single transient faults
can be grouped into two sub-categories, SEU and SET:
Single-Event Upset (SEU) is the disturbance of a memory cell that leads to the change
of its state, i.e., a bit-flip. SEUs can be caused by a direct particle hit. A radiation
particle creates a transient pulse that can be captured by the asynchronous loop forming
the memory cell and can change its state. Historically, SEUs in memory cells were the
main contributors to the fault rate due the sensitivity of memory elements [47].
Single-Event Transient (SET) is a transient current in a combinational circuit induced
by the passage of a particle. It may propagate through the combinational logic depend-
ing on its electrical characteristics and if not logically masked by circuit functionality.
As a result, the outputs of the combinational circuit might be glitched and be incor-
rectly latched by memory cells. Since an SET may potentially lead to several bit-flips,
SETs subsumes SEUs. SET-caused glitches are not attenuated because the logic tran-
sition time of gates is shorter than a typical glitch duration. Moreover, the increasing
circuit clock frequencies increase the probability to latch a transient pulse. Nowadays,
the combinatorial circuits are becoming as susceptible to faults as memory cells [48].
The classifications by NASA [49] and by ESA [50] also distinguish other transient faults.
Some of them are given hereafter:
Single Event Disturb (SED) : A momentary disturbance of the information stored in
memory cells. It can manifest itself only when the information is incorrectly read out.
The bits state remains correct.
Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) : A condition where the device stops oper-
ating in its normal mode, and usually requires a power reset or other special sequence
to resume normal operations. It is a special case of an SEU changing an internal control
signal.
Multiple-Bit Upset (MBU) : An event induced by a single energetic particle that causes
multiple upsets or transients during its path through a device. The analysis of MBUs
requires the knowledge about the circuit physical layout due to its spatial nature.
Even if they have different characteristics and behavior, any single radiation transient
fault can be modeled as either an SEU or an SET. For instance, the effect of an SED can be
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modelled as an SET on the output of a memory cell. The memory cell will keep its correct
state but its output will be read incorrectly. A SEFI is just a special case of an SEU: the
term Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is usually used when internal circuit design
is unknown but it is necessary to describe its corruption. In such cases, one may say: “A
SEFI interrupted CPU normal execution”. The term SEU is more commonly used when a
location of a bit-flip is known (e.g., a particular memory cell). An MBUs can be modelled
as multiple SEUs [51].
2.1.2.1 Fault Rate and Fault Model
Even in environments with high levels of ionizing radiations (e.g., space, particle accelera-
tors), transient faults happen rare relatively to clock periods of modern devices. Below, we
provide several observations of the fault rates in different environmental conditions.
The experiments of TIMA laboratory with 1 Gbit of SRAM memory at 130 nm technol-
ogy have shown that 15 soft-errors have been observed during the flight Los Angeles-Paris
(23/4/2009) [1]. Among them, there were 5 SEUs and 4 MBUs. It verified the precision of
the developed prediction tool MUCSA. The dependence between the flight length and the
number of bit-flips is presented in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Predicted number of bit-flips vs the number of observed bit-flips [1].
In other experiments in Peru at 3800m, 1 Gbit of SRAM at 90 nm and 130 nm experienced
37 bit-flips during 5 months: 10 SEUs and 9 MBUs [1].
Soft-Error Rate (SER) can be as small as 10−5 bit-upset/day for Vertex FPGAs [52] in
terrestrial conditions.
At geosynchronous Earth orbit altitudes, Lockheed Martin Commercial Space Systems
observed 1.8x10−10 errors/bit/day in SRAM 0.25µm devices [53]. During solar maximum
condition, SER raised to 1x10−9 errors/bit/day. MBUs constituted 4-10% of all faults.
Microsemi Corporation [7] lists an extensive list which shows that the radiation-based
soft-errors are widely observed and already leaded to incidents. Among others, let us cite:
• “In 2008, a Quantas Airbus A330-303 pitched downward twice in rapid succession,
diving first 650 feet and then 400 feet. The cause has been traced to errors in an
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on-board computer suspected to have been induced by cosmic rays.”
• “Canadian-based St. Jude Medical issued an advisory to doctors in 2005, warning that
SEUs to the memory of its implantable cardiac defibrillators could cause excessive drain
on the unit’s battery.” The observed SER in defibrillators was 9.3x10−12 upsets/bit-
hour [8].
Due to low fault rates on Earth or even in open space, the most common fault-model is
a single fault, e.g., an SEU or an SET. If we relate SER with the number of system clock
cycles between two consecutive faults, then we can introduce fault models of the form “at
most n bit-flips within K cycles”, denoted by SEU (n,K), and “at most n SETs within K
cycles”, denoted by SET (n,K).
Besides radiation-related faults, it is worth to mention the faults caused by signal metasta-
bility during aggressive voltage scaling [2]. Voltage scaling is a technique to reduce circuit
energy demands, it decreases the voltage in the circuit to minimize its power consumption.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the dependency between voltage and error rates for an 18x18-bit mul-
tiplier at 90MHz in Xilinx XC2V250-F456-5 FPGA.
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Figure 2.2: Measured error rates dependency from supply voltage [2]
As it is marked on the plot, when the voltage is 1.52 V, the error rate is one error per 20
seconds or per 1.8 billion operations. It corresponds to the fault model SET (1, 1.8x109).
2.1.3 Conventional Fault-Tolerance Techniques
Any fault-tolerance technique is based on some sort of redundancy. There are three redun-
dancy classes:
Hardware or spatial redundancy. It adds additional hardware resources to simultane-
ously produce several copies of the same computational result for their further com-
parison (resp. voting) to detect (resp. to mask) soft-errors. For instance, a duplicated
system is capable to detect an error occurrence by comparing the states of its two
redundant modules. The triplicated design can mask an error by majority voting. Ad-
ditional hardware introduces the corresponding cost in terms of physical space, power,
etc, but it allows avoiding significant performance degradation because redundant com-
putations are performed in parallel.
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Time or temporal redundancy. The redundant computations are performed sequentially
multiple times re-using the same hardware resources. Thus, time redundancy trades-off
performance for a low hardware cost. For instance, if a system re-computes its result
twice for further comparison, it is capable to detect an error. If the computation is
triplicated in time, the system can mask an error by voting on the redundant results.
Information redundancy. It adds extra information (bits) to be used for detection/cor-
rection purposes. To operate with and use this information, e.g., parity bits, a system
also needs additional hardware and/or time resources that encode/decode this extra
data.
Furthermore, there is an orthogonal classification of the redundancy types according
to the system reaction upon error detection and the guarantees on the primary outputs
correctness. In particular:
Active redundancy relies on an error-detection with a subsequent appropriate system
reaction. For example, the system performs a global reset after an error-detection in
any of its redundant copies.
Passive redundancy is based on fault-masking techniques to guarantee the correctness of
the primary outputs. Any fault occurring in the system protected by passive redun-
dancy does not change the system output behavior.
Hybrid redundancy incorporates both active and passive types of redundancy.
Since active redundancy does not guarantee the equivalence of output streams with and
without fault occurrence, it is typically used in systems that can tolerate some temporal
service quality degradation. As the European Space Agency (ESA) states: “In some appli-
cations it is sufficient to detect an error caused by an SEU and to flag the affected data as
invalid or corrupted” [49].
The two observed classifications are orthogonal. There are systems where an error detec-
tion of active redundancy is realized through hardware duplication with comparison (hard-
ware redundancy), error detection codes (information redundancy), or self-checking logic
(time redundancy) [31].
The next three sections present hardware, time, and information redundancies in details.
2.1.3.1 Hardware Redundancy
The lectures by von Neumann given in Princeton University in 1952 [54] can be considered
as the first theoretical work about hardware redundancy. He proposed and analyzed Triple-
Modular Redundancy (TMR) that stays to be the most popular approach for error masking
in safety-critical applications.
TMR relies on three redundant copies of an original system receiving the same inputs.
Majority voters are introduced at the primary triplicated outputs. If at least two of three re-
dundant outputs return correct values, the voters return the correct result, therefore masking
one possible error. TMR is able to detect one or two errors and to correct one.
Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) represents the reduced version of TMR that has
only two redundant modules and is only capable to detect one error. The generalized version
of TMR, called N-modular redundancy, requires N redundant copies of a system to feed
majority voters with N inputs. It can correct bN−12 c errors and detect (N − 1) errors.
There are several versions of TMR that can be applied to circuits [12], in particular:
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1. the whole circuit triplication with the insertion of a single majority voter at each
primary output (as in the von Neumann’s original TMR);
2. only memory cells are triplicated with a single voter after each triplicated cell and each
primary output;
3. the whole circuit triplication with a single voter after each triplicated memory cell and
each triplicated primary output;
4. the whole circuit triplication with three voters after each triplicated memory cell and
each triplicated primary output.
The first TMR version, depicted in Figure 2.3, is tolerant only to a single fault, temporal
or permanent, occurring inside one of the redundant modules. When a fault occurs in a
module, its state becomes corrupted and may stay erroneous forever if it does not have
any additional error-masking mechanisms. This is why this scheme is tolerant only to a
single internal fault of the modules. This TMR version may not be capable to tolerate a
second fault occurring in a different module. If another fault occurs (even long after the
first one) and corrupts the second module, the TMR structure would have two erroneous
modules simultaneously and cannot guarantee anymore the correctness of primary outputs.
Furthermore, if an SET corrupts an output voter, then the correctness of the output is not
guaranteed. As a result, the first TMR modification is tolerant to the fault models (notations
of Section 2.1.2.1): SEU(1,∞) and SET (1,∞), provided that faults do not occur at the
output voters.
Module
Module
Module
Input
Figure 2.3: TMR scheme proposed by von Neumann.
The second TMR version triplicates only memory cells introducing a single majority
voter per each triplet, see Figure 2.4. This approach relies on the assumption that radiation
effects cannot cause perturbations in a combinational circuit (which is not triplicated in this
case). In other words, it protects only against SEUs. Indeed, an SET in the non-redundant
combinational part could simultaneously corrupt three redundant memory cells and that
error would not be masked after the voting on this triple. The second TMR version makes
any circuit fault-tolerant to the fault model SEU(1, 2). If an SEU happened every clock
cycle, then one redundant cell could be corrupted at the end of the cycle i and the next
fault could corrupt its redundant copy at the beginning of the cycle i+ 1. In this case, the
majority voting that happens after the triplicated cells would produce an incorrect result
because two of three redundant cells have a wrong value.
The third version triplicates both the combinational and the sequential parts of the
original circuit. Voters are inserted after each triplicated memory cell and each primary
output but they are not triplicated. This scheme assumes that voters are fault-tolerant by
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comb.
Figure 2.4: TMR with only cells triplication for SEU masking.
themselves. For instance, the voters could be radiation hardened and produced by a different
technology than the rest of the circuit. This version can tolerate the fault models SEU(1, 2)
or SET (1, 2) assuming no fault occurs at voters. Since the later fault-model subsumes the
former one, we write just SET (1, 2). Again, if faults happen every cycle, this TMR protection
is not capable to mask them for the same reason as in the previous case.
The fourth TMR version works exactly as the third one but its voters are triplicated,
see Figure 2.5. It tolerates the fault-model SET (1, 2) without assumptions on voters. This
TMR version is often referred as “full TMR” since all original circuit components and voters
are triplicated. The first TMR version can be considered as the fourth one where voters after
all triplicated memory cells have been suppressed.
comb.
comb.
comb.
Figure 2.5: Full TMR with a triplicated voter.
The second and the fourth TMR versions are well supported by the majority of existing
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) synthesis tools like Xilinx XTMR tool [10, 55], BYU
Los Alamos National Laboratory B-TMR [56], Synopsys Synplify Premier [11], and Mentor
Graphics Precision Hi-Rel [12]. The inclusion of TMR can be also done manually directly in
VHDL, as it has been done in the LEON SPARC ESA microprocessor [49].
Since hardware redundancy introduces a high hardware overhead, it is usually used only
in high reliability/availability applications (e.g., for aerospace and nuclear applications). In-
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terestingly, hardware redundancy (as any other redundancy type) can be applied at different
design abstraction levels, from transistors to the whole system. The NASA shuttle used
five-time redundant on-board computers, the primary flight computer of Boeing 777 is tripli-
cated [57], four-time component-level redundancy has been implemented in PPDS computer
of NASA Orbiting Astronomical Observatory satellite [58], triplicated CPUs are used in
automotive applications [59].
2.1.3.2 Time Redundancy
The basic principle of all time redundant techniques is data re-computation for further com-
parison/voting. The hardware overhead of time redundancy is significantly lower than that
of hardware-redundancy because the same hardware is used to re-compute. On the other
hand, the performance degradation often prohibits the use of this technique in applications
demanding high throughout (e.g., real-time).
We can distinguish time-redundant techniques based on the period P (or granularity) of
the re-computation of redundant results. For example, techniques that produce redundant
information within one clock cycle have the re-computation period P < 1. If a circuit re-
computes its state after one cycle, then P = 1; and if it performs several times a multi-cycle
computation, then P > 1. The period of recomputation is connected with the abstraction
level where a fault-tolerance technique is introduced: lower the level, shorter the period can
be reached. We start the overview of time-redundant techniques with the low-level ones that
have P < 1.
Nicolaidis et al. [3, 60] presented a time-redundant IC transformation at the transistor
level. Since an SET manifests itself for a limited duration of time in a combinational circuit,
the circuit timing properties should be adjusted so that the correct values are present on
the circuit outputs for a time duration greater than the duration of the transient fault.
Consequently, if the signal is latched at three different instances of time with guarantees
that a glitch can be latched only once, the majority voter after the memory cells is able to
filter out the corrupted latched value. The implementation of such mechanism is presented
in Figure 2.6.
Clk1 Latch 2
Latch 1
Latch 3
Voter
Clk
Combinational
 Circuit
Output 
Latch
Clk1
Clk1
+δ
 
 
+2δ
Figure 2.6: Circuit realization of inter-clock time-redundant technique [3].
The three latching edges of the three clock lines are shifted relatively to each other on δ,
which is chosen based on the targeted transient pulse duration. This construction guarantees
that a glitch in the combinational circuit cannot affect more than one latch, which assures
the output correctness of the output latch. This time-redundant technique has an area
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overhead of 15−23% and 10−15% depending on the SET pulse duration, 0.45ns and 0.15ns
respectively. The performance degradation is 20− 50% for 0.45ns and 10− 22% for 0.15ns
glitches. Fault-masking efficiency reaches 99− 100%. In comparison, TMR required ∼ 200%
of hardware overhead and 10− 25% of performance penalty with the same circuits.
A similar technique with shifted clock edges has been presented for Field-Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) [61, 62]. The technique reaches 97-100% error-detection efficiency.
Both in Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and FPGAs, the techniques require
a strong control of the clock lines. In addition, these techniques usually do not guarantee
100% SET fault coverage.
The same principle of shifted clock has been used for error-detection in the Razor CPU
pipeline architecture and its variants [2, 63–65] where aggressive voltage scaling increases
fault risks. A “shadow” latch with its own delayed clock line is annexed to each original
memory cell of original pipeline stages, as shown in Figure 2.7. Both the main memory cell
and its shadow latch take the same data and the comparison between their values implements
an error detection mechanism. It may happen that the combinational stage logic L1 exceeds
the intended delay due to subcritical voltage operation caused by aggressive voltage scaling.
In this case, the main memory cell does not latch the correct data but the “shadow” latch
successfully saves the correct combinational output because it operates using the delayed
clock.
RazorkFF
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1
Logickstage
L2Main
flip-flop
Shadow
latch
Error_L
Error
Comparator
clk
clk_delayed
Q1D1Logickstage
L1
Figure 2.7: Razor flip-flop for a pipeline stage [2].
The recovery phase starts after an error-detection. Since the “shadow” latches contain the
correct information, they can be used to re-calculate the values for the main memory cells in
the pipeline. One of the proposed mechanisms [2] involves a pipeline control logic that stalls
the entire pipeline for one cycle. This additional clock period allows every stage to re-compute
its result using “shadow” latches values. This mechanism is a typical representative of an
active fault-tolerance technique that imposes a performance penalty after an error-detection.
Being developed to tolerate soft-errors to organize a safe voltage scaling, these techniques
have a performance penalty as low as 0-2.5% while providing near 100% fault masking.
However, all the mentioned restrictions (precise time properties tunings, additional clock
lines, pipelined architecture) prevent the use of these approaches for FPGAs, where special
circuitries to implement these techniques are not normally available in standard synthesis
tools for commercial off-the-shelf FPGAs.
At Register-Transfer Level (RTL), time-redundancy can be realized in many forms with
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different periods of re-computation. For instance, let us assume that an original circuit
computes and returns the result during n clock cycles (a block of information). Its triple-
time redundant version with P = n works according to the next three-step scenario:
1. It fully computes and stores the result a first time. It takes n cycles.
2. It re-computes and stores the result a second time. It takes another n cycles.
3. Finally, it re-computes and stores the result a third time, again during n cycles.
With three independently calculated outputs, a corruption of any of them can be masked by
voting. This approach is similar to software fault-tolerance techniques where a program is
re-executed three times to produce three independent redundant computation results.
McElvain [4] presents an automatic circuit transformation technique to insert time-
redundancy with the period P = 1. The combinational circuit is re-used three times consec-
utively to calculate three times the same bits. In other words, the combinational circuit is
time-multiplexed. Every single bit is recomputed three times first before its successive bit
is recomputed three times. The input and output streams of the circuit can be seen as up-
sampled (x3) versions of the corresponding input and output streams in the original circuit.
A voting element depicted in Figure 2.8 is introduced to each output of the combinational
circuit.
Figure 2.8: Voting element for a time-multiplexed circuit [4].
The memory cells R1, R2, and R3 in each voting element are used to record the three
successively recomputed bits. When the pipeline R1−R2−R3 is filled with redundant bits,
the signal CL is raised and the content of R1−R3 propagates to three cells R4−R6. During
the next three clock cycles these three redundant bits circulate in the loop R4−R5−R6−R4
(CL = 0) and the voter that takes the outputs of R4−R6 cells is capable to vote three times
on the same redundant bits. Note that during the circulation of one bit-triple in R4−R6 cells,
the cells R1−R3 are being filled with the next redundant bit-triple. This three-cycle period
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repeats. As a result, the output of a voting element is error-free even if the combinational
part experiences an SET.
We can notice that there is a single point of failure in this voting element (Figure 2.8):
if the signal CL is corrupted by an SET, it may corrupt two or even three cells R4−R6 that
contain redundant information. In this case, the voter cannot mask an error.
Since each input and output is triplicated in time when the period P = 1, this fault-
tolerant scheme can be considered as stream-oriented. This scheme is a typical representa-
tive of passive fault-tolerance techniques where error masking does not require a dedicated
recovery process.
As an active fault-tolerance technique, we can consider schemes based on checkpointing
and rollback. The circuit state (the content of its memory cells) is saved periodically and
re-stored after an error detection. The circuit rolls-back to its previous correct state and
re-computes the results previously computed. Since it relies on re-computation, this group
of techniques can be also considered as time-redundant. Thus, the Razor architecture imple-
ments an active fault-tolerance technique with “shadow” latches keeping the circuit correct
state.
Carven Chan et al. [66] show how checkpointing/rollback mechanisms can be automat-
ically inserted at register-transfer level. The used Backwards Error Recovery (BER) takes
snapshots of the system states and after an error detection rolls back within one clock cycle.
Until this work, BER had been implemented only manually, e.g., for processors [67,68]. Us-
ing syntactic additions to standard Verilog HDL, the main circuit design is separated from
the BER mechanism. The approach requires minimal modifications of an original Verilog
design. A user must choose which signals to checkpoint, the conditions when their values
are saved, the error-detection conditions when the states are restored, etc. All these cir-
cuit fault-tolerance actions are described as guarded operations [69] on the original circuit
design. While flexibility and generality of this automatic approach makes it applicable to
almost all cases where checkpointing/rollback are needed, the user-defined error-detection
condition in the form of assertions does not guarantee to take into account all possible tran-
sient fault effects. It has not been investigated if a transient fault can corrupt simultaneously
both a circuit and its checkpointed snapshot. If such possibility exists, the rollback may be
performed to a wrong state. Therefore, its flexibility requires a deep understanding of the
original circuit to make the proper decisions about checkpointing and rollback conditions.
Similar approaches have been proposed in [70] with multi-cycles rollback from a register file
and in [14] at a gate-level.
General hardware checkpointing/rollback techniques have also been proposed as micro-
architectural transformations [14]. However, the resulting circuit is tolerant to SEUs but
not to SETs. Indeed, an SET may corrupt both a cell (i.e., the current state) and its copy
(i.e., its checkpoint) because they use the same input data signal that can be glitched by
the same SET. As a result, when an error is detected, the rollback may return the circuit to
an incorrect state.
The checkpointing/rollback mechanisms allow the system to reduce the performance
penalty introduced by time-redundancy. Instead of triple-time redundancy a system can
use a double-time redundant scheme with checkpointing/rollback to mask an error. As a
result, the throughput loss can be reduced from triple to double one but the system ob-
tains the same fault-tolerance properties. In general, the recovery (rollback and a third
re-computation) disturbs the output stream and is not transparent to the surrounding cir-
cuit.
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Besides performance penalty, another disadvantage of time-redundancy is that it does not
mask a permanent fault because all redundant results computed on a permanently corrupted
hardware will be wrong. In comparison, a single permanent fault in TMR does not lead to
erroneous results since only one redundant module is out of order. TMR will however stop
working upon the next fault (even transient) happening in another redundant module than
the permanently corrupted one. Nevertheless, there are mixed forms of time redundancy with
input data encoding (and an additional hardware cost) that are capable of detecting the effect
of a permanent fault. One of them is alternating logic [71] that achieves error detection using
time redundancy. The original combinational circuit is modified to implement a self-dual
function. The first cycle, the signals propagate through the combinational circuit and its
outputs are saved. The second cycle, an inverted version of the same signals is given to the
combinational circuit. Comparing these two results, a circuit can detect a fault.
2.1.3.3 Information Redundancy
Information redundancy adds extra bits to data, often using encoding, and uses this extra in-
formation for error-detection and error-correction. The most common circuit fault-tolerance
techniques that use information redundancy are FSM encoding and memory encoding using
Error-Correcting Codes (ECC).
Error-Correcting Codes. Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) are mainly used for mem-
ory storage protection [72]. ECC can protect large memory blocks imposing low hardware
overhead but it is not so efficient when used for small memory storages or distributed ele-
ments [73]. They can be automatically introduced in a circuit design as shown in Figure 2.9.
The integration of ECC requires extra memory and extra combinational logic in the form
of an “ECC bit generator” and an “Error detection and correction” circuit. The ECC bit
generator creates extra ECC bits from the stored data according to the chosen encoding
scheme, e.g., Hamming(7,4) encoding [74]. When reading the memory, the ECC detection
and correction logic checks the combination of ECC bits and regular data from the data
memory. If no error is detected, the regular data is passed through unchanged. A single bit
error can be corrected using ECC bits, e.g., in Hamming(7,4). Additionally, the “Health”
flag indicates error detection. In Hamming(7,4) scheme, two errors also can be detected
but not corrected and the ECC scheme can only signal about this event to the surrounding
circuit.
Data out
Health
ECC bits
ECC bits
generator
Data in
Data
Memory
Error
detection
and
correction
Figure 2.9: Memory storage with ECC protection [5].
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Table 2.1.3: Hamming code (7,4).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Data p0 p1 u3 p2 u2 u1 u0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
4 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
6 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
...
13 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
14 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Historically, ECC has been introduced due to the high soft error rate in large memory
banks. However, it introduces resilience against other fault types, e.g., a permanent fault in
a single bit (a stuck bit).
ECC techniques were derived from channel coding theory whose main purpose was to
transmit data quickly correcting, or at least detecting, corrupted information. Two major
types of encoding are linear block codes and convolutional codes. Hamming code is a repre-
sentative of linear block codes class. If a linear block takes k original information bits and
encodes it with n bits, it is denoted as (n, k) block code. For instance, Hamming encoding
(7,4) is presented in Figure 2.1.3 [75]. It includes 4 information bits u0 − u3 and 3 check
bits p0 − p2. The check bits p are located in the positions of power-of-two’s (1, 2, 4). p0 is
the parity bit for bits at the odd positions; p1 is the parity bit for bits in the positions (2,
3, 6, 7); p2 is the parity bit for bits in the positions (4, 5, 6, 7). The syndrome (i.e., the
error indicator) is calculated by exclusive OR (XOR) of the bits in the same group, e.g., in
the odd positions, in the (2, 3, 6, 7) positions, in the (4, 5, 6, 7) positions. Any single bit
error is indicated by the syndrome, and corrected accordingly. Including an additional bit
for the overall parity of the codeword gives the most commonly used Hamming code [74]: a
single-error-correcting, double-error-detecting code.
Linear block codes also include Reed-Solomon codes which are error-correcting codes
used in consumer technologies such as CDs, DVDs, Blue-ray, data transmission such as DSL
and WiMAX, and in satellite communication (e.g., to encode the pictures of the Voyager
space probe). This type of encoding is suitable to correct multiple bit-flips caused by MBU.
By adding t check symbols to the data, where a symbol is an m-bits value, a Reed-Solomon
code is able to detect up to t erroneous symbols and to correct up to bt/2c.
Convolutional code is an error-correcting code where parity symbols are generated via
the sliding application of a Boolean polynomial function to a data stream. This sliding
application represents the “convolution” of the encoder over the data. Convolutional codes
do not offer stronger protection against errors in data than equivalent block codes but their
encoders are simpler to implement in many cases. This advantage and the ability to perform
low overhead decoding make convolutional codes very popular for noise-related protection in
digital communication.
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State Binary Code One-Hot Code Gray Code
S1 000 00001 000
S2 001 00010 001
S3 010 00100 011
S4 011 01000 010
S5 100 10000 110
S1 S3
S4S5
S2
Figure 2.10: Three examples of state encoding for the FSM with 5 states.
FSM encoding. While we can make any FSM fault-tolerant using simple TMR, available
encoding techniques usually offer less hardware overheads. For instance, Gray encoding
is widely used for flight applications [49]. Gray code assignment implies that consecutive
encodings codes only differ by one adjacent bit. In other words, only one memory cell
changes at a time its value when the FSM changes its state. An example of a 5-state FSM
in Gray encoding is presented in Figure 2.10.
A single bit value change per state transition permits SEU detection. Time and hardware
characteristics of Gray code might make it not the best design choice due to the complexity
of decoding and encoding circuits before and after memory cells respectively.
Another example of FSM encoding for a bit-flip detection is one-hot encoding [76, 77].
Only one bit of any FSM state has the value of logical one in this encoding, all other bits are
zero, see Table 2.10. As a result, we need one bit per state, i.e., an n-states FSM requires
n bits. The encoding and decoding combinational circuits are simple since this state bit by
itself indicates the corresponding state.
Both encodings, Gray and one-hot, allow us to detect erroneous FSM behavior caused
by a transient fault under the assumption that a fault corrupts only one bit. If more bits
are corrupted, then error detection is not guaranteed. For instance, if the current FSM state
is 00001 in one-hot encoding and the next one is 00010, then a bit-flip leading to the state
10010 will be detected. On the other hand, two simultaneous bit-flips that lead to the state
10000 will not be detected since the state is valid according to one-hot encoding rules.
Other encoding schemes include FSM Hamming encoding [78] for error-detection and
error-correction as well as convolutional codes to implement self-checking circuits [79].
Additionally, modern synthesis tools provide automatic FSM transformations to avoid
possible dead-lock states upon an SEU occurrence. Indeed, if an FSM has unused states that
could be entered due to a soft-error occurrence, it may not be able to recover afterwards.
Consequently, a good design practice ensures the existence of an exit path from each unused
state, which allows the FSM to resume its nominal operation mode. Another scenario that
can be selected is a forced FSM reset upon such abnormal transition into functionally unused
states. Adding exits to unused FSM states requires extra combinational logic and possibly
slows down the circuit due to a longer critical path.
Information redundancy, as hardware redundancy, is well supported by existing EDA
tools [10–12, 56] which allow to automatically implement both FSM encoding and ECCs of
memory storages.
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2.2 Formal Methods in Circuit Design
The high complexity of a modern circuit makes mandatory the verification of its design
correctness since the confidence in the design cannot be anymore obtained through simple
circuit simulations. It is necessary to catch all design errors as early as possible to minimize
the re-design cost and to reduce time-to-market. Formal methods can replace simulation-
based verification giving full assurance that the implementation satisfies a given specification.
The term implementation refers to the circuit design to be verified and the term specification
designates the property that defines the correctness [80].
“Formal methods are system design techniques that use rigorously specified mathematical
models to build software and hardware systems” [81,82]. Using formal methods, engineers are
able to specify the system behavior, to implement the design, as well as to verify particular
properties of the implementation.
There is a distinction between design verification (or validation) and implementation
verification. The former checks the design specification correctness relatively to the original
design requirements and aspects. In other words, it checks the correspondence of the specifi-
cation w.r.t. the required pre-defined properties (e.g., deadlock freedom). The latter verifies
the design steps correctness and the correspondence between circuit models before and after
refinements (e.g., before and after optimization steps during circuit synthesis).
Different design abstraction levels dictate their own formal representations, e.g., gates
netlists, FSMs, data flow graphs. At the same time, the specifications and properties can
be expressed in terms of logic (e.g., propositional logic, µ-calculus) or automata/language
theory (e.g., ω-automata).
Using formal methods, the correctness of every refinement step from high algorithmic
behavioral abstraction level to its low hardware realization can be proved. However, the
complexity and the time needed make such complete verification impractical in the majority
of cases. One exception is safety-critical (aerospace, defense, etc) applications [83,84] where
the cost and consequences of erroneous behavior prevail the cost of verification.
Gupta gave a classification of formal methods [80] grouping them in four categories:
• Model Checking is an automated verification technique that checks if a system, encoded
usually in the form of finite-state model, satisfies a specification given in the form of a
logic formula.
• Theorem proving expresses the relationship between the design implementation and its
specification as a formal statement that has to be proven. The validity of the statement
is established in a proof assistant using axioms and implementation assumptions. While
proof assistants facilitate and certify proof procedures, theorem proving is mainly a
manual technique.
• Equivalence Checking is an automatic approach to show the equivalence between a
specification and an implementation (e.g., FSM equivalence, equivalence between func-
tions). This technique is widely used to show the equivalence between an RTL circuit
description and its synthesized netlist before and after optimizations.
• Language containment is a technique checking correctness by showing that the language
of an implementation is contained in the language of a specification. Both design and
property are expressed as FSMs/automata. Then, the property is complemented and
composed into the design to form the product of the two FSMs. The language emptiness
is checked by traversing the product.
22 Chapter 2. Circuits Fault-Tolerance and Formal Methods
The research presented in this dissertation mainly relies on the first two groups of formal
methods that are discussed in details below. Other surveys presenting formal methods in
hardware can be found in [85–88].
2.2.1 Model Checking
Model checking [89–91] is an automated verification technique for checking if a system,
usually described as a finite-state model, has designated properties expressed as a temporal
logic formula [90]. A model checker exhaustively examines all behaviors of the given system
to confirm its correctness or to provide a counterexample if the property is violated. For
instance, it can be used to prove that an interrupt in a circuit is acknowledged at most t
clock cycles after the interrupt request.
A property can be expressed in propositional logic and some of its extensions. Proposi-
tional logic by itself deals with absolute truths in a domain and is usually used to express
state properties. One of the extensions of propositional logic is propositional temporal logic
that has temporal modalities [92] . The underlying nature of time divides temporal logics
into two categories: linear and branching. In linear logics (e.g., LTL [90]), there is a single
successor moment for each moment in time. In branching logics (e.g., CTL [93]), each mo-
ment has a branching tree-like structure, where scenarios may split into alternative courses.
For instance, if a path ~pi = s0, s1, ... is a possible sequence of system states, then a property
formula in LTL is Af where f is a path formula. A system satisfies an LTL property Af if
all state paths of the system satisfy f . If there is a path not satisfying f , this path defines
a counterexample. One of the ways to check an LTL property is to express the model and
the negation of the property as Non-deterministic Bu¨chi Automata (NBA). Their empty
intersection signifies that the model satisfies the property.
Since model checking technique relies on exhaustive checking, its limitation is the state
space explosion that happens when a system state space is too large to be processed. Average-
size circuits have often a huge state space and space explosion can impose prohibitive memory
and time processing requirements. Significant research efforts have been put to increase
model checking scalability. We shortly observe the main model checking techniques below.
The first breakthrough in model checking scalability was introduced with Binary-Decision
Diagrams (BDDs) [94] that offered a compact way to represent binary functions and state
spaces. Symbolic model checking [95] is built on BDD structures and increased the scalability
from dozens to a few hundred memory cells. The name of the technique comes from the fact
that finite state models are not stored explicitly, but expressed through BDDs [96]. We give
more details about that approach in the next section.
Another improvement step in scalability was the introduction of bounded model check-
ing [97] which was mainly aimed at finding counterexamples or design errors in a system im-
plementation. Its basic idea is to search for a counterexample in system executions bounded
by some k execution steps. It either finds a counterexample path of length k or less, or
concludes that the property cannot be assured. This problem can be efficiently reduced to a
propositional satisfiability problem, and be solved by SAT methods rather than BDDs [98].
SAT-based techniques do not suffer from the space explosion problem and they can handle
hundreds of thousands of variables nowadays. The main drawback of the bounded model
checking approach is its incompleteness, it cannot guarantee that there is no counterexample
path of size greater than k. Completeness can be obtained when the length of the longest
path is shorter than k, but it is hard to compute the proper bound k for termination.
SAT-based unbounded model checking has also been proposed for full verification. It
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combines the bounded model checking technique with overapproximations that tackle the
state-explosion problem (e.g., interpolation-sequence [99] or induction [100]). Bounded model
checking is used to search for counterexamples while overapproximation techniques check for
termination.
Abstraction-refinement [101] hides model details that are not relevant for the checked
property. The resulting abstract model is smaller and easier to handle by model checking
algorithms. Lazy abstraction [102] hides details at different verification steps.
Nowadays, model checking stays the leading industrial verification approach due to its
ease of use and automatization. On the other hand, there are two drawbacks. The first
lies in the difficulty to judge if the specification, expressed as an enumeration of temporal
formulas, characterizes the desired behavior. For instance, a verification engineer can forget
to check some property that he takes for granted. In practice, the temporal formulas can
be difficult to understand or interpret correctly. The second drawback is the state explosion
problem, which limits its applications and is currently a very active research area.
2.2.1.1 Symbolic Simulation
Symbolic methods can explore a system behavior under all possible input scenarios. This
characteristic distinguishes them from simulation-based techniques where inputs and system
states are specified for a particular execution. Symbolic simulation allows us to verify the
desired property for all possible circuit executions in a straightforward manner.
A sequential synchronous circuit with M memory cells and I primary inputs is formalized
as a discrete-time transition system with the state-to-state transition function δ:
δ : {0, 1}M × {0, 1}I 7−→ {0, 1}M
We abuse the notation and use M (resp. I) to denote both the number and the set of memory
cells (resp. inputs) of the circuit. The state of a circuit is just the values of its cells. The
initial state s0 denotes the initial state or the state after the circuit reset.
We write ∆(S) for the function returning the set of states obtained from the set S for
any possible input after one clock cycle. Formally:
∆(S) = {s′ | ∃i. ∃s ∈ S. δ(s, i) = s′}
∆ applies the transition function δ to all states of its argument set and all possible inputs.
The set V = I
⋃
M of symbolic Boolean variables implies a set of states S = {0, 1}|V |,
where each state s ∈ S is an evaluation instance of the variables V .
The transition relation R is described using next-state functions fv for each variable v
that returns its next state v′. Namely, R(V, V ′) =
∧
v∈M (v
′ = fv(V )) where fv(V ) is a
propositional formula that returns the next value to v based on the current variables V .
Functions fv are not defined for input variables v ∈ I because their values are not restricted.
R(V, V ′) means that a set of states V ′ can be reached from V in one step. Here, R : S →
S → B , where S = {0, 1}|V | and B denotes the set {0, 1}. Another possible notation is
(V, V ′) ∈ R.
Consider the circuit represented in Figure 2.11. This circuit has one input i and four
memory cells a, b, c, and d. The next value of the memory cells (noted a′, b′, c′, and d′)
can be expressed from their current values and primary inputs, in particular:
a′ = i; b′ = i; c′ = i; d′ = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (c ∧ a)
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Figure 2.11: Circuit with a majority voter.
The circuit states are the Boolean tuple (a, b, c, d). The next state transition function
δ : {0, 1}4 × {0, 1}1 7−→ {0, 1}4 can be expressed as:
δ((a, b, c, d), i) = (i, i, i, (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (c ∧ a))
The corresponding transition relation function is:
R(i, a, b, c, d)(i′, a′, b′, c′, d′) = (a′ = i) ∧ (b′ = i) ∧ (c′ = i) ∧ (d′ = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (c ∧ a))
A circuit state s is reachable in m steps if and only if it is possible to find a sequence s0,
s1, ..., sm such that s0 is an initial system state, sm = s and R(si, si+1) for i = 0, ...,m− 1.
Such sequence is called a trace from the initial state s0 to sm. We write R
i(V, V ′) to signify
that V ′ is reachable from V in i steps. A state is reachable if and only if it can be reached
within a finite number of steps.
The Reachable State Set (Reachable State Space (RSS)) is defined by the fixed point of
the following iteration:
S0 = {s0} Si+1 = Si ∪∆(Si)
Starting from the initial state, we can compute the set of reachable states by accumulating
states obtained by applying iteratively ∆. The set of possible states being finite for circuits,
the iteration reaches a fixed point equal to the RSS denoted 1 by {s0}∗∆. State properties of a
system can be checked by verifying that they hold in each state of RSS. Often, model-checking
properties are expressed as temporal formulae that must be checked on traces.
If the initial state of the circuit in Figure 2.11 was (a = 0, b = 0, c = 0, d = 0), its
reachable state set is a set of circuit variables (a, b, c, d): RSS = {0000, 1110, 1111, 0001}.
Consider the state property for the considered circuit: “if the memory cell a contains true,
then the cells b and c also contain true”. The property can be formalized as a propositional
formula: a = 1 ⇒ b = 1 ∧ c = 1. Checking this formula against each state in RSS, we find
no counterexample, which implies the correctness of the property.
As another example, we may consider the trace property: “if a contains true at some
cycle, the cell d constrains true the next cycle”. Formally in LTL: a = 1 ⇒ X d = 1. To
verify the correctness of this property, we check it in every state in RSS. That is, for each
state such that a = 1, we apply the transition function to the current state and check if
d = 1.
1This notation for fixpoint is used throughout the document with other initial states and transition func-
tions.
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2.2.1.2 Symbolic circuit BDD-based representation
The symbolic state space exploration discussed in the previous section can be built using BDD
structures. All functions and states that participate in property verification are expressed
through BDDs.
BDDs have been introduced to represent efficiently Boolean functions of type
Bm → B [94, 103].
Definition 2.1. A BDD is a rooted, directed, acyclic graph with two types of vertices V :
• terminal vertices that have no outgoing edges and can be of two values: false (ff ) or
true (tt);
• non-terminal decision vertices: each such vertex is labeled by the Boolean variable v
and has two children called low child and high child; the edge from the node to a low
(resp. high) child represents an assignment of v to true (resp. false).
If different variables appear in the same order on all paths from the root, such BDD is
called ordered. An ordered BDD can be obtained applying the Shannon expansion which is
the identity: f = v · fv + v¯ · f v¯, where f is a Boolean function and fv and f v¯ are f with
the variable v equal to true and to false respectively. If the Shannon expansion is recursively
applied to f on all its variables vi, then we obtain a decision tree with inner nodes labeled with
the variables vi and the leaves labeled with true and false (Figure 2.12 (a)). A reduced BDD
can be obtained by shrinking this decision tree following two rules : 1) identical subgraphs are
merged, and 2) nodes of which both children are identical subtrees are removed. For instance,
the BDD representation of the formula fd(i, a, b, c) = (a∧ b)∨ (b∧ c)∨ (c∧a) that defines the
next state function fd of the memory cell d (Figure 2.11) is shown in Figure 2.12(b). Solid
edges correspond to tt; dashed ones to ff .
(a) Shannon decision tree (b) Bdd (reduced, ordered binary decision diagram)
a
b b
c c c c
ff ff ffff tt t t t t t t
a
b b
c
ff tt
Figure 2.12: Representations of the Boolean function fd(i, a, b, c) = (a∧ b)∨ (b∧ c)∨ (c∧ a).
Given a variable order, a reduced ordered binary decision diagram (ROBDD) is a canon-
ical (unique) representation of a function. The term BDD usually refers to ROBDD.
The size of BDD heavily depends on the Boolean function and the variable ordering.
Finding the best variable order is an NP-complete problem [104]. While heuristics [105]
usually reduce a BDD size, there are functions, e.g., integer multipliers [106], that lead to
an exponential BDD representation regardless of the chosen ordering.
If we have n-tuples of Booleans (v1, ..., vn), then a state space S = Bn has 2n states.
Any subset of S can be represented by a Boolean formula f(v1, ..., vn) where vi is a distinct
Boolean variable. For instance, the formula ¬(v1 = v2) over two variables v1 and v2 represents
the state set {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. The transition relation R(V, V ′) is also a logical formula and can
be expressed symbolically over its variables V and V ′.
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If the current state set S0 is expressed through the formula f0(~v) (~v = v1, ..., vn) and the
formula g(~v, ~v′) represents the transition relation so that {(~v,~v′) | R ~v ~v′}, then the formula
∃~v. f0(~v) ∧ g(~v,~v′) represents the reachable state set in one step expressed over variables ~v′:
f1(~v′) = {~v′ | ∃~v. ~v ∈ S0 ∧R ~v ~v′}
Existential quantification ∃ can be computed as the Shannon expansion:
∃vi. f(v1, ..., vi, ...) = f(v1, ..., 1, ...) ∨ f(v1, ..., 0, ...)
Since the next state set f1(~v
′) is expressed in terms of variables ~v′ = v′1, ..., v′n, it is needed to
substitute variables ~v′ with old variables ~v to perform the next iteration of reachable state
set calculation. The formula f1[~v
′ ← ~v] is identical to f1(~v′) except that each variable v′i ∈ ~v′
is replaced with vi ∈ ~v. Consequently, the formula over variables ~v, that represents the state
set S1 reachable in one step, can be expressed as:
f1(~v) = (∃~v. f0(~v) ∧ g(~v,~v′))[~v′ ← ~v]
Thus, the state set Si, reachable in i steps from the original set S0 expressed through the
given formula f0, can be expressed recursively as:
fi(~v) = (∃~v. fi−1(~v) ∧ g(~v,~v′))[~v′ ← ~v]
For instance, if the initial state of the circuit in Figure 2.11 is {a = 0; b = 0; c = 0; d = 0},
it can be expressed as the formula: f0(i, a, b, c, d) = ¬a∧¬b∧¬c∧¬d. The transition relation,
derived in Section 2.2.1.1 is:
R(i, a, b, c, d)(i′, a′, b′, c′, d′) = (a′ = i) ∧ (b′ = i) ∧ (c′ = i) ∧ (d′ = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (c ∧ a))
Consequently, the next circuit states after its initial one can be expressed by the following
formula:
f1(i, a, b, c, d) = (∃i ∃a ∃b ∃c ∃d. ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d∧
(a′ = i) ∧ (b′ = i) ∧ (c′ = i) ∧ (d′ = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (c ∧ a))
)[{i′, a′, b′, c′, d′} ← {i, a, b, c, d}]
After the Shannon expansion of the existentials, we get
f1(i, a, b, c, d) = ( ((a
′ = 1) ∧ (b′ = 1) ∧ (c′ = 1) ∧ (d′ = 0))∨
((a′ = 0) ∧ (b′ = 0) ∧ (c′ = 0) ∧ (d′ = 0))
)[{i′, a′, b′, c′, d′} ← {i, a, b, c, d}]
and after variables substitution:
f1(i, a, b, c, d) = ((a = 1) ∧ (b = 1) ∧ (c = 1) ∧ (d = 0))∨
((a = 0) ∧ (b = 0) ∧ (c = 0) ∧ (d′ = 0))
Finally, after simplifications: f1(i, a, b, c, d) = ((a ∧ b ∧ c) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c)) ∧ ¬d.
In other words, the next state after the initial one can be either {a = 1; b = 1; c = 1; d = 0}
or {a = 0; b = 0; c = 0; d = 0}. These two scenarios correspond to two input options during
the first clock cycle: i = 1 and i = 0 respectively. The following state sets fi, i = 2, . . . can
be calculated in a similar manner.
There are three operation types for the discussed symbolic state space exploration: logical
operations, existential quantification, and variable substitution. All aforementioned opera-
tions are provided by the most popular BDD libraries [107, 108] in an efficient manner. In
Section 3, we present the symbolic analysis using the BDD library CUDD [107]. The CUDD
library implements BDDs based on typed decision graphs [109] that allow reducing the size
of the used BDD structures by sharing their sub-parts and merging subgraphs.
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2.2.2 Theorem Proving
Another formal hardware verification approach relies on the description of both the imple-
mentation and the specification in a formal logic. The correctness of the implementation is
guaranteed by proving in the logic that the implementation corresponds to the specification.
Theorem proving is based on formal theories (e.g., propositional calculus, first-order logic,
higher-order logic) that define an alphabet, a grammar to construct well-formed formulas,
a subset of the formulas, called axioms, and inference rules that can be used to derive new
formulas [110].
A formal proof in a formal theory is a finite sequence of well-formed formulas: f1, f2, ..., fn,
such that for every i, formula fi either is an axiom or can be derived by one of the inference
rules given the formulas {f1, f2, ..., fi−1} [111]. The last well-formed formula fn is usually
called a theorem.
Proofs can be realized with the help of Interactive Theorem Provers (ITPs) (proof assis-
tants) where theorems are shown by man-machine interactions. Widely-used ITPs include
ACL2 [112], Coq [113], HOL [114], Isabelle [115], Mizar [116], and PVS [117]. An ITP pro-
vides its own input language to write proofs, which has features of a programming language,
a mathematical typesetting system, and a logic. ITPs can be considered as proof editors
where a user gives definitions, theorems, and proofs. The theorem correctness should be
shown by the user in a formal theory of mathematics. ITPs help the user to prove theo-
rems and check the correctness of each proof step. To facilitate and automatize the proofs
ITPs provide tactics that are able to perform some simple reasoning in an automatic man-
ner. The limited automation imposes high manpower and requires an expertise in the used
formal theory. Moreover, a deep understanding of the system implementation, model, and
specification is needed to develop a proper proof strategy that often involves difficult rea-
soning. For comparison, model checking does not always require the knowledge of systems’
internal properties. The understanding of the overall system behavior is often sufficient.
This “black box” and automatic approach does not work in theorem proving. On the other
hand, theorem proving and its richer formalism allow us to express properties that are not
in the scope of simpler formalisms or solvable by model checking. For instance, it allows
showing properties for classes of circuits.
In this dissertation, we use Coq that is based on an expressive formal language called
the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC) [118,119]. CIC combines a higher-order logic
and a richly-typed functional programming language.
In the next section, we provide some intuitions of theorem proving in Coq using simple
examples. Later, we will show where and how theorem proving has been already used and
what kind of problems can be solved with this powerful technique.
2.2.2.1 Theorem Proving in Coq by Examples
From now on, text in this style refers to the text that the user sends to Coq, while text in
this style is the answer of the system.
The command Check returns the type of its argument.
Check (3+4).
3+4:nat
The expression (3+4) has type nat, i.e., natural number. The next formula expresses a
logical proposition of type Prop:
Check (3≤4).
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3≤4:Prop
The basic idea of theorem proving is to specify the implementation and its specification
and to prove their relations in the formal logic. To illustrate this process, we formulate
several small examples with trivial circuits encoded as Boolean expressions.
Example 1. The OR gate can be defined as the following Boolean function:
Definition orGate (b1 b2:bool) : bool :=
match b1 with
| true => true
| false =>
match b2 with
| true => true
| false => false
end
end.
The function orGate takes two Boolean arguments (b1 and b2) as its inputs. It returns
a single Boolean that represents the output of an OR gate.
Similarly, the AND gate can be defined as:
Definition andGate (b1 b2:bool) : bool :=
match b1 with
| false => false
| true =>
match b2 with
| true => true
| false => false
end
end.
We can force Coq to evaluate a given expression using the command Eval compute. For
instance:
Eval compute in orGate false false.
= false: bool
Using these two definitions, the majority voter presented in Figure 2.11 can be specified
as:
Definition voter (a b c:bool) : bool :=
let and1:= (andGate a b)in
let and2:= (andGate b c)in
let and3:= (andGate a c)in
orGate (orGate and1 and2) and3.
The property “if a equals b, then the voter returns a” can be formalized and proved in
Coq as follows:
Property propVoter: ∀ a b c, a=b -> voter a b c = a.
Proof.
intros. unfold voter.
destruct a; destruct b; destruct c; auto.
Qed.
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When the property is formulated, it represents a single current “goal” of the proof in
Coq. The tactics intros moves the quantifiers (∀ a b c) and the hypothesis (a=b) from the
current goal to the “context”. The current goal is voter a b c = a; and the proof “context”
has three variables (a, b, c: bool) and the hypothesis H : a = b. The context just states that
“there are some arbitrary Booleans a, b, and c; a and b are equal”.
The tactics unfold substitutes the name voter by its actual definition in the goal.
The tactics destruct a forces Coq to consider separately the case a=true and the case
a=false. The semicolon operator allows the following tactics to be applied for each generated
subgoal. Consequently, destruct b is applied to two subgoals generated by destruct a and
returns four sub-goals. Similarly, destruct c returns eight subgoals. As a result, there are
eight subgoals with all possible value combinations of three variables.
Then, the auto tactics, which applies some simple resolution procedures, is sufficient to
prove the eight subgoals.
Coq provides a language, called Ltac, for writing proof-finding and decision procedures.
Ltac tactics often make the proof shorter allowing the user to define its own tailor-made
tactics. For instance, the discussed semicolon Ltac operator allows us to combine several
tactics.
Example 2. We can define a parametric OR-chain orN (Figure 2.13) as follows:
Fixpoint orN (b: list bool) : bool :=
match b with
| nil => false
| h :: tl => orGate h (orN tl)
end.
false
out
b1
bn
...
bn-1
b2
Figure 2.13: A parametric OR-chain orN.
The recursive function orN takes a list of Booleans b and returns the result of the dis-
junction of all its elements. It can be seen as the specification of the infinite family of circuits
performing OR on 2, 3, . . . inputs.
The generic circuit orN cannot be represented as a transition system unless the length of
b is fixed. Thus, model checking is not applicable in this case. However, we can prove that
the circuit output is true if any of the inputs bi is true. This property is formalized in Coq
as:
Property propL: ∀ (lst:list bool), In true lst -> orN lst = true.
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It can be read as: “for all Boolean lists lst, if there is at least one true value in the list,
the returned value of orN applied to lst is true”. The proof of the property is given below:
Proof.
intros.
induction lst.
- auto.
- destruct H.
+ rewrite H. auto.
+ apply IHlst in H. simpl. rewrite H. destruct a; auto.
Qed.
The tactics intros moves the quantifiers (∀ lst) and the hypothesis (In true lst) in
the context. The goal becomes: orN lst = true; and the proof “context” has a Boolean
list (lst: list bool) and the hypothesis (H: In true lst).
The most common strategy to prove the property of the inductively defined construction
is the proof by induction. The tactics induction lst realizes an induction on the list
structure and decomposes the current goal into:
• the goal orN [] = true which is easily proven by auto;
• the goal orN (a::lst) = true with the hypotheses : H: In true (a::lst) and
In true lst → orN lst = true
The hypothesis H is destructed in two mutually exclusive cases by destruct H: either
a=true or In true lst. The following proofs for these two cases are split by “+” in the
listing.
For H: a= true, rewrite H substitutes a by true in orN (a::lst) = true and auto
is sufficient to conclude orN (true::lst) = true.
For H: In true lst, we have the induction hypothesis in the context:
IHlst : In true lst -> orN lst = true
Applying IHlst in H, we get H: orN lst = true. Simplification of the goal (simpl)
returns orGate a (orN lst) = true; as using H (rewrite H), we get orGate a true =
true. The equation orGate a true = true holds regardless of the value of a. It is shown
by destructing a and using auto in each case.
Example 3. In comparison with simple type or set theories used in other ITPs Coq relies
on expressive dependent type theory. Dependent types facilitate the encoding of invariants
(properties) in the type. We demonstrate this advantage using vectors, a dependent type of
the standard Coq library. A vector type takes an integer n and returns the type vector of
size n. That is, the type carries information about the length of the structure. Using this
type, we can define bit vectors as:
Definition Bvector := Vector.t bool.
Bvector takes a nat number n and returns the type vector of bool of size n. It makes
possible to verify, for example, the absence of out-of-bounds accesses statically.
Consider the function that represents the family of voters on three buses a, b, and c of
the same length n:
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Definition voterBus (n:nat) (a b c: Bvector n): Bvector n:=
let twoF:= Vector.map2 voter a b in
Vector.map2 (fun vi ci => vi ci) twoF c.
We can apply this function to three Boolean vectors of size 2:
voterBus [true;true] [true;false] [false;false]
Its evaluation returns [true; false] of type Bvector 2. Its type explicitly represents that
two-bit buses are voted and two bits are returned. Dependent types ensure that voterBus
applied to arguments is a well-formed expression. If we used lists, which represent a non-
dependent type, only the evaluation of voterBus would return an error if applied to lists of
different lengths.
We use dependent types in Chapter 5 to ensure that circuits are well-formed by construc-
tion (gates correctly plugged, no dangling wires, no combinational loops, . . .). For further
details about Coq we refer to the tutorial [120].
Proof by reflection. Proof by reflection [121], available in Coq, allows to replace some
proofs by computation. Coq makes a distinction between logical propositions and Boolean
values. While logical propositions represent objects of type Prop, bool is an inductive
datatype with two constructors true and false. Prop supports natural deduction, whereas
straightforward Boolean function evaluation can be performed in bool. However, Prop and
bool are complementary and reflection uses the correspondence between these two domains.
Thus, instead of working with a propositional version of decidable predicates, reflection uses
the proof of the needed property on their Boolean equivalents and replaces manual proofs
by automatic computation. More precisely, let P : A→ Prop be a predicate of type Prop
on a type A, let c : A→ bool be a decision procedure on A so that:
Refl : ∀a, c a = true→ P a
We can prove P b by showing that c b = true, which boils down to the evaluation of c b,
and by applying Refl. We give more details how reflection is used in this dissertation in
Section 5.3.4.
The preceding examples give some intuition how proofs can be performed in Coq and
how circuit properties can be formally proven. In the next section, we consider state-of-art
applications of theorem proving in academy and industry.
2.2.2.2 Theorem Proving Applications
Theorem proving for hardware has been mostly used for functional verification to ensure
the absence of bugs. For instance, as a consequence of the Pentium bug, AMD and Intel
increased their efforts in floating-point verification since the late 1990s [122, 123]. Below we
group all application cases into three main categories: proof of implementations, proof of
parameterized circuit correctness, and proof of circuit synthesis algorithms.
Implementation correctness
Theorem proving is especially important in safety-critical domains where functional correct-
ness prevails the cost of the proof. In [124], Sam Owre, et al. describe the NASA’s experience
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of the use of PVS for life-critical digital flight-control applications. They verified a series of in-
teractive convergence algorithms for Byzantine fault-tolerant clock-synchronization [125,126]
and parts of an avionics processor AAMP5 [6].
The AAMP5 processor verification specifies the processor as a machine, which executes
instructions, at two abstraction levels - the macro level and the micro level. The imple-
mentation correctness consists in proving the relations of the behavior of the processor at
these two levels. The macro level specification of AAMP5 describes the externally observable
effect of executing an instruction on the state visible to an assembly language programmer.
The micro level specification describes the AAMP5 at RTL circuit description, defining the
effect of executing an arbitrary microinstruction on the movement of data between the reg-
isters and other components in the AAMP5 design. Verifying the correctness of instructions
execution consists of defining an appropriate abstraction function α between these levels
(Figure 2.14) and showing that the sequence of micro-instructions f1, f2, ..., fn making up
each machine instruction F causes a corresponding change in the micro-state s1 as F does to
the macrostate S1. Formally: F (α(s1)) = α(fn(...(f2(f1(s1)))...)).
Micro–Instructions
Macro–Instruction
f2f1 fn...
α
Macro–State S1
Micro–State s1
αF
Figure 2.14: Two abstraction levels of the processor AAMP5 operations [6].
While the work revealed several bugs in the AAMP5 processor, the project had a high
cost of 3 man-years. We refer to [124] for further details and comparisons with similar
projects.
Let us cite, among many others, the application of ACL2 to prove the out-of-order
microprocessor architecture FM9801 [127], HOL for the Uinta pipelined microprocessor [128],
and Coq for an ATM Switch Fabric [129].
In [130, 131], HOL is used as an HDL and as a formalism to prove that a design meets
its specification. The circuits are modeled as predicates in the logic: the architecture of a
circuit and its behavior are described in the language of HOL.
Paulin-Mohring proved the correctness of a multiplier unit [132] where circuits are mod-
elled as functions in Coq.
Renaud Clavel et al. [133] considered theorem proving as an alternative to extensive
fault-injection simulations to show circuit fault-tolerance and to analyze transient fault con-
sequences. Formalizing a circuit as a transition system and a fault injection procedure as
a state corruption function, they proved robustness properties for several case studies. The
properties assure that a fault does not disturb a normal circuit behavior or that a corrupted
circuit returns to its normal behavior within k cycles. The logic of ACL2 was not expressive
enough for that approach and PVS had to be used.
In [134], the authors formalized some probabilistic reliability properties in HOL mainly
associated with fabrication-related faults in reconfigurable memory arrays. The properties
expressed that the system is capable to perform its function during some time t until its
failure.
2.2. Formal Methods in Circuit Design 33
Proofs of parameterized circuits
Braibant presented a language-based approach [135] to prove the correctness of parametric
combinational circuits showing the proposed methodology with an example of n-bits adders.
The recursive construction scheme of the adder uses a full-adder, i.e., a 1-bit adder, as a
basic building block. The presented library features a set of basic blocks and combinators
that allows a circuit to be constructed in a hierarchic and modular way as it is done in
circuit diagrams. The approach to generate parameterized circuits allows to reason about
the parameterized functions rather than about their tangible (fixed-size) instantiations.
A circuit has type C n m, where n and m are types of its inputs and outputs. Since func-
tions are used rather than relations, this definition naturally forbids short-circuits, e.g., two
input ports connected to the same output port. Braibant defines plugs using usual Coq
functions to get small and computational definitions of maps.
The author shows that dependent types are useful for developing circuits reliably: the
resulting circuits are correct by construction (no short circuits, no dangling wires, etc).
Similar work by Qian Wang et al. [136] verifies in Coq a generic logic-level architecture
of end-around-carry (EAC) adder, which provides necessary underpinnings for verifying its
customized and new implementations. In this sense, this works extends [137] where basic
adders and their components are verified in Coq. It supplements [137] with arbitrary grouping
of arbitrary input data-width, which makes the method more complete. The key elements
of mechanical verification stay the same as in [135]: the data-width is given as a parameter;
the correctness of core sub-components are verified separately; and the properties on the
grouping are proven.
Circuit synthesis
ITPs have also been used to certify tools used in circuit synthesis. An old survey of formal
circuit synthesis is given in [138].
More recently, S. Ray et al. proved circuit transformations used in high-level synthesis
with ACL2 [139]. The authors argue that high-level behavioral synthesis has not yet found
wide acceptance in industrial practice because of the lack of confidence in the correctness
of synthesis. The main difficulty is the difference between abstractions used in behavioral
descriptions and in gate-level implementations. They propose to decompose the synthesis
certification into two components for high-level and low-level circuit synthesis, which can be
respectively handled by complementary verification techniques: theorem proving and model
checking.
First, high-level transformations are certified once and for all circuits by theorem proving.
These high-level transformations can be grouped into:
1. compiler transformations (e.g., loop unrolling or constant propagation to eliminate
unnecessary variables);
2. scheduling (e.g., pipelining);
3. resource binding (e.g., register allocation).
These transformations operate on a graph-based abstraction called clocked control dataflow
graph. After these high-level transformations, proved by construction in ACL2, the design
is translated from the control/dataflow graph into RTL circuit description.
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The correspondence between the graph-based description and the resulting low-level HDL
is verified by model checking techniques. Low-level tweaks and optimizations are handled
through model checking too. Since the second part is based on model checking, it imposes a
scalability bottleneck for the whole technique.
Another work in high-level circuit synthesis is presented by Braibant and Chlipala who
certified in Coq a compiler from a simplified BlueSpec [140] to synthesizable subsets of Verilog
and VHDL [141]. Opposed to the previous cases where logical formulas are written directly
in the logic of the theorem prover, the simplified BlueSpec is defined as a dependently typed
syntax in Coq. The defined datatypes represent the syntax of the logic.
Finally, the work [142] defines a compiler of mathematical functions from a synthesizable
subset of HOL to correct-by-construction synchronous circuit in Verilog. This solution for
high-level synthesis ensures that the resulting gate-level implementation is correct w.r.t. its
high-level specification.
2.3 Conclusion
We have presented in this chapter background material on circuit fault-tolerance and formal
methods.
While the fault-tolerance domain has existed since the beginning of the computer era, it
remains a very conservative area where the techniques developed half of a century ago are still
in use. Even when new challenges appear, such as high electronics sensitivity and increased
transient fault rates, designers re-use costly but time-proven methods, like TMR. Designers
are not keen to combine, optimize, or invent sophisticated fault-tolerance techniques due to
the difficulty to check their correctness and the high cost of possible mistakes. This cost
is especially obvious in safety-critical applications where a fault-tolerance flaw may lead to
the loss of an aerospace mission or even human lives. Thus, new fault-tolerance solutions
either appear from the academic community [3,66] but are not integrated and used in circuit
synthesis tools or represent specific application-oriented industrial solutions [2, 63,64].
Formal methods in hardware have been used mainly for functional verification. Model
checking is an automatic method to check if a circuit has desired functional properties.
It suffers from a scalability problem, which stays the main research effort in the domain.
Theorem proving often requires prohibitive man-power to show the correspondence between
the specification and the implementation. However, it is able to assure the correctness of
circuit families and of synthesis steps for all circuits.
Fault-tolerance domain could benefit from formal methods to guarantee the presence of
required properties and to give enough confidence about new techniques and optimizations.
This is the aim of the research described in this dissertation. We apply formal methods to
optimize fault-tolerance techniques and to assure their functional and fault-tolerance proper-
ties.
Chapter 3
Verification-based Voter
Minimization
TMR proposed by von Neumann [54] remains the most popular fault tolerance technique in
FPGAs to mask SEUs and SETs. As discussed in Section 2.1.3.1, adding majority voters
only at the primary outputs in a triplicated sequential circuit is not sufficient in general.
Voter insertion after each memory cell is sufficient to prevent errors from remaining in cells.
However, it increases both hardware overhead and the critical path, which decreases the
circuit maximum frequency.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no tool dedicated to voter minimization in TMR
that guarantees fault-tolerance according to a user-defined fault model. In this section, we
present a formal solution to minimize the number of voters in TMR sequential circuits,
keeping the required fault-tolerance properties. While we focus on voter minimization in
TMR circuits, the same approach can be applied to suppress masking mechanisms in time-
redundant solutions (see Section 4.2.5).
The chapter starts with the overview of the proposed verification-based approach (Sec-
tion 3.1). The first technique step is detailed in Section 3.2 and relies on the circuit syntactic
netlist analysis. The second step is performed by a semantic analysis (Section 3.3) taking
into account the logic of the circuit. When it is known how the circuit is used, we may
use this input-output specification for further voter number minimization. Section 3.4 and
Section 3.5 explain how to benefit from the input and output specifications respectively. In
Section 3.6, we extent the fault model from SEUs to SETs. The implementation and exper-
iments are presented in Section 3.7. Related works on TMR and voter insertion strategies
are reviewed in Section 3.8. We summarize our contributions in Section 3.9.
3.1 Approach overview
Our objective is to propose an automatic, optimized, and certified transformation process
for TMR on digital circuits. In this chapter, we focus on the optimization aspects of the
automatic transformation: it should insert as few voters as possible, while guaranteeing to
mask all errors of the considered fault-model.
We consider first fault models of the form “at most one bit-flip within K cycles”, denoted
SEU (1,K). In Section 3.6, we extend our approach to the more general fault-model in the
form “at most one transient fault within K clock cycles”, denoted SET (1,K).
The proposed voter-minimization methodology is based on a static analysis that checks
whether an error in a single copy of the TMR circuit may remain after K cycles. If not,
protecting the primary outputs with voters is sufficient to mask the error. If, for instance, the
circuit is a pipeline without feedback loops, then any bit-flip will propagate to the outputs
and will thus disappear before K cycles, where K is the number of pipeline stages.
But if the state of the circuit is still erroneous after K cycles (in the form of an incorrect
value stored in one of its memory cells), then there is a potential error accumulation since,
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according to the SEU /SET (1,K) fault models, another fault may occur in another copy of
the circuit. It may lead to two incorrect redundant modules and errors cannot be masked.
In this case, additional voters are needed to prevent error accumulation, that is to mask all
errors circulating inside one redundant module before the next soft-error occurs.
Our static analysis consists of four steps. The first step, described in Section 3.2, is
purely syntactic and finds all loops in the circuit. Error accumulation can be prevented by
keeping enough voters to cut all loops.
In many cases, a digital circuit resets (or overwrites) some memory cells, which may mask
errors. Detecting such cases allows further useless voters to be removed. This second step is
performed by a semantic analysis (Section 3.3) taking into account the logic of the circuit.
Circuits are also often supposed to be used in a specific context. For instance, a circuit
specification may assume that a start signal occurs every x cycles and that outputs are
only read y cycles after each start. When such assumptions exist, taking them into account
makes the semantic analysis more effective (Sections 3.4 and 3.5).
3.2 Syntactic Analysis
We consider triplicated circuits with voters but we actually work on a single copy of the
circuits. Indeed, the effect of insertion or removal of voters can be represented and analyzed
on a single copy of the TMR circuit. We model a sequential circuit C as a directed graph GC
where each vertex represents a FF (memory cell or latch) and an edge x→ y exists whenever
there is at least one combinational path between the two FFs x and y in C. An error in a
cell x may propagate, in the next clock cycle, to all cells connected to x by an edge in this
graph. Note that this is an over-approximation since the error may actually be masked by
some logical operation.
Under the fault model SEU (1,K), error accumulation is the situation where an error
remains in the circuit K clock cycles after the SEU that caused it. Any circuit C without
feedback loop will return, after an SEU, to a correct state before K clock cycles, provided
that K is larger than the maximal length of the paths in GC . Even if our approach can deal
with any K, we can assume that K is a huge number (detailed in Section 2.1.2.1) and is
larger than the max length of all paths in GC . It follows that error accumulation can only
be caused by cycles in GC , which must therefore be cut by removing vertices. Removing
a vertex in GC amounts to protecting the corresponding FF with a voter in the triplicated
circuit.
The best solution to cut all cycles in GC is to find the Minimum Vertex Feedback Set
(MVFS), i.e., the smallest set of vertices whose removal leaves GC without cycles. This
standard graph problem is NP-hard [143]. While there exist good polynomial time approx-
imations [144], the exact algorithm was efficient enough to be used in all our experiments
with relatively small circuits (less than 200 FFs).
Having a voter after each cell belonging to the MVFS prevents error accumulation. This
simple graph-based analysis is very effective with some classes of circuits. In particular, it is
sufficient to remove all internal voters in pipelined architectures such as logarithm units and
floating-point multipliers (see Table 3.2.0).
However, this approach is not effective for many circuits due to the extensive use of loops
in circuit synthesis from Mealy machine representation. In such circuits, most memory cells
are in self-loops (e.g., D-type flip-flops with an enable input). This entails many voters if the
syntactic analysis is used alone. However, if the circuit functionality is taken into account,
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Table 3.2.0: Voter Minimization, Syntactic Analysis Step.
Circuit FFs Syntactic
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Pipelined logarithm unit [145] 41 0
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b03 Resource arbiter 30 29
b06 Interrupt Handler 9 3
b08 Inclusions detector 21 21
b09 Serial Converter 28 21
we can discover that such memory cells may not lead to erroneous outputs. Detecting such
cases requires to analyze the logic (semantics) of the circuit. We address this issue in the
following section.
3.3 Semantic Analysis
The semantic analysis first computes the RSS of the circuit with a voter inserted after each
memory cell in the MVFS. Then, for each cell m ∈ MVFS, it checks whether its voter is
necessary: (i) First, the voter is removed and all possible errors (modeled by the chosen fault-
model in each state of RSS) are considered; (ii) If such an error leads to error accumulation,
then the voter is needed and kept.
3.3.1 The precise logic domain D1
Correct and erroneous values are represented by the four-value logic domain D1:
D1 = {0, 1, 0, 1}
where 0 and 1 represent erroneous 0 and 1, respectively. The truth tables of standard
operations in this four-value logic are given in Table 3.3.1. Note that AND and OR gates
can mask errors: x ∨ 1 = 1, x ∧ 0 = 0 , 0 ∧ 1 = 0, 1 ∨ 0 = 1. The err function models
bit-flips: i.e., err(0)=1 and err(1)=0. The vot function models the effect of a voter on a
single copy of the circuit and corrects an error: i.e., vot(1)=0 and vot(0)=1. Finally, for
any x ∈ {0, 1}, vot(err(x))=x, that is, a voter corrects an error.
3.3.2 Semantic analysis with D1
A sequential synchronous circuit with M memory cells and I primary inputs is formalized as a
discrete-time transition system with the transition relation δ : {0, 1}M ×{0, 1}I 7−→ {0, 1}M .
Readers may refer to Section 2.2.1.1 for details about transition systems. The initial circuit
state s0 is obtained after the circuit reset. ∆ applies the transition function δ to all states of
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Table 3.3.1: Operators for 4-value logic domain D1
operands 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
operands 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1
0 0
0 0
NOT err vot
0 1 0
1 0
1 1
� �1 0� 1 1� 0 0
� �1 0� 1 1� 0 0
10 1� 0 0 0� 1
its argument set and all possible inputs. Starting from the initial state s0, we compute the
set of reachable states RSS by accumulating states obtained by applying iteratively ∆.
The second phase is to check whether the suppression of voters may lead to an error
accumulation under the chosen fault-model. Let δV be the transition function of a circuit
equipped with a voter after each cell in a given set V , and let ∆V be its extension to sets
(similarly to the extension of δ into ∆). δV is defined as:
δV ((m1, . . . ,mM ), i) = δ((m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
M
), i)
where ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤M, m′j =
{
vot(mj) if mj ∈ V
mj otherwise
This checking process is described by Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Semantic Analysis – Main Loop
Input : MVFS ; // The minimum vertex feedback set;
∆; // The circuit transition function;
s0; // The initial state;
Output : V ; // The subset of vertices (i.e., memory
cells) after which a voter is needed
1: V := MVFS ;
2: RSS := {s0}∗∆;
3: forall m ∈ MVFS
4: V := V \{m};
5: S := ∆KV (
⋃
mi∈M RSS [mi ← err(mi)]);
6: if ErrAcc(S) then
7: V := V ∪ {m};
8: return V
We start with the circuit equipped with a voter after each cell in the MVFS (line 1). For
each such cell m, we check whether its voter suppression entails error accumulation. Bit-flips
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are introduced in all possible cells and states of RSS according to the fault-model (line 5):⋃
mi∈M
RSS [mi ← err(mi)]
The transition function corresponding to the circuit with the current set of voters (V ) is
applied K times (∆KV ), where K is the number of clock cycles in the fault model (SEU(1,K)).
The resulting set of states shows error accumulation if there exists an erroneous cell in at
least one state of this set, which we capture with the predicate ErrAcc in line 6. ErrAcc is
defined as:
ErrAcc(S)⇔ ∃s ∈ S. ∃m ∈ s. m = 0 ∨m = 1
If the set S does not show error accumulation, the voter is useless and can indeed be sup-
pressed. Otherwise, the voter is re-introduced (line 7).
In practice, ∆ is applied a small number of times dictated by the circuit functionality and
available analysis time. It is always safe to stop the iterative computation before reaching K;
the only drawback would be to infer an error accumulation when there is none. The number
of ∆ applications can be also adjusted to the available analysis time. In our experiments,
the analysis time limit was set to 20 minutes and K to 50. Furthermore, the iteration is
stopped:
• if the current set of states is errorless, then there cannot be error accumulation (no
error can reappear);
• or, if the erroneous current set is the same as the previous one, a fixed point is reached
and there is an error accumulation.
The order in which the cells in the MVFS are analyzed (line 2, in Algorithm 1) may
influence the number of removed voters. We use the following heuristic to choose the ordering
of voter selection: starting from the MVFS of memory cells with voters, we sort it first
according to the number of successive memory cells that each cell has in the circuit netlist
(the number of successors in GC). Then, we consider primarily the removal of voters that
lead to the corruption of the smallest number of cells in the next clock cycle. The voters
whose removal may lead to a large number of corrupted cells are considered last. We found
out that following this ordering, we are able to suppress more voters than with a random
ordering or the ordering relying on the number of preceding memory cells in the netlist.
3.3.3 More Abstract Logic Domains
The aforementioned method is precise but costly since it considers all possible inputs. In
general, keeping track of the relations between indeterminate inputs is not very useful. For-
tunately, our technique can be used as is with other, more abstract, logic domains. There
are several domains that retain enough precision and allow larger circuits to be analyzed.
The 4-value logic domain D2 decreases the state space explosion that occurs with D1:
D2 = {0, 1,U,U}
The abstract value U represents a correct value (either 0 or 1) and U represents any (possibly
erroneous) value (i.e., 0, 1, 0 or 1). A vector of n primary inputs is represented as a unique
vector (U, . . . ,U) with D2 whereas 2
n vectors had to be considered with D1. The truth
tables of standard operations in D2 are given in Table 3.3.3.
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Table 3.3.3: Operators for 4-value logic domain D2
NOT err vot
0 1 U 0
1 0 U 1
U U U U� U U U
0 1 U �
0 0 1 U
1 1 1 1
U U 1 U U� U 1 U U1
U �operands 0 1 U0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 U U
U 0 U U� U U0 UU
In contrast with D1, a gate with two erroneous values cannot produce a correct one.
Logical masking of errors can only occur with two operations: 0 ∧ U and 1 ∨ U. This is
sufficient to take into account the masking performed by explicit signals (e.g., resets).
Typical examples where the semantic analysis is more effective are circuits that use D-type
FFs with an enable input driven by a FSM encoded in the circuit. The syntactic approach
would keep a voter for each such cell (they are in self-loops). The semantic analysis can
detect that such cells are regularly overwritten by fresh inputs. For example, the resource
arbiter b03 in Section 3.7 is such a circuit. After initialization, its finite state machine forces
12 cells (fu[3:0], ru[3:0], grant o[3:0]) to be overwritten with fresh values every other cycle.
The semantic analysis (using D1 or D2) is able to show that those cells, although in self-loops,
do not need to be protected by voters.
Another approximate logic domain is the 16-values logic domain D3, where a memory
cell is encoded as a subset of its four possible values. It is defined as the powerset of D1:
D3 = P({0, 1, 0, 1})
A value A in D3 is the set of all possible values that its memory cell can take at this stage of
the analysis. For example, a fully determinate value is represented by a singleton (e.g., {0}
for a correct 0 or {0} for a bit-flipped 1), an unknown but uncorrupted value by the set
{0, 1}, and a completely unknown value by the set {0, 1, 0, 1}.
The operators of D3 are the power set extensions of the operators of D1.
A ∧3 B = {x | x = a ∧1 b, a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
A ∨3 B = {x | x = a ∨1 b, a ∈ A, b ∈ B}
¬3A = {x | x = ¬1a, a ∈ A}
err3(A) = {x | x = err1(a), a ∈ A}
vot3(A) = {x | x = vot1(a), a ∈ A}
where ∧1 ∨1, ¬1, err1, and vot1 denote the and, or, not, err, and vot operators of D1 as
defined in Table 3.3.1.
That domain is a trade-off in terms of precision between D1 and D2. The main advan-
tage of D3 over D1 is its prevention of state explosion, since a vector of n unknown and
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uncorrupted inputs is represented as a unique vector ({0, 1}, . . . , {0, 1}). Contrary to D2, D3
remains able to represent logical masking such as {0} ∧3 {0, 1} = {0} or {1} ∨3 {1, 0} = {1}.
Indeed, in D2 we would get U∧2U = U and U∨2U = U . Domain D3 can be seen as retaining
precise information about the possible values and corruptions but ignoring the relationships
between different inputs.
3.4 Inputs Specification
Circuits are often designed to be used in a specific context where some input signals must
occur at definite timings. Taking into account assumptions about the context may make the
semantic analysis much more precise, in particular, when the logical masking of corrupted
cells depends on specific inputs (e.g., a start control signal). Our approach is to translate
these specifications into an interface circuit feeding the original circuit with the specified
inputs. The analysis of the previous section can then be applied to the resulting combined
circuit. As a consequence, error accumulation is checked with the method described in
Section 3.3.2, but under the constraints specified by the interface. The only small adjustment
needed in Algorithm 1 is to make sure that errors are introduced only in the cells of the
original circuit and not in the cells of the interface circuit.
We use ω-regular expressions to specify circuit interfaces. An ω-regular expression speci-
fies constraints using vectors of {0, 1, ?}, which replace primary inputs by 0, 1, or leave them
unchanged (? being the wild card). Consider, for instance, a circuit with two primary inputs
[i1, i2], then the expression ([1, 0] + [0, 1]).[?, ?]
ω specifies that the circuit first reads either
i1 = 0 and i2 = 1, or i1 = 0 and i2 = 1, and then proceeds with no further constraints.
In general, specifications need non-determinism to describe a partially specified or a non-
deterministic context. Hence, the aforementioned ω-regular expression can also be seen as a
Non-deterministic Bu¨chi Automaton (NBA) that reads inputs and replaces them by 0, 1, or
leaves them unchanged (?).
For instance, the expression ([1, 0]+[0, 1]).[?, ?]ω can be represented as the two-state Non-
deterministic Bu¨chi Automaton (NBA) of Figure 3.1 (a): in the first state, it reads inputs
and returns either the outputs [1, 0] or [0, 1] (regardless of the inputs). Then, the automaton
goes (and stays) in the second state where inputs are read and produced as outputs. The
indices in ?1 and ?2 allow to identify the inputs according to their position.
To generate a circuit from an ω-regular expression, we first convert the corresponding
NBA into a deterministic automaton as follows. Each nondeterministic edge is made de-
terministic using new inputs (oracles). If a vertex has n nondeterministic outgoing edges,
adding log2(n) new inputs is sufficient. For example, the specification ([1, 0] + [0, 1]).[?, ?]
ω
can be made deterministic by adding a single additional input i. The automaton (see Fig-
ure 3.1 (b)) now reads three inputs: if i is 0 (resp. 1) it produces [1, 0] (resp. [0, 1]). The
resulting deterministic automaton is then translated into an interface circuit using standard
logic synthesis techniques [148, p.118]. If the original circuit has I inputs, the resulting in-
terface circuit will have I + a (a oracles to make it deterministic) inputs and I outputs. It
is then plugged by connecting its outputs to the inputs of the circuit to be analyzed.
A typical example where an input specification is useful is the circuit b08 of Section 3.7.
Such a circuit has a start input signal and 8-bit data input. Its input interface specification
can be expressed as the following ω-regular expression:
([1, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?].[0, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]17)ω (3.1)
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Figure 3.1: Input interface as an NBA (a) and its deterministic version (b)
A start signal is first raised and the input data is read (8 bits of data). For the next 17
cycles, data is processed and start is kept to 0. This process is repeated over and over. Since
start is raised every 18 clock cycles, the internal data registers are rewritten periodically
with new data, as they can keep erroneous data only until the next start signal. The circuit
also has an internal FSM which can be corrupted but the periodic start ensures that it
returns to its initial state every 18 cycles. Consequently, error accumulation is impossible for
any K > 18, and no voters (except implicit voters at primary outputs) need to be inserted.
3.5 Outputs Specification
Consider another example, similar to the previous one, with 2 inputs, 1 output, and where
some waiting can occur before raising the start signal. Formally, the input interface would
be:
([0, ?]∗.[1, ?].[0, ?]17)ω (3.2)
This interface does not guarantee that start will be raised before K clock cycles. Since the
analysis must consider the case where start is not raised, it may detect error accumulation
even though start would ensure logical masking. However, if it is known that the primary
outputs are not read before some useful computation triggered by the start signal completes,
a better analysis can be performed.
We specify the output interface by adding to each vector of the input interface a vector
of {0, 1} indicating whether the corresponding outputs are read (1) or not read (0). For
instance, the output interface of the previous example, where the single bit output is read
only after start is raised, can be specified as
(([0, ?] : [0])∗.([1, ?] : [0]).([0, ?] : [1])17)ω (3.3)
It states that the output is not read ([0]) until the start signal is raised. Then, the output
is read ([1]) during 17 cycles.
The extended ω-regular expression is translated into an NBA as in Section 3.4, then made
deterministic, and finally translated into a sequential circuit. The corresponding interface
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circuit will additionally produce 0 or 1 signals to filter the useless and needed outputs re-
spectively. Each such signal is connected using an AND gate to the corresponding primary
output of the original circuit. The final configuration with the surrounding interface circuit
is shown in Figure 3.2.
In
pu
t i
nt
er
fa
ce
ci
rc
ui
t
or
ac
le
s &
fr
ee
 in
pu
ts
Interface circuit
O
ut
pu
t i
nt
er
fa
ce
ci
rc
ui
tOriginal circuit 
Figure 3.2: Original circuit with the surrounding interface circuit.
The property to check must now be refined to allow error accumulation as long as no error
propagates to the filtered primary outputs. Recall that when an error occurs, it is allowed
to propagate to outputs (or final voters) within the next K clock cycles since no additional
soft-error can occur during that time. If there is an error accumulation, the analysis must
further ensure that no error can propagate to outputs after the K cycles, i.e., when following
errors occur which could not be masked by final voters.
This is performed by lines 6-15 of Algorithm 2. If an error accumulation is detected
in the reached state set S, K cycles after a fault occurrence (line 6), then we calculate all
states S∗∆V that can be reached after these K cycles (line 7). Then, we iteratively simulate
the occurrences of additional errors (line 9-12) separated by at least K steps. E0 (line 7)
represents the circuit reachable state space with only one fault. Ei represents the reachable
state space after at most i+ 1 faults separated from one another by at least K clock cycles.
The global fixpoint Ei (line 13) represents the set of all possible states that can be reached
after all possible sequences of errors allowed by the fault model. It can now be checked that
none of these states leads to the propagation of an error to the (filtered) primary outputs
(line 13).
Since this computation is done assuming that voters operate correctly, we must ensure
that no error accumulates in a cell followed by a voter. Indeed, in that case, if a similar
error occurs in a second copy of the circuit, the voter would fail to mask it. The function
ErrProp (line 13) detects if there is a reachable state where a memory cell with a voter or a
primary output is corrupted and prevents the voter under consideration (m) to be removed.
We assume that each primary output is represented by a new memory cell. Let out , vot and
cor be predicates denoting whether a cell represents an output, a cell protected by a voter
or is corrupted respectively, then ErrProp is defined as:
ErrProp(Ei) ⇔ ∃s ∈ Ei. ∃m ∈ s. (out(m) ∨ vot(m)) ∧ (cor(m))
These criteria are safe but sometimes too strict. Consider, for instance, a circuit with
a sequence of two memory cells with enable signals (i.e., implemented with self-loops) that
produce significant output only two cycles after the enable signal is set. Both cells may be
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Algorithm 2 Semantic Analysis with Output Specification
Input : MVFS ; // The minimum vertex feedback set;
∆; // The circuit transition function;
s0; // The initial state;
Output : V ; // The subset of vertices (i.e., memory
cells) after which a voter is needed
1: V := MVFS ;
2: RSS := {s0}∗∆;
3: forall m ∈ MVFS
4: V := V \{m};
5: S := ∆KV (
⋃
mi∈M RSS [mi ← err(mi)]);
6: if ErrAcc(S) then
7: E0 := {S}∗∆V ;
8: i := 0;
9: repeat
10: i+ +;
11: Ei := Ei−1 ∪ (∆K(
⋃
mi∈M Ei−1 [mi ← err(mi)]))∗∆V ;
12: until Ei = Ei−1
13: if ErrProp(Ei) then
14: V := V ∪ {m};
15: return V
protected by voters to break self-loops and prevent error accumulation. However, no voter
is needed since error accumulation can occur only when no significant output is produced.
Indeed, when the enable signal is set, a new input and intermediate results will overwrite the
(possibly corrupted) cells and a correct output will be produced. If we first try to remove the
first voter, our algorithm will detect that an error can remain in the first cell after K steps.
That cell will in turn corrupt the second one still protected by a voter. Hence, the condition
ErrProp will prevent removing the first voter whereas starting with the second or removing
both voters would have been possible. Therefore, a useful refinement of Algorithm 2 is,
whenever ErrProp is true only because of error accumulation before some voters (and no
error propagates to the output), to iterate and check whether all these voters can be removed.
Output interfaces are especially useful for circuits whose outputs are not read before
some input signal is raised and some computation is completed. For instance, the shift/add
multiplier (see Section 3.7) waits for a start signal. During that time, errors may accumulate
in internal registers and propagate to the outputs, which are not read. When start occurs,
fresh input data is read and written to internal registers (which are thus reset). The outputs
are read only after the multiplication is completed and a done signal is raised.
3.6 Generalization to SETs
In the previous sections, we considered single event upsets and the corresponding fault-
models SEU(1,K) read as “at most one bit-flip every K cycles”. Hereafter, we extend our
approach to single event transients, in particular, the fault model SET (1,K) which can be
read as “at most one SET within K clock cycles”.
We discuss several ways to model SETs, propose a solution, and integrate it into our
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previous analysis.
3.6.1 Precise modeling of SETs
As opposed to an SEU, the effect of an SET depends on the logical propagation (and possible
logical masking) of the signal perturbation through the combinational part. Such signal
perturbation or a glitch is latched in a non-deterministic manner. From now on, a signal can
take 3 values: a logical one, a logical zero, or a glitch written .
Signal := 0 | 1 | 
A glitch can be masked in a combinatorial circuit by or(, 1) = 1 or and(, 0) = 0.
The precise modelling of a glitched signal in a TMR circuit requires the knowledge of its
correct value (present in the corresponding signals of the two other redundant modules).
Consequently, the precise domain D1 is extended as Dt to model a glitch propagation in a
combinatorial circuit of one redundant module:
Dt = {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1}
where 0 and 1 represent respectively a glitched 0 and 1. That is, 0 represents a glitch at
one point of the circuit such that the value in the two other redundant copies is 0. A glitch
on an incorrect signal with the value 0 (resp. 1) will be represented by the signal value 1
(resp. 0). The following example illustrates the difference between a glitch and a corrupted
value:
D1 : 0 ∨1 1 = 1 Dt : 0 ∨t 1 = 1
While in the first case, an or gate with corrupted but stable signals returns a correct
value, in the second case, the glitch propagates.
While the precise domain D1 requires the aforementioned extension to Dt, the domains
D2 and D3 can overapproximate such glitch behavior with no extension. In particular, a
glitched signal, as well as any possibly wrong stable signal, takes the value U in D2. A
glitched 1 (resp. 0) can be represented as {1, 0} (resp. {0, 1}) in D3.
A glitch propagated to a memory cell is non-deterministically latched as true or false.
It follows that the precise glitch modelling in Dt implies that any glitched signal 0
 (resp.
1) is non-deterministically latched as a correct 0 or as an incorrect 1 (resp. as a correct 1
or as an incorrect 0). This non-determinism may lead to a significant state space growth in
D1. The domains D2 and D3 avoid this drawback since glitched signals are expressed in the
same logic as the latched values.
To take into consideration all possible effects of an SET, it is necessary to calculate the
set of reachable states for all cases of SET injections. These cases include a fault injection
at the output of a logical gate or a memory cell. The union of the state spaces that can be
reached in each of these corruption cases forms the reachable state set.
The precise SET modeling in Dt imposes significant computational overhead. Its two
important bottlenecks are the need to consider all possible SET injection points and all
possible non-deterministic choices when a glitch is latched. Both points can been taken into
account by a transition function that expresses a circuit state change during a clock cycle
with an SET and returns a set of possibly corrupted states. In the next Section, we propose
a safe approximation of the precise SET modeling in domains D1, D2, and D3.
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3.6.2 Safe SET over-approximation
If a memory cell is connected by a combinational path to a component (wire or gate) where
an SET occurs, this cell may be corrupted. We should find all sets of cells that can be
corrupted at the same clock cycle to find the worst case. Each of these sets has a common
combinational sub-circuit, in other words, a common “combinational cone”. The apex of
such a cone is either the output of a memory cell or a primary input. A cone apex fully
identifies a cone and the memory cells belonging to this cone.
D Q
D Q
primary 
input
D Q
logic
logic
logic
c1
f1
f2
f3
c2
c3
p1
Figure 3.3: Combinational cones for SET modeling.
In Figure 3.3, the cone with apex at c1 includes both cells c2 and c3. The cone with
apex at p1 also includes {c1, c2}. The cones with apexes at c3 and c2 contain {c1} and {c2}
respectively.
As a result, the worst-case scenario of any SET that happens inside a cone j is the union
of all possible simultaneous corruptions of the memory cells ms(j) in this cone. The power
set P (ms(j)) is the set of all possible memory cell corruption configurations.
As soon as all corruption configurations are found, a new error injection procedure can
be defined and used in both Algorithms 1 and 2. In particular, instead of mutually exclusive
bit-flips injection to a state space S, expressed for SEU as (
⋃
mi∈M S [mi ← err(mi)]), the
corruption of the RSS by an SET is computed as the disjunction of possible simultaneous
memory cells corruptions of the sets included in the cones after memory cells M or primary
inputs I:
⋃
j∈(M∪I)
 ⋃
p∈P (ms(j))
S
[ ⋂
mi∈p
mi ← err(mi)
]
where ms(j) is the subset of memory cells located in the cone with an apex at a memory
cell or a primary input j.
Such corruption procedure is a safe over-approximation in the precise (Dt) and approx-
imate (D2, D3) domains. The complexity bottleneck of the approach is the power-set com-
putation with a large number of memory cells in a single cone. However, in the case of the
approximate logic domains D2 and D3, we can consider only the worst-case scenario: the
simultaneous corruption of all memory cells in a cone (without calculation of its powerset),
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Table 3.7.0: Voter Minimization, SEU model, Boolean domains D1 | D2 | D3.
Circuit FFs num. Syntactic Semantic Sem.Inp. Sem.Out.
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D1 D2 D3 D1 D2 D3 D1 D2 D3
Pipelined FP Multiplier 8x8 [145] 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pipelined log.unit [145] 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shift/Add Multiplier 8x8 [146] 28 28 19 19 19 19 19 19 8 8 8
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w b01 FSM comparing serial flows 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e b02 FSM - BCD recognizer 4 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3
b03 Resource arbiter 30 29 17 29 17 17 29 17 17 29 17
b06 Interrupt handler 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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A ’–’ denotes an out of time termination of the analysis (>20 mins).
computed as: ⋃
j∈(M∪I)
S
 ⋂
mi∈ms(j)
mi ← err(mi)

It may happen that the result of such SET insertion includes corrupted states that are not
reachable because it does not take into consideration the internal error-masking capabilities
of the combinational circuit. Nevertheless, we will see in the experiments that, for the
presented analysis, such over-approximation is an appropriate choice.
3.7 Experimental results
The presented voter minimization technique has been implemented in the Ocaml func-
tional programming language using the BDD library CUDD [107] and its Ocaml interface
MLCuddIDL [149]. Transition systems and set of states are expressed by BDD formulas [150].
The introduced logic domains (D1, D2, D3) are encoded with multiple bits (two for D1
and D2; four for D3) and the associated operators (e.g., Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.3) are expressed
as logic formulae over those bits. For instance, the values of D1 can be encoded with two
bits (a, b) as:
1 as (1, 1)
0 as (1, 0)
0 as (0, 0)
1 as (0, 1)
In this encoding, the first bit a is the correctness bit, and the second one b is the value
bit. The NOT operator of D1 can be represented by the function:
¬1(a, b) = (a, ¬b)
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We used the Quine-McCluskey algorithm to simplify the Boolean functions corresponding to
the AND and OR operators of D1. The AND operator is encoded as:
∧1((a1, b1), (a2, b2)) = (a3, b3), where
a3 = ((a1 ∧ a2) ∨ (a1 ∧ ¬b1) ∨ (a2 ∧ ¬b2) ∨ (¬a2 ∧ (¬b1 ∧ b2)) ∨ (¬a1 ∧ (¬b2 ∧ b1))
b3 = b1 ∧ b2
And the OR operator is encoded as:
∨1((a1, b1), (a2, b2)) = (a3, b3), where
a3 = ((a1 ∧ a2) ∨ (a1 ∧ b1) ∨ (a2 ∧ b2) ∨ (¬a1 ∧ (¬b1 ∧ b2)) ∨ (¬a2 ∧ (¬b2 ∧ b1))
b3 = b1 ∨ b2
BDDs proved to be quite efficient to express the data structures and the processing
required by our technique. We made use of Rudell’s sifting reordering [151] while building
and applying the transition function. It allowed the semantic analysis of circuits up to 100
memory cells on a standard PC (Intel Core i5-2430M/2Gb-DDR3). For comparison, without
reordering, the negative impact of big BDD structures on the algorithm performance was
observed already for circuits with 20-30 memory cells. We did not put much efforts in the
optimization but we believe that there remain much opportunities for improvement.
We used both fault-models SEU(1,K) and SET (1,K) with K = 50, which allows K
cycles/transitions to be computed effectively (∆K). The obtained results are a fortiori valid
for any K ≥ 50. However, for non-restrictive trivial input/output specifications and small
circuits, it is not worth to choose higher K values since all reachable states might be visited
within a small number of execution steps K, and no further optimization will be achieved
even if we continue the execution. When all reachable states are visited, the execution
can be stopped even if K steps have not been fully performed. Thanks to the encoding
of input/output specification into the circuit structure (Section 3.5), the reachable states
also contain the information about the values of input signals and the relevance of primary
outputs (for the error-propagation analysis). The number of steps K needed to explore the
whole state space varies depending on the specification and circuit complexity. For small
circuit (e.g., b01, b02) with simple input/output specification (e.g., only the reset at the
very beginning), we visit all reachable states in K < 10 steps. On the other hand, for larger
circuits (shift/add multipliers or the circuit b08) with explicit complex input/output interface
specifications (FSMs with 10 and more states), a higher values of K is rewarding and allows
us to catch error masking behaviors that happen regularly (e.g., circuit restarts or returns
to the initial state in cyclic FSMs within every 30-40 cycles).
Our analysis has been applied to common arithmetic units taken from the OpenCores
project [145] and to the ITC’99 benchmark suite [147]. For each circuit, we defined non-
restrictive input-output specification for the sake of generality. For the majority of the
circuits, the input pattern specifies only synchronous reset at its initialization phase and
no further reset (b01, b02, b03, b04, b06, b09). Such non-restrictive patterns may reduce
achievable optimizations, which could be significantly increased if more details about the
behavior of the surrounding circuit were provided. For the shift/add multiplier [146] the
input-output specification is dictated by its functionality. The produced output is relevant
only two cycles after the start signal has been raised (one cycle to fetch new data plus at
least one cycle to process it). Since we should not assume when the output is read out, we
suppose that the data output may be read at any time two cycles after the last start and
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until the next start. As a result, our semantic analysis with this output specification shows
that only the 8 product bits should be protected by voters.
Circuit b08 represents a group of self-stabilizing circuits that return to their initial state
(and wait for the next start) within a bounded number of cycles (for b08, this period is 8
cycles). Additionally, by functionality, the circuit is supposed to be restarted periodically.
The corresponding input and output specification allowed us to suppress all voters. We
would like to highlight that any circuit with internal counters has a similar behavior of
self-stabilization (the shift/add multiplier is another example).
Table 3.7.0 summarizes the results of the analysis on those circuits in D1, D2, and D3,
with the fault-model SEU(1,K). The column FFs shows the total number of memory cells
in the original circuit, while the other columns show the number of remaining voters in the
TMR circuit after the syntactic and semantic steps (without, with input, with input and
output interfaces). In each case, we give the results obtained with the three logic domains.
The syntactic step eliminates all voters in circuits with a pipelined architecture such as
adders, multipliers, or logarithmic units. With rolling pipelined architectures, a control part
and a looped dataflow circuit may require voter protection (e.g., none of the 28 voters of the
shift/add multiplier are removed with only the syntactic analysis).
In general, control intensive circuits require a protection of their FSMs. Almost all
memory cells of the serial flow comparator (b01) or the serial-to-serial converter (b09) have
to be protected. Nevertheless, our analysis is capable of suppressing a significant amount of
voters in many control intensive circuits. A circuit is usually composed of data- and control-
flow parts and we can expect that most voters in the data flow part can be suppressed.
The logic domain D2 is, most of the time, precise enough. However, correcting a bit-flip
in D2 (e.g., 0 → U → U) loses information. In some circuits, like b03 and b08, substantial
logical error masking is performed by an FSM and the analysis fails to detect it.
The precision of the domain D3 allows us to achieve better optimizations than the domain
D2 in circuits b03 and b08 (see Table 3.7.0). With D3, the corrupted FSM will recover to
a precise state, while with D2, its cells will recover to the correct unknown value U. This
precise state plays a crucial role to show that the rest of the circuit, which depends on this
FSM, will be “cleaned up” too.
The results for SET (1,K) are shown in Table 3.7.0. The number of suppressed voters
did not change with D2. However, even the proposed approximations in Section 3.6.2 does
not help to resolve the complexity problem for some circuits when analyzed with D1 and
D3. The bottleneck results from the large number of corruption combinations if a single
combinatorial cone includes many memory cells. For example, in the circuit b03, there is an
FSM of 2 cells where each cell is connected through a combinatorial circuit to 26 memory
cells (mainly controlling their enable signals). As a result, to approximate the impact of
an SET in this FSM, we have to calculate all possible corruption combinations of 26 cells,
which is 226 configurations. The circuits that could not be analyzed are marked by ’–’ in
Table 3.7.0.
The scalability of logic domains D1, D2, and D3 has also been compared. Figure 3.4
presents the growth of the RSS Si after i iterations (see Section 3.3) for the b03 and b06
circuits. The fixed point is reached with less iterations in D2, and the number of states
growths exponentially for D1 versus linearly for D2. The same behavior is observed in all
considered circuits.
The logic domain D3 reaches the fixed-point as fast as D1 while keeping the same pre-
cision. This fact is demonstrated in Table 3.7.0 where we measured the number of cycles
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Table 3.7.0: Voter Minimization, SET model, Boolean domains D1 | D2 | D3.
Circuit FFs num. Syntactic Semantic Sem.Inp. Sem.Out.
D
a
t
a
F
l
o
w
I
n
t
.
D1 D2 D3 D1 D2 D3 D1 D2 D3
Pipelined FP Multiplier 8x8 [145] 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pipelined log.unit [145] 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shift/Add Multiplier 8x8 [146] 28 28 – 19 – – 19 – – 8 –
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b03 Resource arbiter 30 29 – 29 – – 29 – – 29 –
b06 Interrupt handler 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
b08 Inclusion detector 21 21 – 21 21 – 21 0 – 21 0
b09 Serial converter 28 21 – 20 – – 20 – – 20 –
A ’–’ denotes an out of time termination of the analysis (>20 mins)
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Figure 3.4: Logic Domain Comparison: Reachable State Space Size.
to calculate the RSS for each domain (the column “# iterations”). The column “seconds”
gives the execution time spent to calculate the RSS, and the last column ,“# BDD nodes”,
gives the complexity of the RSS BDD representation in terms of allocated BDD nodes. For
small circuits (up-to 10 memory cells), the BDD structures in D3 can be more complex and
require more BDD nodes. At the same time, the number of BDD notes allocated to repre-
sent the RSS in larger circuits (b03, b08, b09) is much smaller than with D1. Finally, our
implementation of D3 is more time-consuming and requires further optimization.
The bar graph of Figure 3.5 shows the ratio of the size of the RSS in D1 to the cor-
responding size in D2. The RSSs in D1 are several orders larger than the corresponding
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Figure 3.5: Logic Domain Comparison: Size Ratio of RSS.
Table 3.7.0: Time and memory resources to calculate the RSS.
δ, sec # iterations seconds # BDD nodes
b
0
1
D1 0.037 9 0.01 156
D2 0.037 6 0.01 78
D3 0.060 6 0.01 151
b
0
2
D1 0.020 9 0.005 81
D2 0.020 9 0.04 66
D3 0.024 9 0.01 127
b
0
3
D1 0.42 17 2.53 1506
D2 0.44 7 0.28 311
D3 875.670 7 235.13 668
b
0
6
D1 0.044 8 0.024 473
D2 0.052 6 0.018 130
D3 0.056 6 0.02 256
b
0
8
D1 0.364 40 3.14 27813
D2 0.356 5 0.02 324
D3 41.49 5 48.08 1222
b
0
9
D1 31.332 32 27.57 2919
D2 0.852 20 1.04 446
D3 >1000 - - -
ones in D2. The most computation-demanding step of the whole analysis is checking error
propagation (see Section 3.5). A prohibitive growth of BDD structures representing the set
of states Ei was observed with D1 for circuits of around 30 memory cells. The logic domain
D2 allows the analysis (with input and output interfaces) of much larger circuits, up to 100
cells.
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Table 3.7.0: Frequency and area gain of optimized vs full TMR.
TMR circuit voters MHz gain hw gain
D
a
t
a
F
l
o
w
I
.
Pipel.FP.Mult.8x8 121 60.5 2338
Optimized 0 71.0 17.4% 1831 21.7%
Pipel.log.un. 41 128.3 693
Optimized 0 184.1 43.5% 447 35.5%
Shift/Add.Mult.8x8 28 106.0 537
Optimized 8 108.0 1.9% 408 24.0%
b01 Flows Compar. 5 162.6 126
Optimized 3 162.6 0% 114 9.5%
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b02 BCD recogn. 4 181.9 69
Optimized 2 206.6 13.6% 60 13.1%
b03 Resourc.arbiter 30 81.6 594
Optimized 17 109.0 33.6% 576 3.0%
b06 Interrupt Hand. 9 144.8 168
Optimized 3 144.8 0% 134 20.2%
b08 Inclus.detect. 21 115.4 484
Optimized 0 142.4 23.4% 216 55.4%
b09 Serial Convert. 28 89.4 584
Optimized 20 95.0 6.3% 565 3.3%
In order to evaluate the benefits of our analysis, TMR has been applied to the benchmarks
with the minimized set of voters. The inserted voters are triplicated following the practice
in the existing industrial tools to avoid a single-point of failure and to protect against SETs.
The final circuits have been synthesized with Synplify Pro with no optimization (Resource
Sharing, FSM Optimization, etc). As a case study, we have chosen Flash-based ProASIC3
FPGA as a synthesis target. Its configuration memory is immune to soft-errors [7] and data
memory is protected with voters. Table 3.7.0 compares the size and maximum frequency
of the circuit with full TMR (i.e., voters after each FF) versus TMR with the optimized
number of voters. The gains are presented in terms of the required FPGA hardware Core
Cells (hw column) and maximum synthesizable frequency (MHz column). The gain in the
maximum frequency depends on the location of the removed voters (in the circuit critical
path or not). The reduction in area directly depends on the number of suppressed voters.
3.8 Related work
Research on voter insertion and Selective Triple-Modular Redundancy (STMR) mainly fo-
cuses on probabilistic approaches [16–18] without absolute guarantee that the final circuit
meets a fault-model. [16] shows how selective voter insertion minimizes the negative timing
impact of TMR. In [152], probabilities are used to apply TMR on selected portions of the cir-
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cuit (STMR). In [18], STMR of combinational circuits specifies input interfaces using input
signal probabilities. The main advantage of STMR over TMR is that the area of the STMR
circuit is roughly two-thirds of the area of the TMR circuit. However, since the proposed
methods are probabilistic, some errors may propagate to primary outputs. In our approach,
the circuit is guaranteed to mask all possible errors of the fault model chosen by the user.
Other works use model checking to guarantee user-defined fault-tolerance properties [153,
154]. [153] investigates what memory cells in SpaceWire node have to be protected so that,
even under an SEU occurrence, the circuit keeps its functional properties, expressed as 39
assertions in linear temporal logic. If a cell is protected (fabricated with a special technology),
an SEU cannot corrupt it. On the other hand, a protected cell consumes more power than
a non-protected memory cell. As a result of verification-guided replacement of protected
cells by their non-protected alternatives, a 4.45X reduction in power has been achieved. The
work [154] formally proves that some system properties of ATM controller are kept if an
SEU happens. The authors evaluate the probability to obtain the expected property under
faults. While these studies do not address voter minimization, their formal approaches of
fault-tolerance are related to our work.
3.9 Conclusion
We proposed a logic-level verification-guided approach to minimize the number of voters
in TMR circuits that guarantees a user-defined fault-model to be masked. Our approach
is based on reachable state set computations and input/output interface specifications. In
order to avoid analyzing the triplicated circuit, we introduced three logic domains, which
allowed us to perform the analysis on a single copy of the circuit. Our analysis shows that
some voters are useless and can be safely removed from the TMR application. We have
used as case studies several arithmetic circuits as well as the benchmark suite ITC’99. They
show that our technique allows not only a significant reduction in the amount of hardware
resources (up to 35% for data flow intensive circuits and up to 55% for control flow intensive
ones), but also a significant increase in the clock rate, compared to the full TMR method
that inserts a voter after each memory cell.
We demonstrated that the choice of the logic domain influences the scalability of the
analysis and its precision. We considered both SEU and SET fault-models and explained
the modeling methodology. As the experimental results show, the same level of optimization
can be reached for both fault-models, but the SET model implies a potentially large number
of corruption combinations to be checked, which can cause an analysis bottleneck.
While we focused on voter minimization in TMR, the same approach can also be applied
to suppress masking mechanisms in time-redundant solutions. We present this extension in
Section 4.2.5 for a time-redundant technique presented in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4
Time-Redundancy Circuit
Transformations
While hardware-redundant techniques for circuit fault-tolerance are commonly used and
supported by existing synthesis tools [10–12], time-redundant solutions have been much less
studied and even less integrated in EDA frameworks. However, time redundancy offers a
series of advantages that makes its addition to synthesis tools worthwhile.
Firstly, time-redundant techniques introduce significantly smaller hardware overhead
than the hardware-redundant alternatives. Secondly, as we show in this chapter, they allow
dynamic changes of the redundancy order (and fault-tolerance properties) without inter-
rupting the computation. It permits adaptive circuits whose fault-tolerance properties can
be on-the-fly traded-off for throughput. On the other hand, by using time redundancy, a
system sacrifices its original throughput to obtain fault-tolerance. In particular, a system
that re-computes its result three times for error masking becomes three times slower. This
drawback can be reduced by using checkpointing and rollback mechanisms. They allow us
to use only double-time redundancy to mask SET effects.
Usual time-redundant techniques in software rely on a block-by-block processing: an
input data is processed several times to produce redundant outputs for further comparison
or voting. The techniques presented in this chapter can be applied to stream processing, an
approach that is more general, uniform and does not require application-oriented tuning.
As in software, time-redundancy is only suited to applications that do not always require
maximum throughput. Our particular target is Flash-based FPGA designs for embedded
systems used in safety critical domains (space, nuclear, medical, . . . ). For Flash-based
FPGAs, hardware size is crucial and configuration memory upsets are nonexistent [7]. Even if
we focus on FPGA applications, our techniques do not require any specific hardware support
and can also be used for fault-tolerant designs in ASICs.
In this chapter, we present first the notations (Section 4.1) and a simple Triple-Time
Redundant Transformation (TTR) for circuits (Section 4.2). Any sequential circuit is trans-
formed into a circuit that can mask any SET if it happens less frequently than every four
clock cycles, abbreviated SET (1, 4). Following the same transformation logic, we present the
principle of dynamic time redundancy (Section 4.3) and the corresponding circuit transfor-
mations. Dynamic time redundancy enables to switch between different orders of redundancy
(e.g., from three-time redundancy to non-redundant operating mode and back). We focus
on two particular instantiations in the form of triple dynamic time redundancy (DyTR3)
and double dynamic time redundancy (DyTR2). In Section 4.4, by combining a checkpoint-
ing/rollback mechanism with dynamic time redundancy, we propose a unique double-time
redundant scheme DTR able to mask all SETs of the fault-model SET (1, 10) and whose
recovery process is transparent to the surrounding circuit.
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4.1 Basic notations and approach
Any digital circuit can be represented in the most general way as in Figure 4.1. The circuit,
which consists of combinational and sequential parts, takes a primary input bit vector ~PI and
returns a primary output bit vector ~PO each clock cycle. The combinational part implements
some memoryless Boolean function ϕ.
Sequential Part
Combinational Part 
clk
CI COPI
SO SI
φ
si so
ini:C2FF
D Q
PO
so
Figure 4.1: Digital Circuit before the transformation.
We denote the input (resp. output) bit vector of the combinational part by ~CI (resp.
~CO) and the input (resp. output) bit vector of the sequential part by ~SI (resp. ~SO). They
satisfy the following equalities:
~CO = ϕ( ~CI ) ~CI = ~PI ⊕ ~SO ~CO = ~PO ⊕ ~SI (4.1)
where ⊕ denotes vector concatenation. We use lower case (e.g., ~pi , ~co, etc.) to denote the
corresponding signals in the transformed circuits; they satisfy the same equalities.
We write ~vi for the value of the bit vector ~v at the i
th clock cycle (the numbering starts
at i=1). Values and outputs of memory cells are denoted by the same names. For instance,
the memory cell in Figure 4.1 with output so is itself denoted so.
An SET can occur on any wire (input/output, in the combinational circuit, etc). It can
lead to the non-deterministic corruption of any memory cell connected by a purely combina-
tional path to the place where the SET occurred. For instance, an SET in a combinational
circuit in Figure 4.1 may corrupt any subset of cells ~so. A corrupted bit vector of cells is
written †~v; it represents the vector ~v with an arbitrary number of bit-flips (corrupted bits).
An SET in the combinational circuit of Figure 4.1 at some cycle i can lead to the corrup-
tion of some outputs of the combinational circuit † ~CO i. This leads to the corruption of the
primary outputs † ~PO i and of inputs of the memory cells † ~SI i, which, in turn, causes the
corruption of the circuit’s memory cells †~so. This last corruption is visible at their outputs
during the next clock cycle † ~SO i+1.
Note that SET subsumes the SEU fault-model since any SEU of a cell can be caused by
an SET on its input wire. In this sense, SET tolerance represents a stronger property than
SEU tolerance.
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Transformation. As we will see in the next Sections 4.2.1-4.4, all our time-redundancy
circuit transformations consist of four steps (see Figure 4.2):
1. substitution of each memory cell with a memory block ;
2. addition of a control block ;
3. addition of input buffers to all circuit primary inputs;
4. addition of output buffers to all circuit primary outputs.
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Figure 4.2: General scheme of a time-redundant circuit.
Memory blocks store the redundant results of signal propagations through the combi-
national sub-circuit. In addition, they may have other functionalities, in particular: error-
detection/-making, the support of dynamic time-redundancy, and checkpointing/rollback
mechanisms. The centralized control block provides control signals (ctr) to coordinate mem-
ory blocks behavior as well as the behavior of input/output buffers. The control block
may take feedback signals from other components, e.g., error-detection signals from memory
blocks (err), to become reactive to an error detection event. The TTR scheme implements
passive fault-tolerance and its control block is not reactive to fault occurrences in the trans-
formed circuit. In other words, the TTR control is not aware if there is any error in the
rest of the transformed TTR circuit. As we will show in Sections 4.3-4.4, other transfor-
mations may need such feedback-loop functionality, so that after an error detection in the
memory blocks, the corresponding control block changes the circuit behavior to start the
circuit recovery. In this dissertation, we protect the control block against SETs by TMR as
the simplest and, as we will see, the most practical solution for small FSMs.
The main purpose of input/output buffers is the adjustment of input/output interface
of the transformed circuit so that the circuit behavior or internal processes caused by an
error occurrence are transparent to the surrounding circuit. Input buffers store a part of
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an input stream to provide the necessary information for re-computation in active redun-
dant protection mechanisms. Output buffers mask errors and organize a convenient output
interface.
Any time-redundant transformed circuit requires the upsampling (×N) of the input
stream to organize N-time redundancy. As a result, the kept unchanged combinational
part is time-multiplexed and the circuit throughput drops at least N-times. Throughput is
defined as the number of significant bits (i.e., those not created by the upsampling) processed
per time unit.
4.2 Triple-Time Redundancy
In this section, we present the Triple-Time Redundant Transformation (TTR) for automatic
insertion of SET-masking properties. TTR is a simple technique that provides a good intro-
duction to the more advanced time-redundant solutions, presented in Sections 4.3-4.4.
The principle of TTR consists in the multiplexing of the circuits’s combinational part
when each next state of the original circuit is re-computed three times during three consec-
utive clock cycles. It produces three redundant state copies for further majority voting. As
a prerequisite, the input streams have to be upsampled three times.
Since TTR is able to mask soft-errors “on-the-fly”, without any recovery process, it can
be classified as a passive fault-tolerance technique (see Section 2.1.2). The transformed
circuit always returns to its correct state 4 cycles after an SET occurrence and the output
streams correctness is guaranteed. It allows to state that TTR circuits are tolerant against
the fault-model “at most one SET within 4 clock cycles”, denoted by SET (1 , 4 ).
We introduce in Section 4.2.1 TTR transformation. Sections 4.2.2-4.2.3 describe the
two main components of any TTR circuit: the memory block and the control block re-
spectively. Section 4.2.4 shows by an informal proof that the transformed TTR circuits
are fault-tolerant w.r.t. the fault-model SET (1 , 4 ). Experimental results using the ITC’99
benchmark suite [147] are presented in Section 4.2.6 where we compare the hardware over-
head and maximum throughput of TMR and TTR circuits.
4.2.1 Principle of Triple-Time Redundancy
The TTR transformation follows the steps described in Section 4.1. The TTR transformation
(see Figure 4.3) requires the triple upsampling (×3) of the input stream. The combinational
part of the circuit is kept unchanged, as in other time-redundancy transformations, but ϕ(~ci)
is computed three times. Since ~pi represents the upsampled primary input bit vector of the
transformed TTR circuit, it satisfies the following equalities:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~pi3i−2 = ~pi3i−1 = ~pi3i = ~PI i (4.2)
A TTR memory block memorizes the values computed by the combinational circuit and
performs voting to mask errors. These memory blocks require additional control signals
(fetchA and fetchB) from the control block to schedule these operations.
The TTR scheme implements passive fault-tolerance with no error-detection mechanism
nor any form of re-computation after an error detection. Since no additional re-computation
is needed, there are no input buffers to keep input stream bits.
Output buffers are also absent because the transformed circuit’s outputs are triplicated
in time and the “surrounding” circuit can mask errors by voting.
The following sections present TTR components in details.
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Figure 4.3: Transformed circuit for TTR.
4.2.2 TTR Memory Blocks
The TTR memory blocks implement a triple-time redundant mechanism to mask soft-errors
caused by SETs. Each memory cell so with input si in the original circuit (see Figure 4.1) is
replaced by a TTR memory block, which still takes si as its data input and returns the output
signal so. The input (resp. output) signals of the sequential part ~si (resp. ~so) correspond to
the inputs (resp. outputs) of all memory blocks.
We first consider the memory block without its voting mechanism as depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4.
Q
d
D Q
d'
Dsi Q
d'
D so
'
Figure 4.4: TTR memory block without voting.
This memory block consists of three memory cells that store the three bits of the triple-
time redundant computation. In normal mode (i.e., without error), the behavior of all
memory blocks is described by the following equalities:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~si i = ~di+1 = ~d′i+2 = ~d′′i+3 = ~soi+3 (4.3)
As described in Section 4.1, the upsampled input/output signals satisfy the same equa-
tions as Eq. (4.1), that is:
∀i ∈ N∗.

~coi = ϕ(~ci i)
~ci i = ~pi i ⊕ ~soi
~coi = ~poi ⊕ ~si i
(4.4)
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Recall also that, since the original input stream ~PI has been upsampled three times, ~pi
satisfies Eq. (4.2).
From Eqs. (4.2), (4.3), and (4.6), we can derive two important properties. First, the
output bit stream of the combinational part after the circuit transformation ~co is a triple-
time upsampled version of corresponding bit stream ~CO of the original circuit. Formally:
Property 4.1. ∀i ∈ N∗. ~co3i−2 = ~co3i−1 = ~co3i = ~COi .
Proof. We assume that the three cells d, d′, and d′′ of each memory block are initialized
as the original cell, and therefore ~so1 = ~so2 = ~so3 = ~SO1. By Eqs. (4.1) and (4.6), we
have ~co1 = ~co2 = ~co3 = ~CO1. The proof is then a simple induction using Eqs. (4.1), (4.2),
and (4.4).
Second, at each (3i− 2)th cycle (i ∈ N∗) and in each memory block, the memory cells d,
d′, and d′′ have the same values. Formally:
Property 4.2. ∀i ∈ N∗. ~d3i−2 = ~d′3i−2 = ~d′′3i−2 .
Proof. At the first cycle (i=1), the property is true by the same initialization hypothesis as
above. Property 4.1 and Eq. (4.4) entail that ~si3i−2 = ~si3i−1 = ~si3i. By Eq. (4.3), we have:
~si3i = ~d3i+1 = ~d
′
3i+2 =
~d′′3i+3
‖
~si3i−1 = ~d3i = ~d′3i+1 = ~d
′′
3i+2
‖
~si3i−2 = ~d3i−1 = ~d′3i = ~d
′′
3i+1
and thus, ∀i > 0, ~d3i+1 = ~d′3i+1 = ~d′′3i+1, which is equivalent to ∀i ∈ N∗. ~d3i−2 = ~d′3i−2 =
~d′′3i−2.
Property 4.2 is used to implement the error-masking mechanism with the use of a majority
voter. Since the three cells d, d′, and d′′ must be equal each (3i−2)th cycles, voting at these
specific cycles will mask any single error. Only the result of the vote is forwarded through
~so to the combinational circuit.
Such voting mechanism is presented in Figure 4.5. The TTR memory block with voting
consists of five memory cells:
1. As before, the three cells d, d′, and d′′ store the redundant bits. Their values are used
to vote at each 3i− 2 cycle based on Property 4.2.
2. The two additional memory cells keepA and keepB are used to keep for the next two
clock cycles (i.e., 3i− 1 and 3i) the correct value obtained after voting.
To support such functionality, the two global control signals fetchA and fetchB are gen-
erated by the TTR control block such that:
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Figure 4.5: TTR memory block with voting.
• fetchA = fetchB = 0 at cycles 3i and 3i− 1;
• fetchA = fetchB = 1 at cycles 3i− 2.
When the memory cells d, d′, d′′ should be equal, in particular at cycles 3i−2, their out-
put signals propagate through muxA and muxB to be voted. The result of voting propagates
to so and is fetched by the memory cells keepA and keepB .
During the next two cycles (cycles 3i and 3i− 1), the voted value circulates in the loops
keepA−muxA− votA− keepA and keepB −muxB − votB − keepB , such that the voting is
performed at each cycle and produces a correct result. Such circulation with voting guaran-
tees that no error can stay within these loops for more than one clock cycle. Additionally,
such mechanism ensures that the signal so is correct at least twice during three redundant
clock cycles, even if an SET occurs after voting (see Section 4.2.4 for details). The du-
plication of control signals (fetchA always equals fetchB) and voters (votA and votB take
the same inputs) are needed to tolerate all possible SETs within the memory block. The
fault-tolerance properties of this error masking mechanism are scrutinized in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.3 TTR Control Block
The control block for TTR generates the signals fetchA and fetchB , raising them every
(3i− 2)th clock cycles. It is implemented as an FSM depicted in Figure 4.6.
votestart keep1 keep2
fetchA=1
fetchB=1
fetchA=0
fetchB=0
fetchA=0, fetchB=0
Figure 4.6: TTR control block FSM.
Of course, the control block has to be protected itself by some fault-tolerance technique
to guarantee that the fetchA and fetchB signals cannot be corrupted simultaneously by an
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SET. Such requirement can be met only if the control block FSM is protected with a passive
masking fault-tolerance technique. For simplicity, we protect the control block with TMR,
which ensures that the global control signals fetchA and fetchB cannot be both corrupted
within the same cycle by an SET. Since the control block is a small circuit, the hardware
overhead of its TMR protection is negligible.
4.2.4 Fault-Tolerance Guarantees
To prove that the TTR transformed circuit is tolerant to the fault-model SET (1, 4), we
exhaustively check all possible SETs (glitches on wires) in the transformed circuit. Each
time we consider an SET occurrence, we assume, as the fault-model SET (1, 4) guarantees,
that no additional SET arises during the next four cycles. As we will show, any error caused
by an SET will be masked within 4 clock cycles after its occurrence.
1 An SET occurring in ~pi , ~so, ~si or within the combinational part ϕ may only corrupt
d memory cells in the memory blocks (potentially all of them). Within this corruption,
scenario the erroneous information will be corrected by the vote at the following (3i− 2)th
cycle. The corrupted data can also propagate to (or directly occur at) the primary outputs
but, in this case, only one of three redundant bits can be corrupted. The surrounding circuit
(or output blocks), that fetches these bits, can always correct the error by voting.
2 An SET occurring at the wire between d and d′ in a TTR memory block may corrupt d′
and propagate to votB . But this voter filters it since its two other inputs are correct. The
corruption of d′ is dealt with as before with voting. The same reasoning applies to an SET
occurring at the wire between d′ and d′′.
3 An SET occurring in the voter votB may entail the corruption of the keepB memory
cell. This corruption will be corrected by votB during the next clock cycle.
4 An SET occurring in the voter votA may entail the corruption of the output vector ~so and
of the keepA cell. The corruption of ~so is equivalent to the corruption of the combinational
circuit ϕ and therefore to the corruption of ~d. If the next clock cycle is a (3i − 2)th, then
all keepA cells will be updated with the voting result of ~d, ~d′, and ~d′′ values, where at least
~d′ and ~d′′ are correct. If the next clock cycle is not a (3i − 2)th, then the corruption of
keepA will be masked because ~d does not participate in voting. The only erroneous data
that remains must be in ~d′ after it has propagated from the corrupted ~d cells. But this case
is equivalent to the aforementioned scenario 2 .
5 An SET within an individual voter votA or votB , a keepA or keepB cell, or an output
signal so, is subsumed by the previous cases.
6 An SET occurring inside the control block will be corrected within two clock cycles
thanks to its TMR protection (see TMR properties in Section 2.1.3.1). Furthermore, such
an internal SET cannot propagate to signals fetchA and fetchB due to the majority voters
at the TMR control block. Thus, it ensures that the two global control signals fetchB and
fetchB cannot be corrupted at the same cycle by an SET.
7 The individual corruption of the global control signals fetchA or fetchB leads to the
corrupted output of the multiplexer muxA or muxB respectively, which will be masked by
voters votA and votB .
Checking all the possible locations of SETs, as well as the corresponding propagations
and corruptions, shows that the error disappears from the circuit in at most 4 cycles. The
worst-case scenario is an SET during an (3i − 2)th cycle that corrupts the first copy of
the time-redundant information, because this erroneous data will be masked only during
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the upcoming (3(i + 1) − 2)th cycle. Therefore, the TTR transformation guarantees error
masking for fault-models SET (1,K) with K ≥ 4.
4.2.5 TTR Voting Mechanisms Minimization
It is worth to notice that replacing all cells by TTR memory blocks with voting mechanisms
(Figure 4.5) is not always mandatory. TTR memory blocks without voting (Figure 4.4)
can often be used without jeopardizing fault-tolerance properties. The voting mechanism in
TTR plays exactly the same error-making role as a triplicated majority voter in TMR. As
a result, we can directly use our voter minimization analysis presented in Chapter 3 as an
optimization technique for TTR.
If the voter minimization analysis suppresses the voters after memory cells {M} in a TMR
circuit and guarantees its tolerance to the fault-model SET (1,K), then we can suppress the
voting mechanisms in the TTR voting memory blocks (Figure 4.5) corresponding to these
memory cells {M} in the TTR transformed circuit. Using the non-voting memory block
version (Figure 4.4) instead of the voting one changes the fault-tolerance properties of the
transformed TTR circuit making it tolerant to the fault-model SET (1, 3 ·K + 1).
Again, the most evident example is a pipelined architecture. The voter minimization
analysis suppresses voters after all memory cells keeping only the voters at the primary out-
puts. If a pipeline has n stages, then the corresponding TMR version after the optimization
is tolerant to SET (1, n+1). Indeed, if an error corrupts the first stage, a second error cannot
occur before the first one is corrected (i.e., voted) when it reaches outputs after n cycles. If
we take the same original pipelined circuit, apply the TTR transformation to it but using
only non-voting memory blocks, then the resulting circuit will be tolerant to SET (1, 3·n+1).
Indeed, the TTR circuit still have the pipelined architecture but with 3 ·n stages. Any error
propagates to outputs within 3 ·n+1 cycles. At the primary outputs, the surrounding circuit
(or output buffers) can vote on three redundant bits multiplexed in time. Since errors caused
by an SET always remain confined in one clock cycle out of the three replicated ones, any
SET will be masked.
The weaker fault-model should not be a problem for real applications. For instance,
for the four-stage 32-bits floating-point multiplier [145], the fault model would change from
SET (1, 4) to SET (1, 13). Since the expected fault-rate (see Section 5.2) is much lower than
an SET every 13 clock cycles, such optimization represents a safe solution that reduces the
TTR hardware overhead more than by half (≈ 65%) and the overall circuit size by 37%.
In the next section, we compare experimentally TTR to TMR and evaluate the optimiza-
tion that can be reached with the voter minimization analysis of Chapter 3.
4.2.6 Experimental results
The proposed TTR transformation has been applied to the full ITC ’99 benchmark suite [147].
In comparison with the voter minimization analysis (Chapter 3), the TTR transformation
can easily be applied to large circuits. We compare the resulting TTR circuits with TMR
alternatives (with triplicated voters after each memory cell).
Each transformed circuit was synthesized for FPGA using Synplify Pro without any opti-
mization (resource sharing, FSM optimization, etc). We have chosen Flash-based ProASIC3
FPGA (A3P015 QFN68 -2) as a synthesis target. Its configuration memory is immune to
soft-errors [7] and data memory is protected with TTR.
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The benchmark circuits [147] have been first divided into two groups: 1 with more than
500 core cells in the original version after synthesis; 2 the rest. In each of these subgroups
they are sorted according to the ratio between the sizes of combinational and sequential
parts in the original circuit. Figure 4.7 shows the results for the largest circuits (group 1 )
and 4.8 shows the results for the smallest ones (group 2 ).
For almost all circuits, TTR requires significantly less hardware than TMR does. Since
TTR re-uses the combinational part, hardware benefits are growing with the size of the com-
binational part. The constant hardware cost of the control block becomes negligible when the
size of the original circuit is large enough. On the other hand, the size of voting mechanisms
in all TTR memory blocks is tangible and marked with green in both Figures 4.7-4.8.
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Figure 4.7: Circuit size after transformation (largest circuits).
Figure 4.7 shows that the TTR transformed circuits are 1.7 to 2.4 times larger than the
original ones. For comparison, TMR circuits are 3.4 to 3.9 larger than the original ones. The
largest hardware overhead for all circuit transformations has been observed for b12 circuit,
a game controller with 121 memory cells [147]. The TMR and TTR versions of b12 are
respectively 3.9 and 2.5 times larger than the original circuit.
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Figure 4.8: Circuit size after transformation (smallest circuits).
Figure 4.8 shows that, for the majority of the smallest circuits (less than 100 memory
cells), TTR still has less hardware overhead than TMR. But this benefit is negated for the
tiny circuits b01, b02, and b06 (less than 10 memory cells) due to the hardware overhead
of memory blocks and the control block. For such small circuits, TMR is clearly a better
option.
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Figure 4.9: Transformed circuits profiling, circuit b17.
Figure 4.9 clarifies why the TTR transformation has significantly less hardware overhead
compared to TMR. The synthesized circuit b17 (first bar) consists of a large combinational
part (bottom part: 17240 core cells) and a small sequential part (top part: 1415 core cells).
In the TMR version of b17 (second bar) the triplicated combinational part is dominant.
The triplicated voters after each memory cell occupy 14.5% of the whole circuit. The TTR
circuit (the third bars) reuses the combinational part, so its size stays the same. For TTR,
we explicitly separated the size of the memory blocks without voting mechanisms (denoted
MB in Figure 4.4) and the size of the voting mechanisms (Figure 4.5). Indeed, as pointed
out at the end of Section 4.2.4, TTR circuits can be optimized by suppressing useless voting
mechanisms that can be found using the voter minimization analysis of Chapter 3. We do
not focus here on how many voters can be suppressed for each circuit of the full ITC ’99
benchmark suite since, as explained in Chapter 3, the optimization often depends on the
input/output communication protocol, which is unknown without a concrete application.
Additionally, the scalability limit did not allow us to apply the voter minimization algorithm
to large circuits. Nevertheless, for each circuit in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 we indicate in green the
potential hardware resources gain from replacing TTR voting memory blocks by non-voting
memory blocks.
While TTR incurs a significantly smaller hardware overhead than TMR, it decreases
the circuit’s throughput three times. Figure 4.10 shows the ratio of the transformed circuit
throughput w.r.t. the corresponding original throughput for the ITC’99 benchmark suite
(sorted left to right w.r.t. the size of the original circuit). Besides the upsampling, the
transformation influences by itself the circuit maximum frequency, which also changes the
final throughput.
The TMR voters clearly slow down the circuit. The throughput decrease varies from
3–10% for large circuits (e.g., b17, b20− b22) to 25–35% for small ones (e.g., b02, b06, b03).
In the best case, the throughput of TTR circuits can reach 33% of the original circuit due
to the triple upsampling of inputs. Of course, the centralized control block and the voting
in the memory blocks introduce an extra overhead. For large circuits, the throughput is
20–30% of the original, while for small circuits it drops to 15–20%.
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(sorted according to circuit size).
4.3 Dynamic Time Redundancy
Different reasons can motivate the change of the redundancy level. For example, we may
want to go from no redundancy level (full throughput) to three time-redundant error-masking
mode because the system needs to process critical data or enters a high radiation environment
(e.g., the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) or poles, during high solar activity). The TTR
transformation, discussed in the previous section, cannot change the order of time redun-
dancy, it is constant and equals to three. Thus, TTR circuits cannot dynamically trade-off
fault-tolerance versus throughput.
The dynamic time-redundancy proposed in this section allows us to change the number
of computed redundant results dynamically, that is, without stopping the circuit operation.
Thus, the transformed circuits can switch between different operating modes, each mode
having its own redundancy level and the corresponding fault-tolerance properties. We write
DyTRN for the Dynamic Time-Redundancy transformation where the maximum redundancy
level is N . For instance, the dynamic triple time redundant transformation DyTR3 produces
a circuit with three redundancy modes: a triple redundancy mode that masks any SET
but operates at one third of the nominal throughput (like the static TTR, Section 4.2),
a double redundancy mode that only detects SETs and operates at half of the nominal
throughput, and a non-redundant mode that operates at the nominal throughput but without
any fault-tolerance properties. In conjunction with frequency and power scaling, the proposed
approach provides adaptive design options not available before.
We keep the same notations as in Section 4.1. We consider fault models of the form
“at most M SETs within K clock cycles”, denoted by SET (M ,K ). As it is indicated in
Section 2.1.2, in practice, K is expected to have a huge order (e.g., 10 10 ) even in open space
conditions. With an appropriate order of redundancy, the proposed technique can mask
or detect M errors. However, the most common and realistic fault-model keeps the form
SET (1 ,K ), which only requires double (for fault detection) or triple redundancy (for fault
masking).
We first present informally the general approach (Section 4.3.1) and, then focus on DyTR3
(Section 4.3.2) and DyTR2 (Section 4.3.3). Memory blocks of dynamic time-redundant cir-
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cuits support the redundancy switching and implement the voting/detection. The global
control block provides signals for controlling the voting and the switching between the avail-
able redundancy modes. The input (resp. output) buffers are needed to support the input
(resp. output) stream upsampling according to the chosen redundancy order. Experimental
results using the ITC’99 benchmark suite [147] are presented in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.1 Principle of Dynamic Time Redundancy
Our dynamic time-redundancy transformation DyTRN transforms any circuit at the netlist
level according to the following steps (see Figure 4.11):
1. choice of the fault-tolerance properties and of the corresponding operating modes;
2. substitution of each original memory cell with a memory block ;
3. addition of a global control block ;
4. adjusting the design of input-output interfaces.
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Figure 4.11: Result of the circuit transformation DyTRN .
The first transformation step is specific for the dynamic time-redundancy transformations
due to the necessity to choose what fault-tolerance properties are needed. In particular, a
designer can choose:
• the desired error-detection/masking properties (determine existence of error-detection
signal fail, Figure 4.11);
• the set of needed redundancy levels or operating modes that can guarantee these prop-
erties.
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For example, an application may ask for either running at full speed (hence no fault-tolerance:
N = 1) or being able to detect up to two simultaneous faults (which requires a redundancy
level N = 3). Thus, only two operating modes are needed: mode 1 with no time redundancy
and mode 3 with three-time redundancy.
In general terms, the user must choose the set of fault-tolerance properties that are
desired for the resulting circuit. Each property can be either of the form “mask up to k
simultaneous faults” (noted “mask k” for short) or of the form “detect up to k simultaneous
faults” (noted “detect k” for short). When k = 0, both are identical and it means that the
circuit will run at its full throughput.
Recall that detecting (resp. masking) k simultaneous faults requires a redundancy level
of k+1 (resp. 2k+1) minimum. For instance, in five time-redundant mode, we can detect up
to four and mask up to two faults, while in the case of four-time redundancy we can detect
up to three faults and mask only one.
Accordingly, each property required by the user is then turned into an equivalent oper-
ating mode with n redundancy level (noted “mode n” for short). The maximum value of
all those n is the maximum redundancy level of the transformed circuit, noted N , and the
corresponding transformation is written as DyTRN .
To toggle between the chosen redundancy levels, we allocate input control signals ~mod
(Figure 4.11) which, set by the surrounding circuit, will define the current operating mode
(with the corresponding properties) and support mode switches. The set of available operat-
ing modes influences the design of the memory blocks and the control block and, as a result,
the hardware size, wiring, and circuit maximum frequency.
4.3.1.1 Memory Blocks
The memory blocks implement the core of the dynamic time-redundant mechanism. They
record the recomputed results and organize the voting and comparison procedures. Their
precise internal structure depends on the chosen set of operating modes and fault-tolerance
properties.
Each memory cell of the original circuit is replaced by a memory block with the same data
input and output as in all presented time-redundant techniques. The input (resp. output)
signals of the sequential part ~si (resp. ~so) correspond to the inputs (resp. outputs) of all
memory blocks (see Figure 4.11). The memory blocks produce a fail signal whenever an
error is detected. An error-detection at any memory block raises the fail primary output,
indicating this event to the surrounding circuit. The memory blocks also require additional
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control signals to organize voting and dynamic mode switch. These signals are produced by
the control block (see Section 4.3.1.2).
The general structure of a memory block is depicted in Figure 4.12; all our dynamic
time-redundancy circuits share that design.
A memory block of time-redundancy level N consists of three components:
• A dynamic delay line. This sequential circuit, made of N memory cells, is capable of
saving N consecutive redundant data bits. Its FIFO-like structure can dynamically
change its behavior and length to propagate the input si to several cells at once. This
is implemented using multiplexers under the control of the global signals modeCtr.
• A saving line. This sequential circuit provides additional cells (d˜i) to memorize enough
redundant information to perform the n successive votes.
• A voter/detector. This combinational circuit performs error masking and/or error
detection. The proper subset of bits for voting/comparison is selected from the delay
and saving lines using the global control signals (fetchCtr and modeCtr).
If n is the current time-redundancy mode, the same result is recomputed n times (through
the repetitive signal propagation in the combinational circuit ϕ). The delay line di is filled
with redundant bits, say, a1, . . . , an, and the Vot/Detect circuit receives all of them on the
dataA data bus and votes. The result of the vote is propagated through the output so.
At this point, there are still n− 1 votes to performs on the redundant bits ai, while new
redundant bits, say bi, start filling the dynamic delay line. The ai bits propagate to the
saving line in order to be used in the remaining votes. Voting is always done on a subset of
the dataA and dataB signals. The choice of the relevant bits is controlled by modeCtr and
fetchCtr global control signals produced by the control block. The Vot/Detect component
implements error masking/detection and returns the aforementioned corrected output signal
so. It also outputs a fail error detection signal (if error detection properties are needed).
A straightforward implementation of the saving line would use N − 1 (N being the
maximum redundancy mode) redundant bits d˜1, . . . , d˜N−1. Then, the N votes would be
performed on d1, . . . , dN , then on d2, . . . , dN , d˜1, and so on until the final vote on dN , d˜1, . . . ,
d˜N−1. Then, a new series of N votes can start on the next redundant bits that are now in
d1, . . . , dN . Actually, a saving line of only X = bN−12 c bits is sufficient. This optimization
allows us to save many redundant bits (e.g., one per block for DyTR3). The voting proceeds
as before except that the last N − X votes are all performed on dX , . . . , dN , d˜1, . . . , d˜X .
Without any fault, even if the last di’s are successively filled with a new bit, the majority
vote is sufficient to produce the correct values. If an SET occurs, it may corrupt a cell of
the saving line and the majority vote will fail to mask it. However, such an error will be
detected and masked in the next memory blocks it propagates because the number of correct
redundant bits is always strictly larger than the number of corrupted bits.
The multiplexers in the dynamic delay line are used to duplicate the input si in re-
dundancy modes n, where n < N . For instance, in mode 1, the value is duplicated in
d1, . . . , dN−1. This allows us to vote, like in mode N , on all di’s and it makes possible the
shift from mode 1 to a higher mode (e.g., N). The duplication policy differs depending on
the mode.
A concrete example of the use of the saving line, multiplexers, voting and masking is
given by dynamic triple time redundancy in Section 4.3.2.
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4.3.1.2 Control Block
The control block is a centralized FSM that provides the control signals fetchCtr and modeCtr
to each memory block. It can be seen as a collection of circular automata, one for each mode
(see Figure 4.13). The automaton for mode n (n ∈ [1 . . . N ]) sets the control signals to
select the relevant bits at each of the n steps of voting/comparison. The control block
uses the special inputs mod (see Fig. 4.11) set by the surrounding circuit to switch between
operating modes. They are used to pass the control from one automaton sub-part to another
at specific cycles (at the beginning of a new series of votes/comparisons). In Figure 4.13,
the corresponding states for these cycles are marked with gray.
As for TTR, the control block is itself protected using TMR, which does not impose a
big hardware overhead since it is a small circuit. The control block for the special cases of
double and triple time redundancy is described in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.2 respectively.
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Figure 4.13: Control block for the generic DyTRN transformed circuit
4.3.1.3 Input-Output Interface
The surrounding circuit (or dedicated input/output buffers) should also dynamically upsam-
ple (resp. downsample) the input (resp. output) bits streams of the transformed circuit to
support the changes between the redundant modes. This requirement can be fulfilled, for
instance, through frequency scaling/division. In particular, when the mode n is chosen, the
surrounding circuit should adapt its frequency to produce (resp. consume) n upsampled
inputs (resp. outputs).
In many cases, redundancy of inputs and outputs can also be handled by a circuit inter-
face. Assuming a circuit operating in mode n, if the inputs are read from a memory storage
or from a sensor, the interface would read a new value every n cycles and duplicate it n times.
If the outputs were written into memory, the output interface would perform a writing (after
a final vote) every n cycles only.
4.3.2 Dynamic Triple-Time Redundancy
Dynamic triple-time redundancy DyTR3 is an instance of the general transformation scheme.
It demonstrates all features of the dynamic time-redundancy transformations, including error
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masking, error-detection, and dynamic modes switch. DyTR3 offers the following operating
modes:
1. no time redundancy and no fault tolerance properties (mode 1).
2. double-time redundancy with single error detection (mode 2).
3. triple-time redundancy with single error masking (and error detection) (mode 3).
4.3.2.1 Memory Blocks
The memory block for DyTR3 is represented in Figure 4.14. Its structure follows the general
scheme of Figure 4.12 where:
• three cells d, d′, and d′′ form the data bits to save redundant information for voting if
mode = 3 and comparison if mode = 2. This pipeline is controlled by the global signal
modeS : if modeS = 1, the cell d is by-passed. This allows to dynamically change the
pipeline length and to organize a dynamic delay;
• the cell s (saving line) is needed to have enough redundancy to perform the majority
voting during three cycles;
• the majority voter VotA along with the multiplexers MuxA and MuxC performs error
masking and/or error detection. The proper subset of bits for voting/comparison is
selected from the delay and saving lines using the global control signals modeS and
fetchA.
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Figure 4.14: Memory block for DyTR3.
The majority voter VotA takes three inputs and returns so, the output signal of the
memory block. The Vot/Detect component also outputs the result of the comparison between
d and d′ as the fail signal.
The internal structure of the VotA voter is presented in Figure 4.15: the fail signal is the
result of the comparison between a and b. This signal also serves to implement the majority
vote by selecting the correct output (c if a 6= b; b if a = b).
Hereafter, we describe the functionality of the memory block in each of the three operating
modes.
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Figure 4.15: VotA: voter with detection capability.
Mode 3
In normal execution (i.e., without SET) of the triple-time redundant mode, the behavior of
all memory blocks is described by the following equalities.
In mode 3, the dynamic delay results in:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~si i = ~di+1 = ~d′i+2 = ~d′′i+3 = ~si+4 = ~soi+3 (4.5)
As described in Section 4.1, the upsampled input/output signals satisfy the same equa-
tions as Eq. (4.1), that is:
∀i ∈ N∗,

~coi = ϕ(~ci i)
~ci i = ~pi i ⊕ ~soi
~coi = ~poi ⊕ ~si i
(4.6)
The original input stream ~PI is upsampled three times in this operating mode:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~pi3i−2 = ~pi3i−1 = ~pi3i = ~PI i (4.7)
From Eqs. (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7), we derive that the output bit stream of the combina-
tional part after the circuit transformation ~co is a three-times upsampled bit stream ~CO of
the original circuit.
∀i ∈ N∗. ~co3i−2 = ~co3i−1 = ~co3i = ~CO i (4.8)
In mode 3, the three cells d, d′, and d′′ are equal each (3i− 2)th cycles as formalized by
Eq. (4.9):
∀i ∈ N∗. ~d3i−2 = ~d′3i−2 = ~d′′3i−2 (4.9)
Voting on (d, d′, d′′) at these specific cycles will mask a single error. The result of the
vote is forwarded through ~so to the rest of the combinational circuit. The memory cell s is
used to save the value d′′ for the two subsequent votes. Assuming that d, d′, and d′′ hold
a correct value (say a), the vote at the (3i − 2)th cycle will be between (a, a, a) (stored
in (d, d′, d′′)) and at the (3i − 1)th cycle - between (a, a, a) (stored in (d′, d′′, s)). In this
cycle, d contains the next value of the stream (say b), which will propagate to d′. So, the
vote at the (3i − 2)th cycle will be between (b, a, a) (stored in (d′, d′′, s)). So, if d′′ or s is
corrupted, the vote may return a wrong value, which will be propagated to the next block.
Fortunately, this incorrect value is preceded by two correct ones and can be corrected by a
special recovery procedure described in details in Section 4.3.2.3. As we will see, such an
error is corrected within the next six clock cycles.
To support this functionality, the global control signal fetchA is generated by the control
block according to Eq.(4.10).
fetchA = 0 at cycles 3i and 3i− 1
fetchA = 1 at cycles 3i− 2. (4.10)
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Mode 3 also implements an error detection capability. In particular, a single bit-flip can
be detected each (3i − 2) and (3i − 1) clock cycles. If no error occurs, the values of d′ and
d′′ memory cells in each memory block must be equal (see Eq. (4.9)). Otherwise, a single
bit-flip is detected and the fail signal is raised.
It can be shown that any SET (even on global control signals) will be masked (see
Section 4.3.2.3).
Mode 2
The double-time redundant mode is supported by the global control signals modeS = 0 and
fetchA = 1. In normal execution (i.e., without errors), the behavior of the memory block is
described by the following equalities:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~si i = ~di+1 = ~d′i+2 = ~d′′i+3 = ~si+4 = ~soi+2 (4.11)
The original input stream ~PI is upsampled twice:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~pi2i−1 = ~pi2i = ~PI i (4.12)
As a result, the output stream ~co is the output stream ~CO of the original circuit but
upsampled twice:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~co2i−1 = ~co2i = ~CO i (4.13)
Error detection is based on the following equation, which derives from Eq. (4.11) and
Eq. (4.12):
∀i ∈ N∗. ~d′2i−1 = ~d′′2i−1 (4.14)
In mode 2, the memory cell s does not participate in the computations. The vote is
performed at each cycle on (d, d′, d′′). For instance, consider the input value a. Since it
is upsampled twice, the circuit receives the two bits a1 and a2, say at cycles i and i + 1
respectively. At cycle i+ 2, we have (d, d′, d′′) = (a2, a1, ?) and at cycle i+ 3 (d, d′, d′′) =
(?, a2, a1), where ’?’ denotes an unknown bit. Consequently, two votes on (d, d
′, d′′) will
produce the expected bit a twice. Of course, an SET may lead to an error propagation but
masking is not guaranteed in mode 2.
Error detection is organized through the comparison of d′ and d′′ at odd cycles. If no
errors occur, their values should be equal according to Eq. (4.14). If the values are not equal,
the fail signal will be raised to flag the error to the control block. Recall that an SET at
any wire can corrupt at most one bit in a memory block.
Mode 1
Mode 1 is supported by the global control signals modeS = 1 and fetchA = 1. The multiplexer
MuxB is used to duplicate the input data and to propagate it to both cells d and d′ at each
clock cycle. In normal execution (i.e., without errors), the behavior of all memory blocks is
described by the following equalities:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~si i = ~di+1 = ~d′i+1 = ~d′′i+2 = ~si+3 = ~soi+1 (4.15)
The operating with no time redundancy implies that the input streams are not upsampled:
n = 1 : ∀i ∈ N∗. ~pi i = ~PI i (4.16)
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The output of the combinational circuit ~co is equivalent to the output of the circuit before
the transformation:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~coi = ~CO i (4.17)
From Eq. (4.15), if no error occurs, d equals to d′ each clock cycle. Consequently, voting
on three values (d, d′, s) returns the value of d (and d′) at each cycle. The mode has neither
SET masking nor detection properties, but its throughput is comparable to the original
circuit before the DyTR3 transformation. If d and/or d′ is corrupted, then the vote on
(d, d′, s) may return a wrong value, without raising the fail signal.
4.3.2.2 Control block and mode switch
Dynamic triple-time redundancy has three operating modes {1, 2, 3}. In the most general
implementation, it can switch from any mode to any other one. The control block governing
these switches in presented in Figure 4.16. We present in details three possible switches.
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Figure 4.16: Control block for DyTR3.
1 7→ 2
Switching from the operating mode 1 (modeS = 1, fetchA = 1) to double-time redundancy
can be performed at any clock cycle. It is performed by setting modeS to logical zero and
upsampling the input stream twice. Table 4.3.2 shows such a switch starting from the third
clock cycle. In mode 2, the output vector of the sequential part ~so is the result of the majority
voting on (d, d′, d′′).
1 7→ 3
Switching from the operating mode 1 to triple-time redundancy is performed by setting
modeS to 0 and up-sampling the input stream three times. The fetchA signal is raised every
three cycles, as specified by Eq. (4.10). Table 4.3.2 shows such a switch starting from the
third clock cycle. The error masking and detection properties are guaranteed only three
cycles later when the delay line is filled by three independent redundant bits (~e1, ~e2, ~e3).
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Table 4.3.2: Switching process 1 7→ 2.
mode clk ~si ~d ~d′ ~d′′ ~s modeS fetchA ~so state
1 1 ~c1 ~b1 ~b1 ~a1 ~z1 1 1 ~bv noRed
2 ~d1 ~c1 ~c1 ~b1 ~a1 1 1 ~cv noRed
2 3 ~e1 ~d1 ~d1 ~c1 ~b1 0 1 ~dv dtr1
4 ~e2 ~e1 ~d1 ~d1 ~c1 0 1 ~dv dtr2
5 ~f1 ~e2 ~e1 ~d1 ~d1 0 1 ~ev dtr1
6 ~f2 ~f1 ~e2 ~e1 ~d1 0 1 ~ev dtr2
7 ~g1 ~f2 ~f1 ~e2 ~e1 0 1 ~fv dtr1
8 ~g2 ~g1 ~f2 ~f1 ~e2 0 1 ~fv dtr2
9 ~h1 ~g2 ~g1 ~f2 ~f1 0 1 ~gv dtr1
xv is the result of voting on the values marked in grey at this clock cycle.
Table 4.3.2: Switching process 1 7→ 3.
mode clk ~si ~d ~d′ ~d′′ ~s modeS fetchA ~so state
1 1 ~c1 ~b1 ~b1 ~a1 ~z1 1 1 ~bv noRed
2 ~d1 ~c1 ~c1 ~b1 ~a1 1 1 ~cv noRed
3 3 ~e1 ~d1 ~d1 ~c1 ~b1 0 1 ~dv ttr1
4 ~e2 ~e1 ~d1 ~d1 ~c1 0 0 ~dv ttr2
5 ~e3 ~e2 ~e1 ~d1 ~d1 0 0 ~dv ttr3
6 ~f1 ~e3 ~e2 ~e1 ~d1 0 1 ~ev ttr1
7 ~f2 ~f1 ~e3 ~e2 ~e1 0 0 ~ev ttr2
8 ~f3 ~f2 ~f1 ~e3 ~e2 0 0 ~ev ttr3
9 ~g1 ~f3 ~f2 ~f1 ~e3 0 1 ~fv ttr1
xv is the result of voting on the values marked in grey at this clock cycle.
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Table 4.3.2: Switching process 3 7→ 1.
mode clk ~si ~d ~d′ ~d′′ ~s mS fA ~so state
3 1 ~h2 ~h1 ~g3 ~g2 ~g1 0 0 ~gv ttr2
2 ~h3 ~h2 ~h1 ~g3 ~g2 0 0 ~gv ttr3
3 ~j1 ~h3 ~h2 ~h1 ~g3 0 1 ~hv ttr1
4 ~j2 ~j1 ~h3 ~h2 ~h1 0 0 ~hv ttr2
5 ~j3 ~j2 ~j1 ~h3 ~h2 0 0 ~hv ttr3
6 ~k1 ~j3 ~j2 ~j1 ~h3 0 1 ~jv ttr1
1 7 ~l1 ~k1 ~k1 ~j2 ~j1 1 1 ~kv noRed
8 ~m1 ~l1 ~l1 ~k1 ~j2 1 1 ~lv noRed
9 ~n1 ~m2 ~m1 ~l1 ~k1 1 1 ~mv noRed
xv is the result of voting on the values marked in grey at this clock cycle; mS = modeS ;
fA = fetchA.
3 7→ 1
Switching from three times redundancy to non-redundant mode is performed by raising
signals modeS and fetchA. In Table 4.3.2, this switching is performed at the seventh clock
cycle.
All other switching scenarios are supported by the DyTR3 control block as shown in
Figure 4.16. Each circular automaton part corresponds to one of the three available operating
modes.
The labels specify the values of the global control signals (when absent from a state they
are supposed to be 0). The guard mod is the primary input bus that the environment may
use to indicate which mode switch must be performed. In each operating mode, there is only
one state allowing a switch. This state ensures that the output stream is consistent (i.e., is
not “cut” in the middle of a redundant series). For example, when switching from mode 3
to 1, the output stream has only triplicated values (when in mode 3) followed by single ones
(when in mode 1).
The automaton corresponding to mode 3 has two circular sub-parts: ttr1 − ttr2 − ttr3
and ttr1− ttr2− err1− err2− err3− err4. The former corresponds to the functionality if
no soft errors have been detected. The latter is used if the fail signal is raised by Vot/Detect
during any 3i− 1 clock cycle (state ttr2 of the control block), indicating a data corruption.
The recovery procedure corresponding to this case is described in the next section.
4.3.2.3 Fault tolerance guarantees
In this section, we show that a DyTR3 circuit in triple-time redundant operating mode
(mode 3) is able to mask the effect of any SET within six cycles after its occurrence. In other
words, it is fault-tolerant w.r.t. the SET (1, 7) fault model. The fault-tolerance properties of
mode 2 can be checked with the same reasoning and mode 1 does not have any fault-tolerance
properties.
The error-masking properties are again based on the fact that, even if a single SET can
corrupt several memory blocks, it can corrupt only one cell in a given memory block. Indeed,
in mode 3, in the normal operating mode, the signal modeS is equal to 0, hence an SET at
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Table 4.3.2: Recovery procedure - DyTR3, mode 3.
clk st. ~si ~d ~d′ ~d′′ ~s mS fA ~so
1 ttr1 ~b1 †~a3 ~a2 ~a1 ~z1 0 1 ~av
2 ttr2 ~b2 ~b1 †~a3 ~a2 ~a1 0 0 ~av
3 err1 †~b3 ~b2 ~b1 †~a3 ~a2 0 0 ~†av
4 err2 ~c1 †~b3 ~b2 ~b1 ~a3 0 1 ~bv
5 err3 ~c2 ~c1 †~b3 ~b2 ~b1 0 0 ~bv
6 err4 ~c3 ~c2 ~c1 †~b3 ~b2 1 0 ~bv
7 ttr1 ~d1 ~c3 ~c2 ~c1 †~b3 0 1 ~cv
8 ttr2 ~d2 ~d1 ~c3 ~c2 ~c1 0 0 ~cv
xv is the result of voting on the values marked in grey at this clock cycle; mS = modeS ;
fA = fetchA ; † represents a data corruption
si will corrupt d but it cannot reach d′. Hereafter, we consider all possible SET occurrence
scenarios.
1 An SET occurring in the combinational part ϕ, the signals ~pi , ~so, ~si , or within the
Vot/Detect may only corrupt d cells (potentially in all memory blocks). Since in mode 3,
before an error detection, modeS = 0, any SET is logically masked at the multiplexer MuxB
and cannot corrupt simultaneously d′ and d. Three cases can be distinguished depending on
which redundant bit vector is corrupted (e.g., ~e1, ~e2, or ~e3 as in Table 4.3.2):
1. If the first redundant bit vector ~e1 is corrupted, then the voting masks the error within
three cycles. According to Table 4.3.2, the voting is performed on (~e3, ~e2, †~e1), next
on (~e3, ~e2, †~e1), and finally on (~f1, ~e3, ~e2). In all these votes, †~e1 is masked by the
majority voting.
2. If ~e2 is corrupted, †~e2 is masked only during the first two votes on (~e3, †~e2, ~e1). The
third vote (~f1, ~e3, †~e2) does not guarantee masking †~e2. Since the result of the third
vote may be incorrect, a corrupted third redundant bit vector propagates. Thus, the
error migrates from the 2nd redundant recalculation (i.e., ~e2) to the third one (i.e., ~e3).
We describe in the third case how an error in the third redundant bit vector is masked.
3. The third redundant bit vector can be corrupted by an SET or, as we just showed, by
an error propagation from the second redundant recalculation. In both cases, the fail
signal will be raised during a 3i− 1 clock cycle, which indicates that either ~e2 or ~e3 is
corrupted. This case triggers the recovery procedure described below.
The recovery procedure is organized by the DyTR3 control block (Figure 4.16). If no
error is detected, the control block goes through the ttr1−ttr2−ttr3 states of its automaton.
However, if an error has been detected at a (3i− 1) clock cycle (automaton state ttr2), then
the FSM takes the edge ttr2→ err1 to start the recovery procedure illustrated in Table 4.4.6.
Table 4.4.6 presents the detection of a corruption of the third bit vector ~a3 and its
recovery. The comparison is done between d′ and d′′, so the corrupted vector †~a3 is detected
at cycle 2 (Table 4.4.6). At cycle 3, the control block goes to state err1. As explained above,
cycles 1 and 2 produce a correct result ~av at so, but cycle 3 may produce a corrupted bit
vector †~av. Since †~av propagates through the combinational circuit, the input vector of the
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sequential part †~b3 at the same cycle may be corrupted. On the other hand, we know that
the already computed vectors ~b2 and ~b1 are correct.
At cycle 6, the control block is in state err4. It raises the modeS signal, which substitutes
the usual vote on (d′, d′′, s) with a vote on (d′, s, s) ignoring the incorrect †~b3 in d′′. As a
result, the third redundant bit vector ~c3 is correct and the corrupted †~b3 disappears from the
circuit at cycle 8.
2 An SET at the global control wire fetchA can corrupt only one of the inputs of the
majority voter. In the worst case, it would corrupt the computation of the third redundant
bit vector (during cycles 3i). Indeed, instead of voting on (d′, d′′, s), the memory block will
vote on (d, d′, d′′), possibly producing a wrong value. This single error will be detected and
corrected as explained in case 1 . In the two other cases, voting produces the correct result
because two inputs of the voter remain correct.
3 An SET at the global wire modeS may corrupt the outputs of the multiplexers MuxB
and MuxC. The corruption of MuxC substitutes d′′ with s or vice versa. However, such
substitution alone cannot influence the majority voting at any cycle. During 3i− 2th cycles,
the other two redundant bits are correct and, at the other cycles, d′′ = s. The corruption of
MuxB is equivalent to a corruption of d′. This has been treated in case 1 .
4 Any SET in the centralized control block will be masked within one clock cycle due to
its TMR protection.
Other options of SET injection (e.g., inside dynamic delay) lead to the error masking
scenarios described above.
As we observed in this section, DyTR3 in mode 3 differs from TTR by its recovery
procedure. It implements error-masking that is realized in TTR with voting mechanisms.
As opposed to TTR where voting mechanisms can be suppressed by the verification-based
analysis of Chapter 3 (see Section 4.2.5), a similar optimization for DyTR3 is not so obvious
for two reasons:
• the presented V ot/Detect structure participates not only in error-masking of mode 3
but in the functionality of other modes too;
• the recovery procedure happens simultaneously in all memory blocks, which implies
that even an optimized DyTR3 memory block will have to take the global control
signals and to contain multiplexers to choose the bits of dynamic delay.
Both mentioned aspects complicate the hardware optimization based on the static analysis
of Chapter 3.
4.3.3 Dynamic Double-Time Redundancy
This section presents the double-time redundancy DyTR2 with a dynamic switch between
modes 1 and 2. It is a simpler instance of the general transformation scheme in compar-
ison with DyTR3 since it has one operating mode less and no error-masking capabilities.
In particular, it offers a mode without time-redundancy and a mode of double-time redun-
dancy with error-detection capabilities. DyTR2 circuits are organized according to the same
transformation scenario described in Section 4.3.1. Hereafter, we investigate in details the
subcomponents of this technique.
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4.3.3.1 Memory Blocks
In dynamic double-time redundancy, error masking is fundamentally impossible because
there is not enough redundancy. Consequently, DyTR2 memory blocks (Figure 4.17) have
only error detection capabilities. A DyTR2 memory block includes the comparator EQ to
detect soft-errors caused by an SET as well as the multiplexer MUX to switch-off time
redundancy.
Dynamic Delay
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modeS
fail
1
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soMUX
EQ≠
Vot/Detect
Figure 4.17: Memory Block for DyTR2.
The memory block for DyTR2 consists of the following components:
• two cells d and d′ (the data bits) to save redundant information for comparison in
mode 2; in this operating mode, the input stream is upsampled twice and d and d′
contain the same value each odd cycle. For example, if the input stream leads to
si1=a, si2=a, si2=b,... then the pair (d, d
′) will contain successively the values (0, 0),
(a, 0), (a, a), (b, a), . . . where the initial values of the cells are supposed to be 0;
• a comparator EQ which raises the fail signal if d and d′ differ; in mode 2, if this signal
is raised during an odd cycle, it indicates an error detection;
• a multiplexer MUX that allows to switch between the double-time redundancy (mode 2
when modeS=0) and no redundancy (mode 1 when modeS=1); it is used to by-pass
the d′ memory cell; in this case, the circuit throughput is twice higher than in mode
2 but faults cannot be detected; the modeS signal is a global control wire provided by
the control block.
Compared to the general representation of memory blocks (Figure 4.12), the memory
cells d and d′ represents the dynamic delay part, while the comparator EQ along with the
multiplexer MUX play the role of the Vot/Detect sub-circuit. The saving line is not needed
by this transformation because of the absence of voting and error-masking properties. There
is no need to keep the redundant information in saving line for consecutive voting as it is
done in DyTR3. Since there are only two DyTR2 operating modes, the choice between them
can be done by a single control wire (modeS ) in comparison with DyTR3 that requires two
wires (modeS and fetchA) to choose between its three modes.
4.3.3.2 Control block and mode switch
While the functionality of the memory block is straightforward, the switching process needs
to be detailed. With double-time redundancy only two switches are possible: from no re-
dundancy to double-time (1 7→ 2) and back (2 7→ 1). Table 4.3.3 presents a generic example
of an execution of twelve cycles with two successive switches (1 7→ 2 and then 2 7→ 1).
80 Chapter 4. Time-Redundancy Circuit Transformations
Table 4.3.3: Switching process 1 7→ 2 7→ 1; ‘?’ is a don’t care.
mode clk ~si ~d ~d′ modeS fail ~so state
1 1 ~c1 ~b1 ~a1 1 ? ~b1 noRed
2 ~d1 ~c1 ~b1 1 ? ~c1 noRed
3 ~e1 ~d1 ~c1 1 ? ~d1 noRed
4 ~f1 ~e1 ~d1 1 ? ~e1 noRed
2 5 ~f2 ~f1 ~e1 0 ? ~e1 dtr1
6 ~g1 ~f2 ~f1 0 0 ~f1 dtr2
7 ~g2 ~g1 ~f2 0 ? ~f2 dtr1
8 ~h1 ~g2 ~g1 0 0 ~g1 dtr2
9 ~h2 ~h1 ~g2 0 ? ~g2 dtr1
1 10 ~j1 ~h2 ~h1 1 ? ~h2 noRed
11 ~k1 ~j1 ~h2 1 ? ~j1 noRed
12 ~l1 ~k1 ~j1 1 ? ~k1 noRed
The first four cycles correspond to non-redundant mode 1 (modeS=1). In this mode, the
input stream is not upsampled (bit vectors are indexed by 1); it is the input stream of the
original circuit (∀i, ~pii = ~PIi).
Starting from the fifth cycle, double-time redundant mode is switched on (modeS=0).
To support this mode, the input stream is upsampled (the duplicated bit-vectors have the
corresponding indexes 1 and 2). As we can observe, during the next five cycles (5 to 9) the
output stream ~so is also upsampled twice. In the cycle following the switch, error detection
is already active and fail = 1 would represent a detected error. Since there is no errors,
fail = 0 every second clock cycle in the mode 2.
At the ninth clock cycle, the redundancy is switched off (modeS=1). The input stream is
down-sampled as well as the bit vector ~so, and the circuit returns to the full speed mode 1.
The described operation mode switch and the corresponding control of the modeS signal
is set by the control block, which can be represented as the FSM in Figure 4.18.
noRed
mode 1
dtr1 dtr2
mode 2
modeS=1
mod '2'
'1'mod
modeS=0 modeS=0
Figure 4.18: Control block for DyTR2.
This FSM is made of two sub-automata, each one represents an operating mode. The
single state automaton notRed corresponds to the non-redundant mode 1, while the two
states {dtr1 , dtr2} correspond to the mode 2. Note that this FSM corresponds to the sub-
part noRed − dtr1 − dtr2 of DyTR3 control FSM (Figure 4.16) that represents the same
modes, mode1 and mode 2, and the same mode switch between them.
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4.3.3.3 Fault Tolerance Guarantees
Hereafter, we consider all possible SET occurrence scenarios and check the fault-detection
properties of DyTR2, that is, in mode 2. We prove that any SET that influences the func-
tionality is detected within two cycles after its occurrence.
SET occurrences can be grouped in the following categories:
1 An SET occurring in the combinational part ϕ, the signals ~pi , ~so, ~si , modeS, output of
d′ or within the Vot/Detect may only corrupt the d cell of memory blocks (potentially all of
them). If the SET occurs (and is latched) during an even cycle, then ~d′ represents a correct
version of †~d. The error is detected in the next cycle. If the SET occurs during an odd
cycle, in the next cycle the corruption propagates to †~d whereas the redundant ~d is correct.
The error is detected during the next comparison, which happens two cycles after the SET
occurrence.
2 An SET occurring between d and d′ may lead to three different corruptions scenarios:
1. the corruption of only d′; if it occurs at an even cycle it will be detected in the next
clock cycle (a situation already considered in 1 ) or, if it occurs at an odd cycle, it
will propagate to the next memory block and be detected by its comparator two cycles
after its occurrence;
2. the corruption of the comparator EQ only; the fail signal is raised without corrupting
d′ (with no influence on functionality);
3. the corruption of both d′ and EQ which will instantly signal an error.
3 Any SET within the control block will be corrected within one clock cycle by its TMR
protection. It will not be signaled since it does not alter functionality.
An SET may also occur directly on the fail signal during odd clock cycles. An error-
detection will be indicated to the surrounding circuit even though such SET does not disturb
the functionality of the circuit.
4.3.4 Experimental results
We applied the proposed transformations DyTR2 and DyTR3 to the ITC ’99 benchmark
suite [147] and compared the results with TMR, as we did for TTR (see Section 4.2.6).
Figure 4.19 illustrates the relative hardware overhead introduced by TMR, DyTR2, and
DyTR3. The DyTR3 and DyTR2 circuits (third and fourth bars) reuse the combinational
part (as in any presented time-redundant techniques). For DyTR3, we explicitly indicated
the size of the dynamic delay, the Vot/Detect component, and the saving line. The DyTR2
circuit has an even smaller area overhead coming from the smaller size of its dynamic delay
and the absence of saving line. In DyTR2 and DyTR3, the size of the control block is
negligible in comparison with the rest of the circuit (< 1%).
In the following experiments, the circuits of the ITC ’99 benchmark suite are sorted as
in Section 4.2.6: we first separate big circuits (>500 core cells) from small ones, and then
sort these groups according to the ratio between the sizes of combinational and sequential
parts in the original circuit (written COM/SEQ). Figure 4.20 shows the circuit size growth
(relatively to the original one) after the transformation for highly combinational circuits
(COM/SEQ > 8, i.e., more than 8 combinational core cells per memory cell).
82 Chapter 4. Time-Redundancy Circuit Transformations
bsavingblinen
Vot/Detect
H
ar
dw
ar
eb
(c
or
eb
ce
lls
)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
voters
Dyn.Delay
sequential
combin.
Ctr.Block
DyTR DyTRTMRoriginal 23
x103
Figure 4.19: Transformed circuits profiling (circuit b21 ).
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Figure 4.20: Circuit size after transformation, big circuits (for all COM/SEQ > 8).
Figure 4.20 shows that the DyTR2 circuits are 1.18 to 1.37 times larger than the original
ones, whereas DyTR3 circuits are 1.46 to 2.17 times larger. For comparison, TMR circuits
are 3.4 to 3.9 times larger than the original ones. As a result, DyTR2 and DyTR3 circuits
are 2.7 to 2.9 and 1.7 to 2.4 smaller than TMR ones.
Figure 4.21 shows that when the combinational part is small, DyTR2 and DyTR3 are
still 2.4 to 2.8 and 1.36 to 1.71 smaller on average than TMR. However, the attractiveness of
time-redundancy schemes is lower for circuits that have small combinational parts (e.g., b01,
b02, b03, and b06). For such circuits, lower hardware benefits and loss in throughput makes
the non-adaptive TMR a better option.
The figures do not represent the overhead of the input/output interface, which are re-
sponsible for streams upsampling/dowsampling respectively. Since such interfaces need to
be tuned to the surrounding circuit, we do not propose a particular design here. The over-
all overhead of such interface depends on the number of inputs/outputs wires since a small
upsampling/downsampling FSM may have to be inserted for each of them. For instance,
an FSM that upsamples twice a signal can contain one memory cell (with an enable signal)
to keep a data bit and a shared two-state counter (one cell and an inverter). For the triple
upsampling (e.g., for DyTR3) we need a three-states counter (two memory cells and 1-2
gates) to make cells with enable signals sending the same saved bit three times. Consider,
for instance, the circuit b21 with 54 inputs reading some sensor. Each input would require
one of the aforementioned input buffers. The size of an input buffer remains small and we
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Figure 4.21: Circuit size after transformation, small circuits (for all COM/SEQ < 8).
can estimate the overall overhead of the input buffers to be less than 3% of the overall DyTR3
design.
We also investigated the relative loss of the maximum synthesizable frequency for the
transformed circuits relatively to one of the original circuit. In the best case (b15, b21−b22),
the maximum frequency of DyTR2 circuits is lower than the original one by 1-5%. The control
block and the multiplexers in the memory blocks introduce an overhead and the Vot/Detect
component makes the critical path longer. This is especially visible in circuits with a small
combinational part and consequently with low flexibility in combinational optimization (b13,
b06, b03). In such cases, the loss in maximum frequency can reach 25-30% which comes close
to the loss observed with TMR. A similar behavior is observed for DyTR3. The Vot/Detect
circuit is more complex than the one in DyTR2. The maximum frequency loss is also a bit
higher: 1-10% for circuits with a large combinational part (b15, b21− b22) and up to 35-44%
for small circuits (b02, b06, b13).
The principle of dynamic time-redundancy is very helpful when, based on the environ-
ment conditions and the corresponding fault-model, we can assume that no error will happen
within some time interval after the previous error occurrence. Under this assumption, we
can safely reduce the order of redundancy after an error-detection and, thus, accelerate the
transformed circuit increasing its throughput. The “acceleration after an error” allows us to
make the recovery process in active fault-tolerance techniques transparent to the surround-
ing circuit. Before our proposal, the recovery would typically lead to the disturbance of the
normal output stream, which we avoid with the accelerated recovery. We demonstrate this
application of the dynamic time-redundancy in the next section with the Double-Time Re-
dundant Transformation (DTR). DTR uses both dynamic double-time redundancy DyTR2
and a checkpointing/rollback mechanism to achieve error masking with only one re-execution
instead of two as in TTR scheme.
4.4 Double-Time Redundancy with Checkpointing
This section presents the DTR transformation that is able to mask SET effects with only
double time redundancy. It re-uses the principle of dynamic time redundancy (Section 4.3) to
make the recovery process transparent to the surrounding circuit. Indeed, the circuit recovery
based on checkpointing/rollback mechanisms represents one of the active fault-tolerance
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techniques that are responsive to an error-detection event and adjust the circuit functionality
to recovery from errors. In particular, double-time redundancy allows us to detect an error,
to rollback to a previous correct checkpointed state and to perform a third re-computation.
Such reactions usually imply the disturbance of the normal output stream. However, as
we will show, the combination of the dynamic time-redundancy with a checkpoing/rollback
mechanism allows us to overcome this drawback and to make the recovery invisible for
the surrounding circuit. The novelty of DTR consists in switching-off the time-redundancy
(like in DyTR2) to perform the recovery fast enough so that the normal output stream is
not disturbed and the next possible SET does not occur during this unprotected recovery
“speed-up”.
We show that any circuit transformed according to our DTR technique is able to mask
any SET of the fault model SET (1 , 10 ) i.e., “at most one SET within 10 clock cycles”.
As any presented time-redundancy transformation presented in this dissertation, DTR is an
automatic logic-level fault-tolerance transformation that does not depend on the implemen-
tation technology (e.g., FPGA or ASIC). It naturally supports stream-to-stream processing.
Section 4.4.1 presents the general principle of combining error-detection with recovery,
and the use of input/output buffers. Each DTR subcomponent is explained in details in
Sections 4.4.2 to 4.4.5. Section 4.4.6 discusses DTR circuit functionality without an SET
occurrence and Section 4.4.7 explains the recovery process after an error detection. Section
4.4.8 presents the informal proof that the transformed circuit is fault-tolerant for all possible
errors according to the fault-model. The formal proof of DTR correctness in Coq is explained
in the next chapter. The hardware overheads and maximum throughput of the original,
TMR, and DTR circuits are compared in Section 4.4.9.
4.4.1 Principle of Time Redundancy with Checkpointing
The main features of the DTR transformation are illustrated in Figure 4.22. The primary
input stream is upsampled twice and given to the combinational part to detect errors by
comparison (written C). The line . . . , s1, s2, t1, t2, . . . represents paired internal states
and . . . , a, a, b, b, . . . paired bits in the output stream. In normal mode, checkpointing is
performed every other cycle. When an error is detected (e.g., t1 6= t′2), a recovery process
consisting of a rollback and a re-execution is triggered (resulting in the internal state t3).
s1 s2 t 1 t 2 w1 w2 ...
C C
Output stream
(both cases)
Execution
with SET
a a b b c c ... kd... ...
rollback
Speed up
no redundacy
Output buffer
k
s1 s2 t 1 t 2 w1 w2 ...
C CExecution
without SET
u1 u2 ...
CC
C
...
...
Error 
detected
t3u1'
Figure 4.22: Overview of the DTR transformation.
According to the fault-model SET (1 ,K ), no fault occurs within K clock cycles after the
last fault. This allows us to switch off time-redundancy during the recovery phase and to “ac-
4.4. Double-Time Redundancy with Checkpointing 85
SequentialRPart
clk
CombinationalRPartR
ini:C2
MemoryRBlock
si so
failsave
rollBack
In
pu
tR
B
uf
fe
rs
rB
O
ut
pu
tR
B
uf
fe
rs
save
ci copi po
so si
rollBack
substφ
ini:C2
f3
ControlRBlock
save
rollBack
rB
subst
failf1
f2
f1
TMR f2
f3
ControlRFSM
Figure 4.23: Transformed DTR circuit.
celerate” the circuit twice (speed up phase in Figure 4.22). Along with the use of specifically
designed input and output buffers to record inputs and to produce delayed outputs during
that phase, this makes the recovery transparent to the surrounding circuit. The input/out-
put behavior remains unchanged as if no SET had occurred. The output streams correctness
and consistency (. . . , a, a, b, b, . . . ) are guaranteed by the transformation. After an error,
the recovery process returns the circuit to a correct state (i.e., to the state that the circuit
would have been if no error had occurred) within at most 10 clock cycles. Consequently, the
allowed maximum fault rate is one every 10 clock cycles (i.e., SET (1 , 10 )).
The DTR transformation consists of the same general four steps that have been used in
the previous transformations (Section 4.1) but DTR is enriched with more complex func-
tionalities (see Figure 4.23).
As in other time-redundant schemes, the combinational part of the circuit is kept un-
changed but ϕ(~ci) is computed twice. The results are compared and, if an error is detected,
ϕ(~ci) is recomputed a third time. The input stream is upsampled twice. The bit vector ~pi
represents the upsampled primary inputs of the transformed circuit; it satisfies the following
equalities:
∀i ∈ N∗. ~pi2i−1 = ~pi2i = ~PI i (4.18)
Each original memory cell is substituted with a memory block that implements the double
time-redundant mechanism. The memory blocks store the results of signal propagations
through the combinatorial circuit but they also save recovery bits for checkpointing. As an
error-detection mechanism, a comparison takes place that, in case of an error, leads to the
use of the checkpointed bits to rollback and re-execute. The control block takes the result
of comparisons (fail signals) as an input and provides several control signals to schedule
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checkpointing and rollback (see Figure 4.23). Three redundant memory cells (f1, f2, and f3)
are inserted before the control FSM that is protected by TMR. Three cells isolate a possible
glitch on fail signal from the triplicated control FSM so that at least two redundant control
FSMs have always the same state (see Section 4.4.5).
To prevent errors from corrupting the input/output behavior, additional input and output
buffers are necessary. Input buffers store the last two input vectors to provide the necessary
information for re-computation. The output buffers emit previously recorded correct outputs
and filter out the corrupted data during the recovery process. Recording outputs, they
introduce a latency of two cycles.
The memory blocks, the control block, and the input/output buffers guarantee that the
DTR circuit is fault tolerant, i.e., that an SET (within the fault-model) cannot corrupt the
primary outputs. Even errors occurring directly at the primary outputs can be masked.
In the previously presented TTR scheme, the outputs are triplicated (multiplexed) in time,
so the “surrounding” circuit can demultiplex them and mask an error by voting. In the
DTR case, such an approach would not work because the outputs are only duplicated in
time. To resolve this issue, the DTR output buffers provide three redundant output wires
for each output of the original circuit, so that the surrounding circuit can vote to mask errors
occurring directly at the primary outputs (Section 4.4.4).
We describe the components of the DTR transformed circuit in the following sections.
4.4.2 DTR Memory Blocks
The memory block is depicted in Figure 4.24. It consists of four memory cells:
1. two cells d and d′ (the data bits) to save redundant information for comparison; since
the input stream is upsampled twice, d and d′ contain the same value each odd cycle;
e.g., if the input stream leads to si1=u, si2=u, ... then the pair (d, d
′) will contain
successively the values (0, 0), (u, 0), (u, u), ... where the initial value of the memory
cells is supposed to be 0;
2. two cells r and r′ (the recovery bits) with an enable input to keep the value of the si
input during four clock cycles and to allow the rollback after an error detection.
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Figure 4.24: DTR Memory Block.
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The DTR memory performs an error-detection comparison whose result is sent as a fail
signal to the DTR control block. As noted above, the comparison of d and d′ is meaningful
only during the odd cycles and so is the fail signal which is read only at those cycles.
In addition to the data input signal (si in Figure 4.24), each DTR memory block takes
as inputs the special global control signals save and rollBack produced by the control block
and used to organize the circuit recovery after an error detection.
In Figure 4.24 we name all the internal wires that are connected to multiple gates (e.g., the
output of d is connected to 3 gates, hence the 3 names dA, dB, and dC). This will be useful
in Section 4.4.8 to address all possible corruptions caused by an SET.
4.4.3 DTR Input Buffers
An input buffer is inserted at each primary input of the original circuit to keep the two last
bits of the input stream. The buffer is implemented as a pipeline of two memory cells, b
and b′, as shown in Figure 4.25. The signal rB is raised by the control block during the
recovery process (Figure 4.27).
b
D Q
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D Q
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Figure 4.25: DTR input buffer (pi primary input).
The cells b and b′ are used only during the recovery process in order to re-execute the last
two cycles. These bits are provided to the combinational part instead of the bits from the
input streams. They also serve to store the inputs that keep coming during those two cycles.
During the recovery, the vector ~ci consists of (i) the first part ~pi coming from the input
buffers and (ii) the second part ~so coming from the rollbacked memory blocks. If an error is
detected at cycle i, then the rollback is performed at cycle i+ 1 and the vector ~pi i−1⊕ ~soi−1
is provided to the combinational part (exactly the input vector already supplied 2 cycles
before).
From Eq. (4.18), we see that b and b′ represent two identical (resp. distinct) upsampled
bits at each odd (resp. even) clock cycle: ~b2i−1 =~b′2i−1. Since error detection occurs at odd
cycles, the recovery, which starts a cycle after, will read two different non-redundant inputs
from ~b and ~b′. This is consistent with the speedup of the circuit during the recovery. The
behavior of input buffers during the recovery is illustrated in Section 4.4.7.
4.4.4 DTR Output Buffers
The error recovery procedure disturbs the vector stream ~co in comparison with the normal
operating mode. To mask this effect at the primary outputs, we insert a DTR output buffer
(Figure 4.26) before each primary output. They produce correct outputs but introduce, in
normal mode, a latency loss of two clock cycles.
The output buffer is designed to be also fault-tolerant to any SET occurring inside or at
its outputs. To achieve this property, the new primary outputs are triplicated (poA, poB ,
poC ). The output buffers ensure that at least two out of them are correct at each even cycle.
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Figure 4.26: DTR Output Buffer (co is the output of the combinational part).
The surrounding circuit can thus read these outputs at even cycles and perform a vote to
mask any SET that may have occurred at the outputs. This is just a possible implementation
and a different design could be used, e.g., with a fault-model excluding/disregarding errors
at the outputs or with different interface requirements.
The memory cells p′, o′, and o′′ have the same value at each even cycle if no error has
occurred. With an SET, the correctness of only two of them is guaranteed.
The multiplexer muxD allows to propagate either the signal co or the value of the memory
cell o directly to the outputs (poA, poB , poC ) of the output buffer. This functionality is
used only during the recovery after an error detection in order to propagate the correct re-
calculated value directly to the primary outputs of the transformed circuit. This allows us
to keep the output stream as it would be if no fault occurred.
While the functionality of three AND-gates and three multiplexers (muxA, muxB,
muxC) is exactly the same, they are needed to guarantee that an SET cannot corrupt
more than one output signal (poA, poB , poC ).
Our output buffers have error-detection capabilities too (thanks to the comparator EQ).
If an SET happens in the combinational circuit and directly propagates to an output buffer
corrupting the memory cell o, then it will be detected. However, an SET can corrupt the
memory cell p too. Therefore, there are three possible corruption scenarios that should be
considered:
1. both p and o are corrupted: since o is corrupted, the error will be detected by EQ with
the subsequent recovery;
2. only o is corrupted: same as above;
3. only p is corrupted: this error propagates to p′ and to the output poA then, but it does
not violate the property that only one of outputs (poA, poB , poC ) may be corrupted.
Additional details about the behavior of output buffers are provided in Section 4.4.7.
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4.4.5 DTR Control Block
The control block is shown in Figure 4.23. The control signals save, rollBack (for memory
blocks), rB (for input buffers), and subst (for output buffers) are generated to support the
transformed circuit functionality during the normal and recovery modes.
The control block takes the error detection signal fail as its input (the disjunction of
all memory blocks and output buffers individual fail signals). The fail signal is latched
by three redundant memory cells f1, f2, and f3 to indicate the presence of errors in the
circuit (or absence if they are zeros). These three redundant cells return three redundant
signals (f1 − f3) to the control FSM. The control FSM itself is protected by TMR, hence it
is triplicated. Such structure guarantees that, in all possible corruption scenarios, at least
two of the three signals f1−f3 are the same. This property also means that, under any SET
occurrence, at least two of the three redundant control FSMs are in the same state. If these
three cells did not exist, a glitch on fail would be able to corrupt three redundant control
FSMs in three different ways. Three redundant copies would have three different states after
such SET, which is a non-recoverable situation for TMR.
The functionality of a single copy i (i = 1, 2, 3) of the control FSM is presented in
Figure 4.27. States 0 and 1 compose the normal mode, which raises the save signal alter-
natively. When an error is detected (i.e., fail = 1), the next clock cycle (fi = 1) the FSM
enters the recovery mode (edge 1− 2) for 4 clock cycles and raises the corresponding signals.
i
i
0 1
2
34
5
Figure 4.27: FSM of the DTR control block: “
?
=” denotes a guard, “=” an
assignment and signals absent from an edge are set to 0.
fi is a fail delayed on one cycle.
Since the size of the control FSM (∼25 core cells) is negligible in comparison with the rest
of the circuit, its triplication almost does not increase the hardware overhead (as confirmed
in Section 4.4.9). Therefore, the only way to corrupt the global control signals is by an SET
outside the control block. This ensures that no two global control signals can be corrupted
simultaneously by one SET.
It would be tedious to explain separately all the possible interactions of the control block
with memory blocks and buffers. Instead, in Sections 4.4.6 and 4.4.7 we present the two
operating modes of the DTR circuit: the normal mode (before a fault) and the recovery
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mode (after a fault). Section 4.4.8, which examines all possible SETs, also clarifies the
mechanisms of the different components.
4.4.6 Normal Execution Mode
If no error is detected, the circuit is working in the normal operating mode. During this
mode, the signal rollBack is always set to zero, while save is raised every even cycle:
save2i−1 = 0 and save2i = 1 (4.19)
Since save is the enable signal of memory cells r and r′, it organizes a four-cycle delay from
si to r ′ in normal mode. The internal behavior of each DTR memory block in normal mode
can be described by the following equations:
rollBacki = 0
~si i = ~di+1 = ~d
′
i+2 = ~soi+2
~si2i = ~r2i+1 = ~r2i+2 = ~r′2i+3 = ~r′2i+4
save2i−1 = 0, save2i = 1
(4.20)
It is easy to show that the DTR circuit verifies the same equalities as Eq. (4.1) for the
original circuit:
~coi = ϕ(~ci i) ~ci i = ~pi i ⊕ ~soi ~coi = ~poi ⊕ ~si i (4.21)
From Eqs. (4.18), (4.20), and (4.21), we can derive two properties for the normal operating
mode. First, the output bit stream ~co of the combinational part after the circuit transforma-
tion is a double-time upsampling of the corresponding bit stream ~CO of the original circuit.
Formally:
Property 4.3. ∀i ∈ N∗. ~co2i−1 = ~co2i = ~COi
Proof. We assume that the two cells d and d′ of each memory block are initialized as the
original cell, and therefore ~so1 = ~so2 = ~SO1. By Eqs. (4.1) and (4.21), we have ~co1 = ~co2 =
~CO1. The proof is then a simple induction using Eqs. (4.1), (4.18), and (4.21).
Second, at each odd cycle, the outputs of the cells d and d′ are equal:
Property 4.4. ∀i ∈ N∗. ~d2i−1 = ~d′2i−1
Proof. At the first cycle (i=1), the property is true by the same initialization hypothesis as
above. Property 4.4 and Eq. (4.21) entail that ~si2i−1 = ~si2i. By Eq. (4.20), we have:
~si2i = ~d2i+1 = ~d
′
2i+2
‖
~si2i−1 = ~d2i = ~d′2i+1
and thus, ∀i > 0, ~d2i+1 = ~d′2i+1, which is equivalent to ∀i > 1, ~d2i−1 = ~d′2i−1.
For error detection, we check the violation of Property 4.4 which is performed by the EQ
comparator (Figure 4.24). If at some odd cycle 2j − 1 the d and d′ cells of a memory block
differ, an error is detected and the fail signal will be raised (fail2j−1 = 1). The circuit has to
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Table 4.4.6: Recovery process in DTR circuits.
clk ~pi ~b ~b′ ~ci ~d ~d′ ~r ~r ′ f sa ro ~ci ~d ~d′ ~r ~r ′
i− 3 ~pi i−3 ~pi i−4 ~pi i−5 ~pi i−3 ⊕ ~si i−5 ~si i−4 ~si i−5 ~si i−5 ~si i−7 ? 1 0 ~pi i−3 ⊕ ~si i−5 ~si i−4 ~si i−5 ~si i−5 ~si i−7
i− 2 ~pi i−2 ~pi i−3 ~pi i−4 ~pi i−2 ⊕ ~si i−4 ~si i−3 ~si i−4 ~si i−3 ~si i−5 0 0 0 ~pi i−2 ⊕ ~si i−4 ~si i−3 ~si i−4 ~si i−3 ~si i−5
i− 1 ~pi i−1 ~pi i−2 ~pi i−3 ~pi i−1 ⊕ ~si i−3 ~si i−2 ~si i−3 ~si i−3 ~si i−5 ? 1 0 ~pi i−1 ⊕ ~si i−3 ~si i−2 ~si i−3 ~si i−3 ~si i−5
i ~pi i ~pi i−1 ~pi i−2 ~pi i ⊕ †~si i−2 ‡~si i−1 †~si i−2 ‡~si i−1 ~si i−3 1 0 0 ~pi i ⊕ ~si i−2 ~si i−1 ~si i−2 ~si i−1 ~si i−3
i+ 1 ~pi i+1 ~pi i ~pi i−1 ~pi i−1 ⊕ ~si i−3 †~si i ‡~si i−1 ‡~si i−1 ~si i−3 ? 1 1 ~pi i+1 ⊕ ~si i−1 ~si i ~si i−1 ~si i−1 ~si i−3
i+ 2 ~pi i+2 ~pi i+1 ~pi i ~pi i+1 ⊕ ~si i−1 ~si i−1 †~si i ~si i−1 ‡~si i−1 ? 0 1 ~pi i+2 ⊕ ~si i ~si i+1 ~si i ~si i+1 ~si i−1
i+ 3 ~pi i+3 ~pi i+2 ~pi i+1 ~pi i+3 ⊕ ~si i+1 ~si i+1 ~si i−1 ~si i−1 ‡~si i−1 ? 0 1 ~pi i+3 ⊕ ~si i+1 ~si i+2 ~si i+1 ~si i+1 ~si i−1
i+ 4 ~pi i+4 ~pi i+3 ~pi i+2 ~pi i+4 ⊕ ~si i+3 ~si i+3 ~si i+1 ~si i−1 ‡~si i−1 ? 0 1 ~pi i+4 ⊕ ~si i+2 ~si i+3 ~si i+2 ~si i+3 ~si i+1
i+ 5 ~pi i+5 ~pi i+4 ~pi i+3 ~pi i+5 ⊕ ~si i+3 ~si i+4 ~si i+3 ~si i−1 ‡~si i−1 ? 1 0 ~pi i+5 ⊕ ~si i+3 ~si i+4 ~si i+3 ~si i+3 ~si i+1
i+ 6 ~pi i+6 ~pi i+5 ~pi i+4 ~pi i+6 ⊕ ~si i+4 ~si i+5 ~si i+4 ~si i+5 ~si i−1 0 0 0 ~pi i+6 ⊕ ~si i+4 ~si i+5 ~si i+4 ~si i+5 ~si i+3
i+ 7 ~pi i+7 ~pi i+6 ~pi i+5 ~pi i+7 ⊕ ~si i+5 ~si i+6 ~si i+5 ~si i+5 ~si i−1 ? 1 0 ~pi i+7 ⊕ ~si i+5 ~si i+6 ~si i+5 ~si i+5 ~si i+3
i+ 8 ~pi i+8 ~pi i+7 ~pi i+6 ~pi i+8 ⊕ ~si i+6 ~si i+7 ~si i+6 ~si i+7 ~si i+5 0 0 0 ~pi i+8 ⊕ ~si i+6 ~si i+7 ~si i+6 ~si i+7 ~si i+5
† = ‡ but for two mutually-exclusive error propagation cases
f :fail; sa:save; ro:rollBack
rollback to the correct state stored in ~r′ and to re-compute the previous step. The rollback
is performed by propagating ~r′ to ~so. From Eq. (4.20), we can derive the following equation:
~r′2j−1 = ~r′2j = ~si2j−4 (4.22)
Eq. (4.22) means that, at the moment of an error detection (and at the next clock cycle
when fi = 1, i = 1, 2, 3), the recovery bit r
′ is set to the value of the input signal si 3
cycles before. It will be shown in Section 4.4.8 that all recovery bits contain correct values
when an error is detected (i.e., an error in the data bits never corrupts ~r′).
4.4.7 Recovery Execution Mode
If an error has been detected, the circuit performs a rollback followed by three consecutive
cycles during which the double time redundancy mechanism is switched-off. These steps
are implemented by a sequence of signals (save, rollBack , subst , and rB) produced by the
control block.
The left part of Table 4.4.6 (in white) shows the values of the bit vectors in the trans-
formed circuit cycle by cycle when an error is detected at clock cycle i. The behavior of the
circuit in normal mode (when no error occurs) is shown in the right part (in gray). Recall
that, in the normal mode, the vector ~ci at cycle i is such that ~ci i = ~pi i ⊕ ~soi = ~pi i ⊕ ~si i−2.
The principle of the rollback mechanism is that the DTR memory blocks re-inject the last
correct saved state (the ~si vector) while the DTR input buffers re-inject the corresponding
primary input (the ~pi component).
At the clock cycle (i+ 1) following an error detection, the recovery starts and the correct
state represented by ~r′ is pushed through ~so. Consequently, ~soi+1 = ~r′i+1 = ~si i−3 instead of
the expected ~si i−1 in the normal mode. Thus, the second component of ~ci i+1 is ~si i−3. The
primary input vector is also replaced by the vector kept in the input buffers; that is, at the
i + 1 cycle ~pi i+1 is replaced by ~pi i−1. Recall that, during recovery, the circuit is working
with the throughput of the original circuit, which is twice higher than in the normal mode.
In particular, during the cycles i+ 2, i+ 3, and i+ 4, ~d propagates directly through the ~so
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outputs of each memory block, bypassing the memory cells ~d′. This is implemented by raising
rollBack and lowering save which control the muxA and muxB multiplexers appropriately
in each memory block. This is safe since the SET (1 ,K ) fault-model guarantees that no
additional error can occur just after an SET.
Consider cycle i + 2: the second component of ~ci i+2 is ~si i−1 (~si i−2, which is identical
to ~si i−1, has been skipped). Similarly, the primary input vector is replaced by ~pi i+1, since,
in the input buffers, ~b′i+2 = ~pi i and ~pi i+1 = ~pi i. It follows that ~ci i+1 = ~pi i−1 ⊕ ~si i−3 and
~ci i+2 = ~pi i+1 ⊕ ~si i−1.
Let us look more closely at how an error propagates and how it is masked. The error
~di 6= ~d′i detected at cycle i does not indicate which of ~d or ~d′ is corrupted. The fault-model
only guarantees that their simultaneous corruption is not possible. We consider both of
them as potentially corrupted and the † and ‡ marks indicate the two possible bit vector
corruptions. We track the error propagation cycle by cycle based on data dependencies
between vectors as shown in Table 4.4.6.
Case #1: If ~d′i contains a corrupted value †~si i−2, it contaminates ~ci i. Since this input
bit vector is corrupted, the outputs of the combinational circuit can be corrupted as well
since ~di+1 that latches †~si i. This corrupted value propagates to ~d′, so ~d′i+2 = †~si i. Since
~d′ is bypassed and ~d propagates directly through the wires ~so, the error at †~si i is logically
masked at muxB by rollBack , which is raised during 4 cycles after the error detection.
Case #2: If ~di contains a corrupted value ‡~si i−1, it will propagate to ~d′ and ~d′i+1 =‡~si i−1.
Since ‡~si i−1 has been latched by ~d and ~r at the same clock cycle, ~ri is also corrupted:
~ri=‡~si i−1. When rollback happens at cycle i+ 1, ~r propagates to ~r′ and remains in ~r′ until
the next raised save. The save signal is raised only 5 cycles after the error-detection, when
rollBack is lowered again. As a result, any error in ~r′i+5 will be re-written with a new correct
data and cannot propagate through signals ~so due to the logical masking by rollBack =0 at
muxB .
All corrupted signals disappear from the circuit state within 6 clock cycles after an error
detection. The whole circuit returns to a correct state within 8 cycles. As it is shown in the
next section, the error detection occurs at worst 2 cycles later after an SET.
Table 4.4.7 represents the behavior of output buffers in the same situation (i.e., the
recovery procedure when an error is detected at cycle i). The signal names correspond to
Figure 4.26 and Table 4.4.6.
The fail signal can be raised by any memory block as well as by any output buffer since
the latter also have an error-detection mechanism (EQ comparator). Consequently, if an
error is detected at cycle i (fail = 1), we cannot assume the correctness of cells ~o and ~o′ in
the output buffers at this clock cycles (‡ ~coi−1, ‡ ~coi−2). Moreover, if a memory block signals
an error, the bit vector ~pi i ⊕ †~si i−2 coming from the memory blocks to the output buffers
can be corrupted too. However, in all corruption scenarios, the DTR circuit performs the
rollback at the next cycle i + 1 by re-calculating the bit vector ~coi−1 a third time. The
output buffers allow this recalculated correct bit-vector ~coi−1 to propagate directly to the
primary outputs ~poA/B/C through the multiplexers muxD − {muxA, muxB, muxC}. In
such a way, the primary outputs of DTR circuits remain correct even one cycle after an
error-detection. The next even cycle, when fault-tolerance properties should be guaranteed,
is the cycle i+ 3. If no error had occurred, the primary output values would have been equal
to ~coi+1 = ~coi as the right part of Table 4.4.7 indicates (filled with grey color). To fulfill
this condition after an error occurrence, the outputs of cells ~o are propagated directly to
the primary outputs. As a result, the output buffers substitute twice the corrupted output
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Table 4.4.7: Recovery Process: Input/Output Buffers Reaction for an Error Detection at
cycle i.
clk ~pi ~ci ~o ~o′ ~o′′ ~poA/B/C fail sa ro rB sub ~o ~o′ ~o′′ ~poA/B/C
i− 3 ~pi i−3 ~pi i−3 ⊕ ~si i−5 ~coi−4 ~coi−5 ~coi−6 ~coi−5 ? 1 0 0 0 ~coi−4 ~coi−5 ~coi−6 ~coi−5 = ~coi−6
i− 2 ~pi i−2 ~pi i−2 ⊕ ~si i−4 ~coi−3 ~coi−4 ~coi−5 ignore 0 0 0 0 0 ~coi−3 ~coi−4 ~coi−5 ignore
i− 1 ~pi i−1 ~pi i−1 ⊕ ~si i−3 ~coi−2 ~coi−3 ~coi−4 ~coi−3 ? 1 0 0 0 ~coi−2 ~coi−3 ~coi−4 ~coi−3 = ~coi−4
i ~pi i ~pi i ⊕ †~si i−2 ‡ ~coi−1 ‡ ~coi−2 ~coi−3 ignore 1 0 0 0 0 ~coi−1 ~coi−2 ~coi−3 ignore
i+ 1 ~pi i+1 ~pi i−1 ⊕ ~si i−3 † ~coi ‡ ~coi−1 ‡ ~coi−2 ~coi−1 (←) ? 1 1 1 1 ~coi ~coi−1 ~coi−2 ~coi−1 = ~coi−2
i+ 2 ~pi i+2 ~pi i+1 ⊕ ~si i−1 ~coi−1 † ~coi ‡ ~coi−1 ignore ? 0 1 1 1 ~coi+1 ~coi ~coi−1 ignore
i+ 3 ~pi i+3 ~pi i+3 ⊕ ~si i+1 ~coi+1 ~coi−1 † ~coi ~coi+1 (←) ? 0 1 0 1 ~coi+2 ~coi+1 ~coi ~coi+1 = ~coi
i+ 4 ~pi i+4 ~pi i+4 ⊕ ~si i+3 ~coi+3 ~coi+1 ~coi−1 ignore ? 0 1 0 0 ~coi+3 ~coi+2 ~coi+1 ignore
i+ 5 ~pi i+5 ~pi i+5 ⊕ ~si i+3 ~coi+4 ~coi+3 ~coi+1 ~coi+3 ? 1 0 0 0 ~coi+4 ~coi+3 ~coi+2 ~coi+3 = ~coi+2
i+ 6 ~pi i+6 ~pi i+6 ⊕ ~si i+4 ~coi+5 ~coi+4 ~coi+3 ignore 0 0 0 0 0 ~coi+5 ~coi+4 ~coi+3 ignore
i+ 7 ~pi i+7 ~pi i+7 ⊕ ~si i+5 ~coi+6 ~coi+5 ~coi+4 ~coi+5 ? 1 0 0 0 ~coi+6 ~coi+5 ~coi+4 ~coi+5 = ~coi+4
i+ 8 ~pi i+8 ~pi i+8 ⊕ ~si i+6 ~coi+7 ~coi+6 ~coi+5 ignore 0 0 0 0 0 ~coi+7 ~coi+6 ~coi+5 ignore
‡ = † but for two error-detection cases: ‡ - detection in Output Buffer; † - detection in a preceding
Memory Block
(←) - data substitution performed by multiplixers muxA, muxB, muxC, muxD
sa - save; ro - rollBack; sub - subst
stream values with their correct re-calculated versions during cycles i+ 1 and i+ 3 (marked
with “(←)”). After this recovery period, the output buffers introduce a delay on purpose for
the next two reasons:
1. The output buffers have to be able to detect SET effects by themselves to guarantee
the primary outputs correctness. Not all glitches in a combinational circuit propagate
to the memory blocks to be detected there. Some glitches may go directly to the output
buffers. That’s why the output buffers have to first latch two redundant bits (in cells
o and o′) and compare them to detect possible data corruption.
2. If an error is detected at the output buffers, one additional clock cycle is needed to re-
calculate the correct output value. To make the output correctness properties simpler
we introduce the memory cell o′′ that plays the role of such delay in normal mode
(when no error occurs). During the recovery this cell o′′ is by-passed (with muxD).
As a result, the recovery process becomes transparent for the surrounding circuit.
We investigate all possible SETs in the next section.
4.4.8 Fault Tolerance Guarantees
We check all possible SET insertion cases. We write j to denote the clock cycle where the
SET occurs. The causal relationship is written as “→” and “†” denotes the corruption.
1 An SET in ~ci , ~si , the rollBack signal, the internal wire dA′, or the combinational part
ϕ may lead to †~d and †~r. During odd cycles (i = 1, 3, . . .), the simultaneous corruption of
~d and ~r is not possible since the save signal logically masks SET propagation towards the r
memory cell. As a result, there are two cases:
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1. †~dj+1∧if j = 2i−1. If ~d has been corrupted by an SET in the preceding combinational
circuit, an error will be detected by the comparator within the next two cycles. fail j+2 =
1 since ~dj+2 is calculated correctly. Since ~r′ is correct, the recovery will return the
circuit to its correct state.
2. †~dj+1 ∧ †~rj+1 ∧ if j = 2i. In this case, we must check that the error is detected before
reaching ~r′. Actually, the error will be detected at the next (odd) clock cycle after an
error occurrence: fail j+1 = 1. But
~r′ keeps its correct value because savej+1 = 0. The
recovery process starts at cycle j+2, re-writing the correct ~r′ with a possible corrupted
data; but in the same cycle ~r′j+2 outputs a correct value that rollbacks the circuit to
a correct state.
2 Consider the following SETs: †savej , †~rj , † ~r′j , † ~muj , †siB j , and † ~dC j , which may result
in the corruption of the pipeline r − r ′ (see Figure 4.24). This corruption disappears a few
cycles later at muxB because rollBack =0. So, this failure is masked.
3 An SET during an odd clock cycle at the fail line possibly leads to spurious error detec-
tion followed by a recovery. But ~r′j+1 is valid and the recovery will be performed correctly.
During even clock cycles, an SET at the fail line remains silent since, at these cycles, fail is
ignored by the control block. Recall that fi in Figure 4.27 is the fail signal delayed by one
clock cycle.
4 An SET at the output signal of d′ may lead to three different cases:
1. †~d′j → † ~soj → †ϕj , which is equivalent to case 1 ;
2. †~d′j → † ~failj , which is equivalent to case 3 ;
3. †~d′j → †ϕj ∧ † ~failj i.e., a simultaneous corruption of combinational circuit and a fail
signal. The recovery process starts at the next clock cycle j+1 using the correct ~r′j+1.
5 An SET at the output signal of d may lead to the corruption of dA, dB , and/or dC (see
Figure 4.24). First, a corruption of dC will always be masked regardless of the possible com-
mon corruptions of dA or dB . Indeed, if dC is corrupted, then the propagation/corruption
will be masked by muxB since rollBack =0 (a simultaneous corruption of d and rollBack is
impossible). Five other cases must be considered:
1. If the error propagates to dA (but not dB) and is latched by d′ during an even cycle,
then an error will be detected at the next odd cycle j + 1 and will be masked as in
case 1 .
2. If the error propagates to dA (but not dB) and is latched by d′ during an odd cycle,
then it is equivalent to a corruption of the combinational circuit one clock cycle after
the latch. It will be masked as in case 1 .
3. If the error propagates to dA and dB and corrupts d′ and fail at an even cycle, then
we are back to the first case above; indeed, the control block reads fail only at odd
cycles and the corruption of fail will not be considered.
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4. If the error propagates to dA and dB and corrupts d′ and fail at an odd cycle, then
the recovery starts at the next clock cycle using the correct ~r′ and disregarding the
corrupted ~d′.
5. If the error propagates to dB (but not dA), it may corrupt the fail signal and it is
masked as in case 3 .
An SET in the control block may lead to the following corruption scenarios (see Fig-
ure 4.23):
1. Any effect of an SET occurring in the control FSM protected by TMR will be masked
within one clock cycle thanks to the TMR protection. Moreover, such an SET cannot
propagate to the output signals of the control block (save, rollBack, etc) due to the
voters at its outputs.
2. The output signals of the control block can be influenced by an SET individually, but
these separate corruption cases have been already considered above.
3. Any SET occurring between the redundant cells f1-f3 (including these cells) and the
triplicated control FSM can corrupt only one redundant copy of the TMR protected
control FSM. So, this case is equivalent to the 1st one in this list.
4. An SET on fail signal leads to two possible scenarios: the majority of cells f1-f3 takes
the value true or the majority of cells f1-f3 takes the value false. In the former case,
the scenario is similar to one described in 3 : if fail is corrupted at odd cycles (state 1,
Figure 4.27), then the recovery starts; otherwise, the control FSM ignores the outputs
of f1-f3 cells (state 0). In the latter case, no recovery happens. Even if the cells f1-f3
are corrupted non-homogenously (one cell has a different value from the other two),
the states of the redundant control FSM copies will be re-synchronised within 2 clock
cycles thanks to its TMR structure and to the majority voting on their states. The
outputs of the control block always behave as if all cells f1-f3 have the same value
equal to the value of the majority.
An SET may also occur in the input buffers, in particular in the memory cells b and
b′ (see Figure 4.25). Such an error will be logically masked within two clock cycles by the
signal rB =0 at the multiplexer.
An SET occurring just before an output buffer at ~co (see Figure 4.26) will be detected by
the comparator (like in the memory blocks). This error will be masked at the multiplexers
muxA, muxB , or muxC . The structure of the output buffer provides an isolation for the
pipelines o − o′ − o′′ and p − p′, which in turn guarantees that at least two memory cells
among o′, o′′, and p′ are correct during all even clock cycles. The new primary outputs, poA,
poB , and poC , are identical during all even clock cycles if no SET occurs, and only one can
differ from the others if an SET occurs. This fault-tolerance property still holds even if one
of the control signals (rollBack, subst, or save) is corrupted by an SET. Furthermore, using
three outputs, as in TMR, gives the surrounding circuit the capability to mask (by voting)
any error occurring at the primary outputs.
The final SET scenario is the one that may occur at the primary input signals ~pi and is
latched both by the memory blocks and the input buffers. Double-redundancy can detect the
error but it has no way to replay the input signal. Such an SET can be masked only if the
surrounding circuit can read the fail signal from the DTR circuit and provide a third copy
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Figure 4.28: Circuit size after transformation (large circuits).
of ~pi . Here, we do not enforce such a requirement on the surrounding circuit and consider
that the fault-model forbids the corruption of the primary inputs.
4.4.9 Experimental results
In this section as in 4.3.4 and 4.2.6, we compare DTR to full TMR on the ITC ’99 benchmark
suite [147]. Each transformed circuit was synthesized for FPGA using Synplify Pro without
any optimization (resource sharing, FSM optimization, etc.). We have again chosen flash-
based ProASIC3 FPGA family as a synthesis target.
The circuits are sorted as in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.3.4: first according to their size (bigger
or smaller 500 core cells) and then according to the ratio between the sizes of combinational
and sequential parts in the original circuit. Figures 4.28 shows the results for the largest
circuits and 4.29 shows the results for the smallest ones.
The DTR circuits require significantly less hardware for almost all circuits of the bench-
mark. The constant hardware cost of the supporting mechanisms (control block, input/out-
put buffers) becomes negligible when the size of the original circuit is large enough.
Figure 4.28 shows that the DTR circuits are 1.39 to 2.1 times larger than the original
ones. For comparison, TMR circuits are 3.3 to 3.9 larger than the original ones. The largest
hardware overhead for all circuit transformations has been observed for b12 circuit, a game
controller with 121 memory cells [147]. The TMR and DTR version of b12 are respectively
3.9 and 2.1 times larger than the original circuit.
Figure 4.29 shows that, for the majority of the smallest circuits (< 100 memory cells),
DTR still have less hardware overhead than TMR. But this benefit is negated for the tiny
circuits b01, b02, and b06 (< 10 memory cells) due to the hardware overhead of the control
block and input/output buffers. For such small circuits, TMR is clearly a better option.
Figure 4.30 demonstrates why DTR transformation has significantly less hardware over-
head compared to TMR. The synthesized circuit b17 (first bar) consists of a large combina-
tional part (bottom part: 17240 core cells) and a small sequential part (top part: 1415 core
cells). The DTR circuit (third bar) reuses the combinational part, so its size stays the same.
The hardware cost of the DTR control block, input and output buffers is negligible (only
5% of all needed hardware resources). As a result, after DTR transformation, the circtuit
occupies 153% of its original size (hardware overhead = 53%) whereas, after TMR, it takes
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350% (harware overhead = 250%). The overhead of DTR is 4.7 times smaller than TMR for
b17 and between 2.7 to 6.1 times smaller for the whole ITC ’99 benchmark suite.
Although DTR has a significantly smaller hardware overhead than TMR it decreases the
circuit throughput. Indeed, since the technique requires the input streams to be upsampled,
the throughput of the transformed circuit is at least divided by two. Figure 4.31 shows the
ratio of the transformed circuit throughput w.r.t. the corresponding original throughput for
the ITC’99 benchmark suite (sorted left to right w.r.t. the size of the original circuit). Besides
the upsampling, the DTR transformation influences by itself (as well as TMR) the circuit
maximum frequency, which also changes the final throughput. In particular, the maximum
synthesizable frequency after DTR transformation reaches ∼75% of the original frequency
for small circuits (for TMR it is ∼77% ) and ∼92% for large circuits (for TMR it is ∼93%).
In the best case, the throughput of DTR circuits can reach 50% of the original circuit
due to the double upsampling of inputs. The control block and the multiplexers in memory
blocks also introduce a small extra overhead. For large circuits, the throughput is 40–50%
of the original, while for small circuits it drops to 30–40%.
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(sorted according to circuit size).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a family of novel logic-level circuit transformations that au-
tomatically introduce time-redundancy for fault-tolerance in digital circuits. In each trans-
formation, the combinational part of the original circuit is time-multiplexed to produce the
redundant results for further error detection and/or error masking. This significantly reduces
the hardware overhead in comparison with hardware-redundancy. This reduction is achieved
with a trade-off on the circuit throughput that, as in any other time-redundant techniques,
drops according to the order of time-redundancy. All transformations are technologically
independent, do not require any specific hardware support, and are suitable for stream-
to-stream processing. Existing synthesis tools can be easily enriched with the presented
automatic transformation techniques.
We first presented a simple TTR scheme (Section 4.3.2.3) which uses three time redun-
dancy and is able to tolerate the fault-model SET (1, 4). While TTR circuits are 1.6-2.1
times smaller than their TMR alternatives, the constant triple loss of the original through-
put presents a significant disadvantage for high-performance applications. We have proposed
how to minimize the hardware size of TTR circuits with the static analysis presented in Chap-
ter 3. Such optimization has a potential to cut the hardware overhead of TTR technique by
two third, making TTR circuits only 12%-30% bigger than the original circuits.
The next group of time-redundant techniques can be featured by their ability to change
“on-the-fly” the order of redundancy. The transformed circuit may dynamically adapt
the throughput/fault-tolerance trade-off by changing its operating mode. Therefore, time-
redundant modes can be used only in critical situations (e.g., above the SAA, above the
Earth poles for satellites), during the processing of crucial data (e.g., the encryption of se-
lected data), or critical processes (e.g., a satellite computers reboot). When hardware size
is limited and fault-tolerance is only occasionally needed, the proposed scheme is a better
choice than the static TMR, which incurs a constant high hardware overhead, and the static
TTR, which introduces a permanent triple throughput loss. We have focused on two cases
of these techniques: the dynamic double-time redundant scheme DyTR2 and the dynamic
triple-time redundant one DyTR3. The synthesis results show that DyTR3 and DyTR2
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circuits are respectively 1.72.4 and 2.72.9 times smaller than TMR.
At last, using the principles of the dynamic time redundancy and state checkpointing
and rollback, we have introduced the DTR transformation that needs only double-time re-
dundancy to mask SETs and makes the recovery after an error-detection transparent for
the surrounding circuit. Under the assumption that SETs happen less frequently than ev-
ery 10 clock cycles, the transformed DTR circuit switches-off the double-time redundancy
to rollback and recompute data a third time preserving the output stream correctness as if
no error had occurred. Additionally, DTR may allow the surrounding circuit to switch off
time redundancy (as the control block does in the recovery phase). This feature permits
to dynamically and temporarily give up fault-tolerance and speed up the circuit twice as
in DyTR2. The overall size of DTR circuits is 1.9 to 2.5 times smaller than their TMR
alternatives. While the transformed circuits are still 1.4-2.1 larger than the original ones and
twice slower, DTR presents an interesting general time-redundant solution to protect any
sequential circuit and can serve as an alternative to widely-used TMR.
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Figure 4.32: Transformations overheads for throughput and hardware, the circuit b21.
Figure 4.32 compares the presented time-redundant transformations according to through-
put and hardware overheads for the circuit b21. Each point is notated with its tolerated
fault-model for the corresponding transformation. The strength of fault-tolerance guaran-
tees could play the role of the third axis. TMR transformation requires much more hardware
recourses than any of time-redundant circuits whose sizes are comparable between each other.
On the other hand, TMR offers the strongest tolerated fault-model and the smallest through-
put overhead (∼5%). Among time-redundant circuits, the strongest fault-model is provided
by TTR which looses in other criteria: throughput, hardware size, flexibility. Trading off the
fault-tolerance properties for circuit size, throughout, and the ability to change operating
modes, we first reach the point of the DyTR3 transformation and after arrive to the DTR
solution. DTR can tolerate weaker fault-model than other transformations but imposes low
hardware cost (as DyTR3 does) and the smallest throughput loss among time-redundant
transformations. In addition, DTR has the ability to switch off time redundancy.
While going from relatively simple techniques, as TTR, to the more advanced DTR,
it became clear that the manual check of the transformation correctness and of its fault-
tolerance properties is error-prone and not convincing enough for safety-critical applications.
Even the patented circuit transformation solutions [4] have fault-tolerance flaws, as discussed
in Section 2.1.3.2. As an answer to this issue, we have formally proven DTR correctness, as
presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 5
Formal proof of the DTR
Transformation
Since fault-tolerance is typically used in critical domains (aerospace, defence, etc), the cor-
rectness of circuit transformations for fault-tolerance is essential. Along with functional
verification, the fault-tolerance properties have also to be checked. As we saw in Chapter 4,
fault-tolerance techniques, like DTR, are often too complex to assure their correctness with
manual checks. Widely-used post-synthesis verification tools (e.g., model checking) are sim-
ply inappropriate to prove that a transformation ensures fault-tolerance properties for all
possible circuits; only proof-based approaches are suitable.
In this chapter, we present a language-based solution to certify fault-tolerance techniques
for digital circuits. Circuits are expressed in a gate-level HDL, fault-tolerance techniques
are described as automatic circuit transformations in that language, and fault-models are
specified as particular semantics of the HDL. These elements are formalized in the Coq proof
assistant [155] and the properties, ensuring that for all circuits their transformed version
masks all faults of the considered fault-model, can be expressed and proved. Proofs rely
mainly on relating the execution of the source circuit without faults to the execution of the
transformed circuit w.r.t. the considered fault-model. They make use of several techniques
(case analysis, induction on the type or the structure of circuits, co-induction on input
streams).
While our approach is general, our primary motivation is to certify the DTR technique
that we have presented in Section 4.4. The DTR transformation combines double-time re-
dundancy, micro-checkpointing, rollback, several execution modes, and input/output buffers.
While we have manually shown its correctness (Section 4.4.8), DTR intricacy asks for a for-
mal certification to make sure that no single-point of failure existed.
Section 5.1 introduces the syntax and semantics of our gate-level HDL. In Section 5.2,
we present the specification of fault-models in the language formal semantics. Section 2
explains the proof methodology adopted to show the correctness of circuit transformations.
It is illustrated by examples taken from the simplest transformation: TMR. Section 5.4 in-
troduces the DTR circuit transformation [20] and sketches the associated proofs. Section 5.5
summarizes our contributions.
We use standard mathematical and semantic notations. The corresponding Coq specifi-
cations and proofs are available online [156].
5.1 Circuit Description Language
We describe circuits at the gate level using a purely functional language inspired from
Sheeran’s combinator-based languages such as µFP [157] or Ruby [158]. We equip our lan-
guage with dependent types which, along with the language syntax, ensure that circuits are
well-formed by construction (gates correctly plugged, no dangling wires, no combinational
loops, . . . ).
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Contrary to µFP or Ruby, our primary goal is not to make the description of circuits
easy but to keep the language as simple and minimal as possible to facilitate formal proofs.
Our language contains only 3 logical gates, 5 plugs and 3 combining forms. It is best seen as
a low-level core language used as the object code of a synthesis tool. We denote it as lddl
for Low-level Dependent Description Language.
5.1.1 Syntax of lddl
A bus of signals is described by the following type
B := ω | (B1 ∗B2)
A bus is either a single wire (ω) or a pair of buses (B1 ∗ B2). In other terms, signals are
defined as nested tuples. The constructors of lddl annotated with their types are gathered
in Figure 5.1. A circuit takes as parameters its input and output types and is either a logic
gate, a plug, or composition of circuits.
Gates
not : Gate ω ω and,or : Gate (ω ∗ ω) ω
Plugs
id : ∀α,Plug α α
fork : ∀α,Plug α (α ∗ α)
swap : ∀α β,Plug (α ∗ β) (β ∗ α)
lsh : ∀α β γ,Plug ((α ∗ β) ∗ γ) (α ∗ (β ∗ γ))
rsh : ∀α β γ,Plug (α ∗ (β ∗ γ)) ((α ∗ β) ∗ γ)
Circuits
C ::= Gates
| Plugs
| C1 -◦-C2 : ∀α β γ,Circ α β → Circ β γ
→ Circ α γ
| []C1, C2[] : ∀α β γ δ,Circ α γ → Circ β δ
→ Circ (α ∗ β) (γ ∗ δ)
| x−C : ∀α β, bool→ Circ (α ∗ ω) (β ∗ ω)
→ Circ α β
Figure 5.1: lddl syntax.
The sets of logical gates and plugs are minimal but expressive enough to specify any
combinational circuit. Actually, extending those sets would have a marginal impact on the
proofs.
The type of and and or, Gate (ω ∗ω) ω, indicates that they are gates taking a bus made
of two wires and returning one wire. Likewise, not has type Gate ω ω. Plugs, used to express
(re)wiring, are polymorphic functions that duplicate or reorder buses: id leaves its input bus
unchanged, fork duplicates its input bus, swap inverts the order of its two input buses, lsh
and rsh reorder their three input buses.
5.1. Circuit Description Language 103
Circuits are either a gate, a plug, a sequential composition (. -◦- .), a parallel composition
([]., .[]), or a composition with a cell (flip-flop) within a feedback loop ( . −.) (Figure 5.1).
The typing of the sequential operator ensures that the output bus of the first circuit has
the same type β as the input bus of the second one. The typing of the parallel operator
expresses the fact that the inputs (resp. outputs) of the resulting circuit are made of the
inputs (res. outputs) of the two sub-circuits. As Figure 5.1 presents, if there are two original
circuits of types Circ α γ and Circ β δ, then after their parallel composition the resulting
circuit will have the input and output interfaces of types (α∗β) and (γ ∗δ) respectively. The
last operator (related to the µ operator of µFP) is the only way to introduce feedback loops
in the circuit. x−C is better seen graphically as the circuit in Figure 5.2.
C
x
Figure 5.2: x−C operator.
The circuit C can have any input/output bus but it also takes and returns a wire con-
nected to a memory cell set to the Boolean value x (i.e., tt or ff). The main advantage of
that operator is to ensure that any loop contains a cell. It prevents combinational loops by
construction. Of course, it does not force all cells to be within loops. A simple cell without
feedback is expressed as x−swap in Figure 5.3:
SWAP=x
x
Figure 5.3: Simple memory cell ( x−swap).
To illustrate the language, consider the description of a multiplexer whose internal struc-
ture is presented in Figure 5.4. The circuit has a type Circ (ω ∗ (ω ∗ ω)) ω and takes three
input wires: a control wire and two data ones. It returns a single wire which is shown by
the type ω of its output interface.
0
1
c
c
d1
d0 d1
d0
c
Figure 5.4: Multiplexer realization
The multiplexer structure can be described in lddl as the following expression:
[]fork, id[] -◦- lsh -◦- []not, rsh -◦- swap[] -◦-rsh -◦- []and,and[] -◦-or
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This description starts with a polymorphic circuit []fork, id[] of a type Circ (α ∗ (β ∗ γ)) ((α ∗
α) ∗ (β ∗ γ)) which duplicates the control wire c and propagates the data wires (d1 and
d0) directly to its outputs with no change. Being applied to the input interface of type
(ω ∗ (ω ∗ ω)), it is instantiated and returns four wires of type ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ (ω ∗ ω)): duplicated
c and the data wires. The following lsh transforms the bus type from ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ (ω ∗ ω)) to
(ω ∗ (ω ∗ (ω ∗ω))). The signals order stays the same: (c, c, d1, d0). The parallel construction
[]not, rsh -◦- swap[] inverts the first control wire and reshuﬄes the other three. Thus, the
signals order changes from (c, d1, d0) to (d0, c, d1). The following rsh changes the bus type
from (ω ∗ (ω ∗ (ω ∗ ω))) to ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ (ω ∗ ω)) forming the pairs (¬c, d0) and (c, d1). Both
pairs go to and gates whose outputs are taken by an or gate.
As common with low-level or assembly-like languages, lddl is quite verbose. Recall that
it is not meant to be used directly. It is best seen as a back-end language produced by
synthesis tools. On the other hand, it is simple and expressive; its dependent types make
inputs and outputs of each sub-circuit explicit and ensure that all circuits are well-formed.
5.1.2 Semantics of lddl
From now on, to alleviate notations, we leave typing constraints implicit. All input and
output types of circuits and corresponding buses always match.
The semantics of gates and plugs are given by functions denoted by J.K. The semantics
of the plugs id, fork, swap, lsh, and rsh is given below:
JidK x = xJforkK x = (x, x)JswapK (x, y) = (y, x)JlshK ((x, y), z) = (x, (y, z))JrshK (x, (y, z)) = ((x, y), z))
Taking into account faults (in particular, SETs) makes the semantics non-deterministic.
When a glitch produced by an SET reaches a flip-flop, it may be latched non-deterministically
as tt or ff. Therefore, the standard semantics of circuits is not described as functions but as
predicates. The second issue is the representation of a circuit state (i.e., the current values
of its cells). A solution could be to equip the semantics with an environment (cell → bool).
We choose here to use the circuit itself to represent its state which is made explicit by the
x−C constructs.
The semantics of circuits is described by the inductive predicate step : Circ α β → α →
β → Circ α β. The expression step C a b C ′ can be read as “after one clock cycle, the circuit
C applied to the inputs a produces the outputs b and the new circuit (state) C ′ ”. The rules
are gathered in Figure 5.5.
Gates (or plugs) are stateless: they are always returned unchanged by step (see the rule
Gates & Plugs). The rules for sequential (Seq) and parallel (Par) compositions are standard.
For instance, step on the sequential composition C1 -◦-C2 with the input a returns again a
sequential composition C ′1 -◦-C ′2 where each sub-component C ′1 and C ′2 can be obtained by
applying step to the individual original sub-circuits C1 and C2. The inputs and outputs of
the sub-circuits for these individual step-s are dictated by their sequential interconnection.
For example, the output b of C1 is the input of C2.
The rule for x−C makes use of the b2s function which converts the Boolean value of a
cell into a signal, and of the s2b predicate which relates a signal to a Boolean. b2s takes a
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Gates & Plugs
JGKa = b
step G a b G
Seq
step C1 a b C
′
1 step C2 b c C
′
2
step (C1 -◦-C2) a c (C ′1 -◦-C ′2)
Par
step C1 a c C
′
1 step C2 b d C
′
2
step []C1, C2[] (a, b) (c, d) []C
′
1, C
′
2[]
Loop
step C (a, b2s x) (b, s) C ′ s2b s y
step x−C a b y −C ′
Figure 5.5: lddl semantics for a clock cycle.
Boolean value (tt or ff of the type bool) and returns a signal value (0 or 1 respectively of a
signal value type). s2b is defined as:
s2b s b ⇔ s = 0 ∧ b = ff
∨ s = 1 ∧ b = tt
∨ s = 
The first two cases correspond to the normal situation when a signal set to logical one
(resp. zero) is latched as tt (resp. ff). The last case describes the corruption case when a
glitched signal (denoted by ) can be latched by a cell non-deterministically as tt or ff (hence
the predicate s2b does not constrain b in this case).
In the (Loop) rule, the outputs b and the new state (circuit) y −C ′ depend on the
reduction of the sub-circuit C applied to the inputs a and the signal corresponding to x (the
memory cell output value). The predicate s2b relates the value of the memory cell input
signal s and the Boolean value y latched by this cell. Non-determinism may come precisely
from this s2b which may relate a signal s to both tt and ff if an SET influences the signal
(noted s = ).
The complete semantics is given by a co-inductive predicate eval : Circ α β → Stream α→
Stream β which describes the circuit behavior for any infinite stream of inputs.
Eval
step C i o C ′ eval C ′ is os
eval C (i : is) (o : os)
If C applied to the inputs i returns after a clock cycle the outputs o and the circuit C ′
and if C ′ applied to the infinite stream of inputs is returns the output stream os, then the
evaluation of C with the input stream (i : is) returns the output stream (o : os).
The variable-less nature of lddl spares the semantics to deal with bindings and environ-
ments. It avoids many administrative matters (reads, updates, well-formedness of environ-
ments) and facilitates formalization and proofs.
5.2 Specification of Fault Models
In order to model SETs, glitches and their propagation must be represented in the semantics.
As in Chapter 3, signals can take 3 values: a logical one, a logical zero or a glitch written .
〈α〉 denotes a signal bus of type α.
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Signal := 0 | 1 | 
Glitches propagate through plugs and gates (e.g., and(1, ) = ) but can also be logically
masked (e.g., or(1, ) = 1 or and(0, ) = 0). If a corrupted signal is not masked, it is latched
as tt or ff (both (s2b  tt) and (s2b  ff) hold), as the definition of s2b prescribes.
The semantics of circuits for a cycle with an SET occurrence is represented as the induc-
tive predicate stepg C a b C ′ that can be read as “after one cycle with an SET occurrence,
the circuit C applied to the inputs a may produce the outputs b and the new circuit C ′”.
All possible SET occurrences can be modeled by introducing a glitch after each logical gate
and each memory cell. As a result, the predicate stepg C a b C ′ may hold for many cir-
cuit configurations C ′. DTR assumes that no SET occurs at its primary inputs. Due to
its double-redundant nature, the corruption of a primary input would lead to the lack of
redundant information and the impossibility to recover. In contrast, we allow the corruption
of a primary input in TMR circuits. The main rules for stepg are gathered in Figure 5.6.
Gates
stepg G a  G
Plugs
JGKa = b
stepg G a b G
SeqL
stepg C1 a b C
′
1 step C2 b c C
′
2
stepg (C1 -◦-C2) a c (C ′1 -◦-C ′2)
SeqR
step C1 a b C
′
1 stepg C2 b c C
′
2
stepg (C1 -◦-C2) a c (C ′1 -◦-C ′2)
ParL
stepg C1 a c C
′
1 step C2 b d C
′
2
stepg []C1, C2[] (a, b) (c, d) []C
′
1, C
′
2[]
ParR
step C1 a c C
′
1 stepg C2 b d C
′
2
stepg []C1, C2[] (a, b) (c, d) []C
′
1, C
′
2[]
LoopC
stepg C (a, b2s x) (b, s) C ′ s2b s y
stepg x−C a b y −C ′
LoopM
step C (a, ) (b, s) C ′ s2b s y
stepg x−C a b y −C ′
Figure 5.6: lddl semantics with SET (main rules).
The rule (Gates) asserts that stepg introduces a glitch after a logical gate corrupting its
output wire. Since gates are stateless and an SET is a transient fault with no permanent
effect, the returned circuit is the original gate G. The rule (Plugs) stays the same as in
step. There is no need to corrupt plug branches separately since this case is subsumed by
the separate corruptions of gates using these wires as inputs or outputs.
The two rules for sequential composition represent two mutually exclusive cases where
the SET occurs in the left sub-circuit (SegL) or in the right one (SegR). The rules for the
parallel operator (ParL & ParR) are similar: an SET occurs in one sub-circuit or another
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but not in both.
The rule (LoopC) represents the case where an SET occurs inside the sub-circuit C of
x−C structure. The rule (LoopM) represents the case where an SET occurs at the output
of the memory cell x which is taken as an input by C.
To summarize, stepg introduces non-deterministically a single glitch after a memory cell
or a logical gate. Hence, if a circuit has n gates and m cells, it specifies n + m possible
executions, one execution per SET injection scenario.
Finally, the fault-model SET (1 ,K ) is expressed by the predicate setk eval : Nat →
Circ α β → Stream α→ Stream β:
SetN
step C i o C ′ setk eval (pred n) C ′ is os
setk eval n C (i : is) (o : os)
SetG
stepg C i o C ′ setk eval (pred K) C ′ is os
setk eval 0 C (i : is) (o : os)
The first argument of type Nat plays the role of a clock counter. The operator pred
returns the previous natural number of its argument. A glitch can be introduced (by stepg)
only if the counter is 0, as it is shown in the rule (SetG). When a glitch is introduced, the
counter is reset to enforce at least K − 1 normal execution cycles with step (rule (SetN)).
When the counter is back to 0, both rules can be non-deterministically applied (note that
pred 0 = 0 in the rule (SetN) when n = 0).
5.3 Overview of Correctness Proofs
We illustrate the main steps of the correctness proof using examples taken from the simple
TMR transformation. The formal proof of DTR, which is based on similar principles, will
be presented in details in Section 5.4.
5.3.1 Transformation
TMR and the proposed fault-tolerance techniques can be specified by a program transfor-
mation on the syntax of lddl. They are defined by induction of the syntax and replacement
of each memory cell by a memory block (a small circuit). The TMR transformation takes
a circuit of type Circ α β and returns a circuit of type Circ ((α ∗ α) ∗ α) ((β ∗ β) ∗ β). In-
puts/outputs are triplicated to play the role of the inputs/outputs of each copy. The TMR
circuit transformation can be expressed as:
tmr(X) = [][]X,X[], X[] with X a gate/plug
tmr(C1 -◦-C2) = tmr(C1) -◦-tmr(C2)
tmr([]C1, C2[]) = s1 -◦- []tmr(C1),tmr(C2)[] -◦- s2
tmr( x−C) = x− x− x−(vot -◦-tmr(C) -◦- s3)
where s1, s2, s3 are plugs that re-shuﬄe wires. The first rule for gates and plugs triplicates
them organizing three redundant copies in parallel. If the circuit is composed of two sub-
circuits C1 and C2 connected sequentially, TMR is applied to each subcircuit. Since their
interfaces are triplicated in the same manner, the interface compatibility is kept and the
triplicated circuits (tmr(C1), tmr(C2)) can be sequentially plugged.
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In the case of a parallel construction, we have to re-shuﬄe the input and output wires
with the plugs s1 and s2 to guarantee that the transformed circuit type is of the form
Circ ((α∗α)∗α) ((β∗β)∗β). If C1 and C2 have types Circ α1 β1 and Circ α2 β2 correspondingly,
then their TMR versions will be of types Circ ((α1 ∗ α1) ∗ α1) ((β1 ∗ β1) ∗ β1) and Circ ((α2 ∗
α2) ∗α2) ((β2 ∗ β2) ∗ β2). Hence, the parallel construction []tmr(C1),tmr(C2)[] will have the
following type:
Circ (((α1 ∗ α1) ∗ α1) ∗ ((α2 ∗ α2) ∗ α2)) (((β1 ∗ β1) ∗ β1) ∗ ((β2 ∗ β2) ∗ β2))
We do not provide the definitions of s1, s2, s3 in terms of the basic plugs fork, lsh, . . . .
Their functionality are better described by their types which are:
s1 : Circ (((α1 ∗ α2) ∗ (α1 ∗ α2)) ∗ (α1 ∗ α2)) (((α1 ∗ α1) ∗ α1) ∗ ((α2 ∗ α2) ∗ α2))
s2 : Circ (((β1 ∗ β1) ∗ β1) ∗ ((β2 ∗ β2) ∗ β2)) (((β1 ∗ β2) ∗ (β1 ∗ β2)) ∗ (β1 ∗ β2))
Each memory cell is replaced by three cells followed by a triplicated voter (vot). The
shuﬄing plug s3 reorders the wires to do so. It has the following type:
Circ (((α ∗ ω) ∗ (α ∗ ω)) ∗ (α ∗ ω)) (((((α ∗ α) ∗ α) ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)
5.3.2 Relations between the source and transformed circuits
The correctness property relates the execution of the source circuit without faults C0 →
C1 → C2 → . . . to the execution of the transformed circuit under a fault-model CT0 → CT1 →
CT2 → . . . (see Figure 5.7). The states of the source and transformed circuits are related
with inductive predicates (e.g., P1 and P2 in Figure 5.7). For instance, a lemma L could
state “if the original circuit C1 and its transformed version C
T
1 are in relation P1 at some
cycle, and in the next cycle C1 reduces to C2 and C
T
1 reduces to C
T
2 , then C2 and C
T
2 are in
relation P2”.
C3C0 C2
C0 C1 C2 C3
C1
T ...
......
...
a b c
T T Ta b c
P1 P2
L
Figure 5.7: Execution of source and transformed circuits described by predicates.
For TMR, a key property is that an SET can corrupt only a single redundant copy and
that such corruption stays confined in that copy. To express corruption, we use a predicate
relating source and transformed circuits expressed in the lddl syntax. The corruption of
the first copy of a transformed circuit CT w.r.t. to its source circuit C is expressed by the
predicate
c∼1. The main rule is
CLoop
C
c∼1 CT
( x−C) c∼1 ( z − x− x−(vot -◦-CT -◦- s3))
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which states that if C is in relation with CT and the second and third memory cells of the
transformed circuit are the same as the cell of the source circuit, then x−C and its trans-
formed version are in relation. The other rules just check recursively this source/transformed
circuit relationship. For instance, the rule for the parallel construct is
CPar
C1
c∼1 CT1 C2 c∼1 CT2
([]C1, C2[])
c∼1 (s1 -◦- []CT1 , CT2 [] -◦- s2)
This rule expresses that if there are relations between original (C1 and C2) and TMR circuits
(CT1 and C
T
2 ) that implies the corruption of their first redundant TMR modules, then the
parallel composition of these originals and TMR circuitries are also in the same relations.
It means that the parallel composition of TMR circuit with the first corrupted module will
also have the first redundant module in incorrect state. In the rule (CPar), s1 and s2 are
the shuﬄe plugs introduced above.
The same relations exist for other options of redundant copy corruption (
c∼2 and c∼3)
and for each possible corruption of the triplicated bus (
b∼1, b∼2, b∼3). In the following, we
write
c∼ for the relation c∼1 ∨ c∼2 ∨ c∼3.
5.3.3 Key Properties and Proofs
Properties and their associated proofs can be classified as:
• properties “for all circuits” relating their source and transformed versions for a one
cycle reduction. They are usually proved by a simple structural induction on the
structure of lddl expressions;
• similar properties but for known sub-circuits introduced by the transformations (e.g., vot-
ers). They are proved by cases that is, the exploration of all possible SET occurrences.
• properties about the complete (infinite) execution of source and transformed circuits.
They are proved by co-induction on the stream of inputs.
The main lemmas state how the transformed circuit evolves when it is in a correct state
and one SET occurs (stepg), or when it is in a corrupted state and it executes normally (by
step). For TMR we have for instance:
Lemma 5.1.
step C1 a b C2 ∧ stepg tmr(C1) (a, a, a) b3 CT2 ⇒ C2 c∼ CT2
It can be read as: if C1 reduces by step in C2, and its transformed version tmr(C1)
reduces by stepg in a circuit CT2 , then C
T
2 is the transformed version of C2 with at most one
corrupted redundant copy (C2
c∼ CT2 ). In other terms, an SET can corrupt only one of the
redundant copies of the TMR circuit. This lemma does not relate outputs (b and b3).
The following Lemma 5.2 ensures that a corrupted transformed circuit comes back to a
valid state after one normal reduction step.
Lemma 5.2.
C1
c∼ CT1 ∧ step C1 a b C2 ⇒ step CT1 (a, a, a) (b, b, b) tmr(C2)
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The main correctness theorems state that for related inputs the normal execution of
the source circuit and the execution (under the considered fault-model) of the transformed
circuit give related outputs. A complete execution is modeled using infinite streams of
inputs/outputs and the proof should proceed by co-induction.
The correctness of the TMR transformation is expressed as
eval C i o ∧ set2 eval tmr(C) (tripl i) o3 ⇒ o s∼ o3
TMR masks all faults of the fault-model SET (1, 2), so it tolerates an SET every other cycle.
The stream of primary inputs for the transformed circuit is the input stream i where each
element (bus) is triplicated (tripl i). The stream of primary outputs of the transformed
circuit o3 is a triplicated version of the output stream o with at most one corrupted element
in each triplet (
s∼ relation). Indeed, our fault-model allows an SET to occur after the final
voters. These SETs cannot be corrected internally but, since the outputs are triplicated,
they can still be masked by voting in the surrounding circuit.
5.3.4 Practical issues
Taylor-made tactics had to be written for lddl syntax and semantics. They helped to
shorten and to automatize parts of the proofs.
The DTR transformation uses known sub-circuits and many basic properties must be
shown on them. Such properties are often of the form
Pstepg
P a stepg C a b C ′
Q(a, b, C ′)
with P and Q representing pre- and post-conditions, respectively. These properties on stepg
entail to consider all possible SET occurrences. For TMR, which introduces triplicated
voters, this can be done using standard proofs. The transformation DTR introduces much
bigger sub-circuits, which would lead to very large proofs since dozens of different cases of
SET need to be considered. Fortunately, Coq permits proofs by reflection which, in some
cases, permits to replace manual proofs by automatic computations. In this sense, proofs
by reflection automatizes the exhaustive checks of all possible scenarios of circuit behavior.
Recall that we used BDD-based symbolic simulations for this purpose in Chapter 3. We use
largely proofs by reflection for known circuits. It amounts to
• defining fstepg a functional version of stepg, which, for a given circuit and input,
computes the set of the possible outputs and circuits in relation by stepg;
• proving that if (b, C ′) ∈ (fstepg C a) then stepg C a b C ′;
• defining (or generating) equivalent functional (Boolean) versions Pb and Qb of the
predicates P and Q.
Then, a proof by reflection of the property (Pstepg) proceeds by generating all possible
inputs, then filtering them by Pb, executing fstepg on all elements of that set and, finally,
checking that Qb returns true on all results. In this way, reflection automatizes the explo-
ration of all fault occurrences and most of the proof boils down to computations.
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5.4 Correctness Proof of the DTR Transformation
While TMR is a well-established transformation and its properties are doubtless, DTR (Sec-
tion 4.4) is a novel and much more complex technique. Our goal is to formally ensure that
no single point of failure exists: in particular, any SET in memory blocks, combinational
logic, input or output buffers, control block, and control wires should be masked.
This section presents in details the correctness proof of the DTR transformation. DTR
has been informally described in Section 4.4 where we presented the overall circuit trans-
formation, its sub-components and their functionality. The structure of this section follows
exactly the same flow where we start with formal transformation definition and later show
the properties of the sub-circuits. We use standard mathematical and semantic notations and
give some intuition about the formalization of the DTR transformation in Coq and about the
used proof strategy. In this section, some details are omitted to facilitate the understanding
of the overall picture. The corresponding Coq proof can be found on-line [155].
5.4.1 Formalization of DTR
The DTR transformation is described in Section 4.4.1 and consists of the four typical steps
of any time-redundant transformation: substitution of original memory cells, addition of a
control block, and addition of input and output buffers. The resulting transformed circuit is
presented in Figure 4.23. The core DTR transformation is defined very much like TMR as
presented in Section 2. Below we define each step formally.
Memory cells substitution
The first DTR transformation step, called dtrm(C), replaces each memory cell of the original
circuit C with a memory block by induction on the lddl syntax.
dtrm(X) = []X, id[] with X a gate/plug
dtrm(C1 -◦-C2) = dtrm(C1) -◦-dtrm(C2)
dtrm([]C1, C2[]) = s4 -◦- []dtrm(C1), id[] -◦- s5 -◦- []id,dtrm(C2)[] -◦- s6
dtrm( b−C) = mb(b, b, b, b,dtrm(C))
If the original circuit C has a type Circ α β, the first transformation step dtrm(C) returns
a circuit C ′ of type Circ (α ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) (β ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)). The three wires ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)
correspond to the global control signals ((save ∗ rollBack) ∗ fail) that propagate through
all memory blocks. save and rollBack control the functionality of the memory blocks and
fail indicates error-detection. These three control wires also propagate through all circuit
constructions. For instance, in the case of gates or plugs, the parallel composition []X, id[]
lets these control wires propagate through since they do not interfere with X.
s4-s6 are plugs that re-shuﬄe wires in the aforementioned transformation definition. They
have the following types:
s4 : Circ ((α1 ∗ α2) ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ((α1 ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ∗ α2)
s5 : Circ ((β1 ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ∗ α2) (β1 ∗ (α2 ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)))
s6 : Circ (β1 ∗ (β2 ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω))) ((β1 ∗ β2) ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω))
In sequential and parallel compositions, the control wires propagate first to the first
transformed sub-circuit dtrm(C1). Returned by the sub-circuit, they enter the second one
dtrm(C2).
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Each memory cell b−C is replaced with a memory block mb(b, b, b, b,dtrm(C)) where all
four memory cells have the same value b the original cell has. If the original cell was plugged
to some circuit C then the corresponding memory block is plugged to the transformed version
dtrm(C) of the circuit C. From now on, we write mb(d, d′, r, r′, cir) to denote a memory
block with cell values d, d′, r, r′ (Figure 4.24) plugged to a circuit cir. The internal structure
of mb(d, d′, r, r′, cir) is presented in Figure 5.8 which shows how it integrates the memory
block given in Figure 4.24.
save
si
so
rollBack
fail
failfail
si
rollBack
save
so
rollBack
save
EQ
QQ
QQ
≠
d
rr'
d'
cir
MB(d,d',r,r',cir)
Memory Block
α β 
fail
rollBack
save
fail
rollBack
save
EE
Figure 5.8: The internal structure of mb(d, d′, r, r′, cir).
Inside a memory block, the save and rollBack wires are forked to be connected to the
multiplexers and the cells with enable inputs. This definition of the DTR memory block in
lddl is consistent with its representation in Figure 4.24.
Unlike Figure 4.24 presents, the incoming fail signal goes to an or-gate that takes the
output of comparator EQ as its second input. The output of this or gate indicates if there is
an error detection event either in this memory block or in the preceding blocks. In this sense,
the big or-gate with multiple inputs ~fail, which is shown in Figure 4.23, is decomposed into
two-inputs or-gates, one per memory block.
Input buffers instantiation
The input buffer, denoted as ib(b, b′), is a fully defined circuit of type Circ (ω ∗ω) ω that was
presented in Figure 4.25. In lddl, an input buffer is defined as:
[]fork -◦- []id, (Cell b) -◦- (Cell b′)[], id[] -◦- swap -◦- Mux
The circuit Cell x is a simple memory cell x−swap, see Figure 5.3. The internal structure
of the multiplexer Mux has been discussed in Section 5.1.1 and is given in Figure 5.4.
ib(b, b′) has input wires (pi∗rB) that are data and control inputs respectively. According
to the DTR transformation, an input buffer should be introduced to each original primary
input. The original circuit C is unknown but its type Circ α β implies its input interface
type α. To introduce input buffers, we define a parameterized circuit dtri α a1 a2, referred
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as an input bank, that constructs all needed input buffers according to the type α. The
argument a1 (resp. a2) of type 〈α〉 defines the initial values for the cells b (resp. b′) in all
input buffers of the input bank.
dtri has a type of α → 〈α〉 → 〈α〉 → Circ (α ∗ ω) α. The input bank dtri α a1 a2 is
defined recursively on the input interface type α (and its arguments a1 and a2):
dtri : α→ 〈α〉 → 〈α〉 → Circ (α ∗ ω) α
dtri ω v1 v2 = ib(s2b v1, s2b v2)
dtri (B1 ∗B2) (B1.1 ∗B1.2) (B2.1 ∗B2.2) =
s7 -◦- []dtri B1 B1.1 B1.2, dtri B2 B2.1 B2.2[]
The plug s7 creates branches of the control wire pi, plugs them, and properly re-shuﬄes
the wires. Its type is:
s7 : Circ ((α1 ∗ α2) ∗ ω) ((α1 ∗ ω) ∗ (α2 ∗ ω))
There are two cases. When the primary input bus is one wire (type ω), a single input buffer
ib is instantiated with the cells’ values (s2b v1) and (s2b v2). In the second case, α is a pair
of buses B1 and B2, their initial values are also decomposed according to the types B1 and
B2. After the decomposition, the transformation dtri is applied to each of sub-components.
Output buffers instantiation
The output buffers are organized similarly to the input buffers. An output buffer is a circuit
of type (see Figure 4.26):
Circ (ω ∗ (((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ((ω ∗ (ω ∗ ω)) ∗ ω)
The order of input wires is: (co ∗ (((save ∗ rollBack) ∗ subst) ∗ fail)). The order of output
wires is ((poA ∗ (poB ∗ poC)) ∗ fail).
The fail signal propagates through the output buffer as in the case of a memory block.
An internal or-gate takes an input fail signal as well as the output of the comparator EQ
and returns a new fail that goes out of an output buffer. Thus, fail propagates through all
output buffers collecting error-detection signals.
We denote the single output buffer circuit as ob(p, p′, o, o′, o′) where the arguments
p, p′, o, o′, o′ correspond to the values of its five memory cells as shown in Figure 4.26.
The output bank dtro β b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 is defined recursively on the output interface type
β of the original circuit C of type Circ α β. b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 are signal buses of type 〈β〉
that define the initial values of the five memory cells (p, p′, o, o′, o′) in all output buffers
of the output bank.
dtro : β → 〈β〉 → 〈β〉 → 〈β〉 → 〈β〉 → 〈β〉
→ Circ (β ∗ (((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ((β ∗ (β ∗ β)) ∗ ω)
dtro ω v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 = ob(s2b v1, s2b v2, s2b v3, s2b v4, s2b v5)
dtro (B1 ∗B2) (B1.1 ∗B1.2) . . . (B5.1 ∗B5.2) =
s8 -◦- []dtro B1 B1.1 . . . B5.1, id[] -◦- s9 -◦- []id,dtro B2 B1.2 . . . B5.2[] -◦- s10
s8-s10 are re-wiring circuits omitted for simplicity. They have the following types:
s8 : Circ ((β1 ∗ β2) ∗ (((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ((β1 ∗ (((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ∗ (β2 ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)))
s9 : Circ (((β1 ∗ (β1 ∗ β1)) ∗ ω) ∗ (β2 ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω))) ((β1 ∗ (β1 ∗ β1)) ∗ (β2 ∗ (((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)))
s10 : Circ ((β1 ∗ (β1 ∗ β1)) ∗ ((β2 ∗ (β2 ∗ β2)) ∗ ω)) (((β1 ∗ β2) ∗ ((β1 ∗ β2) ∗ (β1 ∗ β2))) ∗ ω)
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The output bank dtro returns the triplicated output interface (β ∗ (β ∗ β)) and the fail
signal.
Control Block
As Figure 4.23 shows, the DTR control block consists of two parts: the control FSM protected
by TMR and three memory cells f1, f2, and f3.
A single copy of the control FSM, denoted ctrFSM(a, b, c), has three internal memory
cells a, b, and c to encode its state (see Figure 4.27). ctrFSM(a, b, c) is a sequential circuit
of type Circ ω ((((ω ∗ω) ∗ω) ∗ω) ∗ω). The incoming wire is an output of one of the cells f1,
f2, or f3. The five outcoming control signals are ((((save ∗ rollBack) ∗ fail) ∗ rB) ∗ subst).
The returned fail signal is initialized to zero. It can be set to the logical 1 only in memory
blocks or output buffers where and when an error is detected.
When TMR is applied to ctrFSM(a, b, c), the returned circuit tmr(ctrFSM(a, b, c)) has
three inputs and three copies of its five control wires. Five voters vot5, one for each triplicated
output, are inserted after tmr(ctrFSM(a, b, c)) to mask all possible SETs occurring in its
structure. As a result, the circuit tmr(ctrFSM(a, b, c)) -◦-vot5 returns five control wires and
takes the three wires from f1, f2, and f3.
From now on, the circuit (tmr(ctrFSM(a, b, c)) -◦-vot5) will be denoted as ctr3(a, b, c)
with type Circ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ((((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω).
DTR Transformation- Final Definition
Having all aforementioned components, we plug them all together to obtain the final defini-
tion of DTR transformation dtr(C) for any circuit C of type Circ α β. The transformation
dtr(C) can be expressed as:
dtr(C) ::= f1 − f2 − f3 −
(
s11 -◦- []id, ctr3(a, b, c)[] -◦- s12 -◦-
[][]dtri α 0α 0α, id[] -◦-dtrm(C), id[] -◦- s13 -◦-
dtro β 0β 0β -◦- s14
)
, where
the cells f1 − f3 are initialized to false as well as the triple {a, b, c} that denotes the initial
state 0 of the control block (Figure 4.27). The notations 0α and 0β designate the signal
buses of types 〈α〉 and 〈β〉 respectively with all their wires equal to 0. Thus, all memory
cells in input dtri and output dtro banks are initialized to false. s11− s14 are plugs that
re-shuﬄe wires. They have the following types:
s11 : Circ (((α ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω) (α ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω))
s12 : Circ (α ∗ ((((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) (((α ∗ ω) ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ∗ ω)
s13 : Circ ((β ∗ ((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω)) ∗ ω) (β ∗ (((ω ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω))
s14 : Circ ((β ∗ (β ∗ β)) ∗ ω) (((((β ∗ β) ∗ β) ∗ ω) ∗ ω) ∗ ω)
The transformed circuit dtr(C) has the type Circ α ((β ∗β) ∗β). The triplicated output
interface of type ((β ∗ β) ∗ β) represents the triplicated original output bus. Figure 5.9
graphically represents the structure of the transformed DTR circuit dtr(C).
The three parallel constructions []., .[] in the dtr(C) definition are needed to propagate
buses or control signals to the components where they are used. For instance, since the
input bank does not use the control signals save, rollBack, subst and fail , the construction
[]dtri..., id[] propagates these signals (with id) in parallel with the input bank dtri.
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Figure 5.9: dtr(C) transformation composition: the types of buses are marked with red.
The memory cells f1, f2, and f2 play a double role: first, they isolate the control block
ctr3(a, b, c) from glitches on the fail signal (see Section 4.4.5 for details); second, they organise
a control feedback loop with the Cloop construction which is needed to return the fail signal
to the control block.
5.4.2 Relations between source and transformed circuits
Most of the inductive predicates relating states and executions of the source circuit C and the
transformed circuits dtr(C) have several versions depending on the state of the control block
(0, 1, . . .) (see Figure 4.27). First, we will consider the predicates for different components of
dtr(C) transformation.
Following Coq standard style, we omit type parameters if they can be deduced from other
parameters.
5.4.2.1 Predicates for DTRM(C)
The predicates, written dtrix, express the relations between the original circuit C (and its
execution) and the circuit dtrm(C) where all memory cells are substituted with memory
blocks. More precisely, the notation dtrix implies that the control block of dtrm(C) is in
state i (Figure 4.27) and the cells x are possibly corrupted.
The predicate dtr0 expresses the relation between a transformed circuit dtrm(C) and its
source version C when the control FSM is in state 0 (Figure 4.27) and no cell is corrupted.
The state of a memory block is of the form [y, y, y, x] where the values x and y are the
two values taken successively by the corresponding cells of the source version. dtr0 is defined
inductively in a similar way as
c∼ predicates in Section 5.3. The main rule relates the memory
blocks to the states of the two source circuits:
dtr0 C0 C1 C
T
dtr0 ( x−C0) ( y −C1) mb(y, y, y, x, CT )
The memory block should be of the form (d = d′ = r = y; r′ = x) where x and y are
consecutive values of the corresponding cells of the original circuits x −C0 and y −C1,
respectively. Those two circuits, x−C0 and y −C1, represent the two consecutive states of
the source circuit.
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While the main rule relates the memory block state with the state of the original cir-
cuit, the same predicate dtr0 also relates the other circuit constructions (e.g., gates/plugs,
sequential and parallel compositions). For instance, the inference rule for a gate G is:
dtr0 G G []G, id[]
Since the gates are stateless, this relationship always holds if the DTR transformation has
been applied to the original gate G: dtr(G)=[]G, id[].
The dtr0 predicate for sequential construction is expressed as:
dtr0 CL C
′
L C
T
L dtr0 CR C
′
R C
T
R
dtr0 (CL -◦-CR) (C ′L -◦-C ′R) (CTL -◦-CTR)
If any two original circuits in two successive states (CL C
′
L) and (CR C
′
R) are in the relation-
ship with two transformed circuits CTL and C
T
R respectively, then the sequential composition
of these original circuits in these two states (CL -◦-CR) and (C ′L -◦-C ′R) are also in relation
with the transformed circuit (CTL -◦-CTR).
The corresponding predicate when the control FSM is in state 1 relates a transformed
circuit to three successive source circuits. Indeed, in that state, the memory block is of the
form [z, y, y, x] where x, y and z are three successive values taken by the corresponding cell
of the source circuit. The main rule for the memory block is:
dtr1 C0 C1 C2 C
T
dtr1 ( x−C0) ( y −C1) ( z −C2) mb(z, y, y, x, CT )
Several versions of these predicates are needed to represent all the corruption cases. For
instance, the predicate dtr1d expresses the relation between a transformed circuit whose d
cells are potentially corrupted and its source version when the control block is in state 1.
The main rule is:
dtr1d C0 C1 C2 C
T
dtr1d ( x−C0) ( y −C1) ( z −C2) mb(w, y, y, x, CT )
That is, r′, (resp. d′ and r) should hold the same values are the first (resp. second) source
circuit; d is represented by the unconstrained value w; it can be corrupted and take any
value. The other rules (for -◦- , []., .[], etc) remain the same as in dtr1.
Other predicates are also needed to relate the source and transformed versions when the
control block is in the recovery mode. As we observed in Section 4.4.8, we do no use the cells
d′, r, and r′ during the speed-up mode during the recovery. So, their values are irrelevant
during several cycles i.e., when the control block is in states 2-4. For example, the relation
between the state of the memory block and the original circuit state is described by the
predicate dtr3:
dtr3 C0 C1 C
T
dtr3 ( x−C0) ( y −C1) mb(x,w,w′, w′′, CT )
The values w,w′, w′′ are unconstrained because the cells d′, r, r′ do not participate in the
transformed circuit functionality during the speed-up phase.
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5.4.2.2 Predicates for DTRI, DTRO, and ctr3
We also define predicates that describe the states of the input/output blocks and the control
block.
Triplicated control FSM. The states of the triplicated FSM ctr3(a, b, c) can be explicitly
listed:
ctr0 := ctr3(false, false, false)
ctr1 := ctr3(false, false, true)
. . .
ctr5 := ctr3(true, false, true)
All these predicates represent the binary encoding of the corresponding FSM states rep-
resented in Figure 4.27. For example, ctr1 holds if the control block is in state 1.
Input bank. There are two different cases for an input bank dtri a1 a2:
ibs0(a) := dtri a a
ibs1(a1, a2) := dtri a1 a2
The first predicate states that the two cells of each input buffer are equal. This is the
case when the control block is in state 0 (Figure 4.27). The second predicate states that the
two cells may be different. This happens when the control block is in state 1.
Output bank. The output bank dtro b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 has also two predicates, for even and
odd clock cycles (states 0 and 1 of the control FSM, Figure 4.27). Recall that the signal
buses (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) defines values for the cells (p, p
′, o, o′, o′′) of output buffers.
obs0(b1, b2) := dtro b1 b1 b1 b1 b2
obs1(b1, b2) := dtro b1 b2 b1 b2 b2
obs0 states that in even cycles, each output buffer has the same value in its cells o, o′, p, p′.
In odd cycles, the relation between cells are o = p and o′ = o′′ = p′ in each output block.
5.4.2.3 Global DTR predicates
The state of the whole transformed DTR circuit can be described as the combination of the
aforementioned predicates relatively to the original circuit C and its consecutive states. The
relation between the complete transformed circuit and its source is described by the following
global predicates:
• Dtrs1 and Dtrs0 relate the DTR and source circuit states in the normal mode (states 0
and 1 in the control block, Figure 4.27) relatively to the original circuit execution;
• Dtr0d′, Dtr1r and other predicates relate the DTR and source circuit state during
the recovery procedure and characterize the possible corruption of the different DTR
components.
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Each of these predicates take additional arguments to fully characterize the state of the
DTR circuit relatively to the original circuit. For instance, the predicate Dtrs1 with its
arguments:
Dtrs1 (ibs1 a b) (obs1 o o′) C0 C1 C2 dtr(C)
implies the following predicates for DTR components:
• dtr1 C0 C1 C2 dtrm(C), which describes the state of the memory blocks relatively to
the consecutive states of the original circuit C0 → C1 → C2;
• the cells (f1, f2, f3) have values (false, false, false), it indicates that no errors have
been detected during the preceding cycle;
• ctr1 which implies that the control FSM is in state 1;
• (ibs1 a b) which describes the state of the input bank dtri a b;
• (obs1 o o′) which describes the state of the output bank dtri o o′ o o′ o′.
Similarly, the predicate Dtr0d′ with its parameters
Dtr0d′ (ibs0 a) (obs0 o o′) C0 C1 dtr(C)
implies the following predicates:
• dtr0d C0 C1 dtrm(C) which expresses the relation dtr0 C0 C1 dtrm(C) but the cell(s)
d in memory blocks may be corrupted;
• the cells (f1, f2, f3) are left unspecified since they are not taken into account at this
clock cycle;
• ctr0 which implies that the control block is in state 0;
• ibs0 a which implies that the input bank has the configuration dtri a a;
• obs0 o o′ which implies that the output bank has the configuration dtri o o o o o′.
Other predicates describe the state of the DTR circuit in a similar manner by combining
the predicates for sub-components. All these predicates are used to show how the transformed
circuit evolves relatively to the execution of its original circuit. We will demonstrate this
application on examples in the next sections.
5.4.3 Main theorem
The main correctness theorem of the DTR transformation for an original circuit C0 of type
Circuit α β is expressed as follows:
step C0 a b C1
∧ step dtr(C0) a b1 CT ∧ step CT a b2 CT1
∧ eval C1 i o ∧ set10 eval CT1 n (upsampl i) oo
⇒ outDTR (b, o) oo
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It assumes that no error occurs during the first two cycles (the two step in the second line of
the theorem). This assumption is needed due to the arbitrary initialization of memory cells
(buffers, memory blocks) performed by the transformation. Since the recovery bits are not
properly set at the initialization, a rollback and the following recovery would be incorrect
during the first two cycles. As a result, the fault-tolerance properties of the transformed
circuit should be checked only starting from the state CT1 .
The first line of the theorem shows that the next state of the original circuit after its
initial state C0 is C1. The third line expresses the relations between the executions of the
original circuit/state C1 and of the transformed circuit/state CT1 .
The stream of primary inputs of the transformed circuit is the original input stream i
where each bit is repeated twice (upsampl i). The fault-model SET (1, 10) is expressed by
the predicate set10 eval that may use stepg at most once every 10 cycles (and uses step
otherwise).
The predicate outDTR relates the output stream (of type Stream β) produced by the
source circuit to the output stream (of type Stream (β ∗ (β ∗ β))) of the transformed circuit.
The two first values of the transformed output stream (b1, b2) are not meaningful since the
output buffers introduce a latency of two cycles. outDTR states that if the first stream has
value v at some position k, then the second stream will have a triplet with at least two v’s
at position 2 ∗ k + 1. We can guarantee the correctness of only two values because we allow
an SETs to occur even at the primary outputs.
In the end, the theorem can be read as: “each triplicated bit of DTR circuit output
stream oo contains at least two bits of the original circuit output stream (b, o) even under
the presence of faults SET (1, 10) if the DTR circuit takes twice upsampled stream i of the
original circuit and no faults occur in the first two cycles of its execution”.
5.4.4 Execution of a DTR circuit
The main theorem asks for reasoning about infinite streams and their equality. The proof is
performed by co-induction. As the first step, the next initial relation between the source C0
and the transformed circuit dtr(C0) is shown:
Dtrs0 (ibs0 0α) (obs0 0α 0α) C0 C0 dtr(C0)
When this initial relation is established, it is necessary to show the next two reduction
scenarios:
Case 1. If the transformed and source circuits are related by Dtrs0 (resp. Dtrs1), then their
reductions by step are related by Dtrs1 (resp. Dtrs0).
Case 2. If the transformed and source circuits are related by Dtrs0 (resp. Dtrs1), then after
stepg (SET occurrence) followed by at most 10 step reductions, the transformed and
source circuits will be again related by Dtrs1 (resp. Dtrs0).
These cases cover all possible execution scenarios and fully establish the relation between
the reductions of the source circuit and the transformed one with and without faults.
Below we consider the lemmas needed to show the two mentioned properties.
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Case 1. The first two lemmas describe how the transformed circuit evolves relatively to
the execution of the original circuit in normal mode (without SETs). Figure 5.10 illustrates:
1. the execution of an original circuit: C0 → C1 → C2 → C3 → . . .
2. the execution of the corresponding transformed circuit: CT0 → C ′T0 → CT1 → C ′T1 → . . .
Since double time redundancy is used, two cycles of the transformed circuit correspond
to one cycle of the source circuit. The relations between executions of the source and trans-
formed circuits are described by the predicates Dtrs0 and Dtrs1 (colored polygons in the
figure). The input used during a reduction step is written above the arrow of this step.
C3 C4C0 C0 C2 C3
Dtrs1
Dtrs0
C1'
T T ...a a 
1 2 3 4 ...
C2C1
b b
C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
Dtrs1
...a b
T T T T
'
T
'
T
'
T
c
c c
d
d d...
...
Figure 5.10: DTR circuit step reduction described by predicates.
The first lemma (Case 1. above) can be formalized as:
Lemma 5.3.
Dtrs0 (ibs0 a) (obs0 o o′) C0 C1 CT1 ⇒ step C1 b t1 C2 ⇒ step CT1 b t′1 C ′T1
⇒ t′1 = (o, o, o′) ∧ Dtrs1 (ibs1 b a) (obs1 t1 o) C0 C1 C2 C ′T1
We omitted the hypothesis that input signals are pure (i.e., contain no glitch) to make
the theorem less verbose. Lemma 5.3 states that if the transformed circuit CT1
• is in relation by Dtrs0 with the original consecutive circuits states C0 and C1 (red
polygon);
• has its input bank in state (ibs0 a);
• has its output bank in state (obs0 o o′),
then after one clock cycle (step)
• its primary outputs will be (o, o, o′);
• the resulting DTR circuit C ′T1 will be in relation Dtrs1 with the three consecutive states
of the original circuit, C0, C1, and C2 (blue polygon);
• the input bank will be in state (ibs1 b a) meaning that the input signals b have been
fetched and saved in its first cells;
• the output bank will be in state (obs1 t1 o) meaning that the output of combinatorial
circuit t1 has been fetched and saved in it.
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Figure 5.11: DTR circuit stepg reduction from the state described by Dtrs0.
This change of the DTR circuit happens when the control block switches from state 0 to
state 1 (Figure 4.27).
During the next clock cycle, the DTR circuit propagates again the same data through
its combinatorial part to produce the second redundant result. Lemma 5.4 describes the
corresponding circuit reduction step:
Lemma 5.4.
Dtrs1(ibs1 b a) (obs1 t1 o) C0 C1 C2 C
′T
1 ⇒ step C1 b t1 C2 ⇒ step C ′T1 b t′′1 CT2
⇒ t′′1 = (o, o, o) ∧ Dtrs0 (ibs0 b) (obs0 t1 o) C1 C2 CT2
It states that the transformed circuit C ′T1 returns back from the relations Dtrs1 (blue
polygon) to the relations Dtrs0 (pink polygon) relatively to the consequent states of the
original circuit C1 and C2. For both steps the main theorem holds. In particular, its right
side, outDTR (b, o) oo, is true because for both cases at least two of the three output signals
in t′1 and t′′1 equal to o.
The predicates Dtrs0 and Dtrs1 express the relationships of each DTR component rel-
atively to the original circuit execution. Thus, the proofs of the aforementioned lemmas
rely on the corresponding lemmas about individual DTR components, e.g., input buffers,
memory blocks. These properties are described in Section 5.4.5.
Case 2. If the transformed circuit reduces by stepg, then the proof considers all possible
corruption scenarios. The reduction by stepg of the DTR circuit CT1 may return several
corrupted circuits {C ′T1 }. Each returned circuit C ′T1 is in a distinct relationship with the
source circuit. They are described by a predicate for each corruption case. Figure 5.11
represents such a case with a (generic) predicate DtrERR.
It can be shown that, in all these corruption scenarios, the DTR circuit returns to a
correct state within ten clock clocks. More precisely, after ten cycles, the relation between
the DTR and source circuits is either Dtrs0 or Dtrs1.
A stepg reduction of CT1 can lead to the corruptions listed in Table 5.4.4.
Recall that memory cells r and r′ with enable inputs save are organized by introducing
a multiplexer in front of a flip-flip, see Figure 5.12. This multiplexer is denoted MuxE in the
table and represents a potential point of fault injection for stepg.
All in all, there are 13 different corruption cases. Among all the listed cases, consider in
details the case when the global save signal is corrupted by an SET after the control block.
The glitched save may corrupt only memory cells r and r′ in memory blocks. This possible
corruption case of memory blocks is described by the predicate Dtr1rr′. This predicate
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Table 5.4.4: Cases of glitched signal (introduced by stepg) and the resulting state corruptions.
Corrupted signal Caused possible erroneous state of
Within the control block ctr3:
anywhere before final voting vot5 one copy of triplicated ctrFSM
rollBack output wire d, r (if save =1), o, p
save output wire r, r′
rB output wire d, r (if save =1), o, p
subst output wire no effect
fail output wire {f1, f2, f3}
Within an input bank dtri :
output of b cell b′
output of b′ cell no effect
any wire in the multiplexer d, r (if save =1), o, p
Within an output bank dtro :
fail output wire {f1, f2, f3}
output of o o′, {f1, f2, f3}
output of o′ o′′, {f1, f2, f3}
output of o′′ one output
output of p p′
output of p′ one output
within multiplexer muxD no effect
after one of three AND gates one output
within one of (muxA, muxB, or muxC) one output
Output of a cell f1, f2, or f3 one copy of triplicated ctrFSM
Within a memory block, mb(d, d′, r, r′, cir) :
fail signal {f1, f2, f3}
output of d d′, {f1, f2, f3}
output of d′ d, r (if save =1), o, p, {f1, f2, f3}
output of r r′
output of r′ no effect
within MuxE of r, Figure 5.12 r
within MuxE of r′, Figure 5.12 r′
within MuxB, Figure 4.24 d, r (if save =1), o, p
within MuxA, Figure 4.24 no effect
describes the relation between the corrupted transformed circuit C ′T1 and the source circuit
execution C0 → C1 → C2, see Figure 5.11. This relation can be expressed as:
Dtr1rr′ (ibs1 b a) (obs1 t1 o) C0 C1 C2 C ′T1
The following lemma shows the reduction step from this corrupted state described by
Dtr1rr′:
Lemma 5.5.
Dtr1rr′(ibs1 b a) (obs1 t1 o) C0 C1 C2 C ′T1 ⇒ step C1 b t2 C2 ⇒ step C ′T1 b t′′2 CT2
⇒ t′′2 = (o, o, o) ∧ Dtr0r′ (ibs0 b) (obs0 t2 t1) C1 C2 CT2
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Figure 5.12: Internal structure of a memory cell with an enable input.
Following the functionality of memory blocks in normal mode, the checkpointing pipeline
r−r′ is being updated when save = 1, which happens during the clock cycle described by the
property above. As a result, the new correct values are introduced into r cells. Consequently,
the following state is described by the predicate Dtr0r′ expressing the fact that only r′ may
stay corrupted.
We have proved similar lemmas for the following cases:
• from a corrupted state described by Dtr0r′, the DTR circuit first goes to another
erroneous state described by Dtr1r′ (r′ continues to be corrupted, the control block is
in state 1);
• from the state described by Dtr1r′, the circuit reduces to the correct state described by
Dtrs0.
As a result, all effects of an SET occurring on the save signal will disappear in less than
10 steps (more precisely, in 3 steps: Dtr1rr′ → Dtr0r′ → Dtr1r′ → Dtrs0). The same proof
strategy is followed for all corruption scenarios (e.g., rollBack corruption or combinatorial
circuit corruption).
We consider now the occurrence of an SET during the second redundant cycle inside a
memory block after the memory cell d, see Figure 4.24. The global predicate DtrERR that
describes the corruption configuration for CT2 is: Dtr0d
′ (ibs0 b) (obs0 t1 o) C1 C2 CT2 .
Since some d′ cells are corrupted at a cycle where all d′ cells are supposed to be equal to
d cells, an error detection occurs (see Section 4.4.8 for details). The raised fail signal will be
latched into three cells f1, f2, and f3 as (true,true,true). Furthermore, since the erroneous
d′ propagates through the combinational circuit, it may lead to the corruption of cells d in
memory blocks and the cells o1 and p1 in output buffers. The corruption of memory blocks
is expressed by the predicate Dtr1Det, and the corruption of output buffers by (obs1 e t1)
with an unknown e value.
The corresponding lemma is:
Lemma 5.6.
Dtr0d′ (ibs0 b) (obs0 t1 o) C1 C2 CT2 ⇒ step C2 c t2 C3 ⇒ step CT2 c t′2 C ′T2
⇒ t′1 = (t1, t1, o) ∧ (∃e, Dtr1Det (ibs1 c b) (obs1 e t1) C1 C2 C3 C ′T2 )
At the next clock cycle, the cells {f1, f2, f3} are read by the control FSM which starts
the recovery. The next reduction step is described as Lemma 5.7:
Lemma 5.7.
(∃e, Dtr1Det (ibs1 c b) (obs1 e t1) C1 C2 C3 C ′T2 ⇒ step C2 c t2 C3 ⇒ step C ′T2 c t′′2 CT3
⇒ t′′2 = (t2, t2, t2) ∧ Dtr2 (ibs0 c) (obs0 t2 e) C2 C3 CT3
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The predicate Dtr2 expresses the fact that the predicate ctr2 holds (the control block is
in state 2). The newly recalculated combinational circuit output t2 is directly propagated
to the primary output of the DTR circuit. During the following 8 clock cycles, the recovery
happens. Each state of the DTR circuit is related to the original circuit execution with a
dedicated predicate. In the end, we show that the state of the circuit returns to the predicate
Dtrs0 that holds in the normal mode.
All the aforementioned properties, expressed as Coq theorems, rely on the properties of
DTR components such as memory blocks, input and output buffers, etc. These properties
are considered in the next section.
5.4.5 Lemmas on DTR components
The previous section discussed how to prove the main theorem by showing how the trans-
formed circuit evolves with and without faults relatively to the original circuit execution. The
proofs of these properties rely on lemmas that show how the components of the transformed
circuit evolve. For instance, to prove Lemma 5.3, it is necessary to show that:
• the dtrm component reduces from dtr0 to dtr1;
• the control block evolves from the state ctr0 to ctr1;
• the input bank dtri reduces from (ibs0 a) to (ibs1 b a) where b is the new primary
input;
• the output bank dtro reduces from (obs0 a b) to (ibs1 c b) where c is the current
output of the combinational circuit.
5.4.5.1 Lemmas for DTRM
Consider the following property for the reduction of dtrm component CT with no SET:
Lemma 5.8.
dtr0 C0 C1 C
T ⇒ step C1 a b C2 ⇒ step CT {a, {0, 0, 0}} b′ C ′T
⇒ b′ = {b, {0, 0, 0}} ∧ dtr1 C0 C1 C2 C ′T
It states that, if the original circuit evolves from C1 to C2 with input a, then the cor-
responding transformed circuit CT with input a and signals save = 0, rollBack = 0, and
fail = 0 returns the same output b and leaves the global signals unchanged. Further, if CT
is related to (C0, C1) with dtr0, the returning state C
′T is related to (C0, C1, C2) with dtr1.
The mirror property from dtr1 to dtr0 relations can be expressed as:
Lemma 5.9.
dtr1 C0 C1 C2 C
T ⇒ step C1 a b C2 ⇒ step CT {a, {1, 0, f}} b′ C ′T
⇒ ∃f, b′ = {b, {1, 0, f}} ∧ dtr0 C1 C2 C ′T
It shows how the transformed circuit CT evolves into C ′T during even clock cycles rela-
tively to the states of the original circuit. In normal mode, the save control signal is set (for
checkpointing) and the fail signal is irrelevant (i.e., f is existentially quantified).
Above, we have considered the corruption scenario when a glitched save signal corrupts
the checkpointing memory cells r and r′ in memory block. Consider the same reduction step
with the corrupted save signal but for dtrm component, we can prove Lemma 5.10:
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Lemma 5.10.
dtr0 C0 C1 C
T ⇒ step C1 a b C2 ⇒ step CT {a, {, 0, 0}} b′ C ′T
⇒ b′ = {b, {, 0, 0}} ∧ dtr1rr′ C0 C1 C2 C ′T
The property can be read as: if an original circuit C1 with input a reduces to the
circuit C2, then the corresponding transformed circuit C
T with data input a, rollBack =
fail = 0 and a glitched save signal will return a circuit C ′T where memory cells r and r′ in
memory blocks are possibly corrupted. The overall proof uses 28 such lemmas corresponding
to the different corruption cases of memory blocks.
All such properties are shown by simple structural induction.
5.4.5.2 Lemmas for input and output buffers (DTRI, DTRO)
Since input and output buffers are known circuit, properties on them are easily proven using
reflection. For instance, one of the lemmas describes how the state of an output buffer evolves
in the normal mode:
Lemma 5.11.
pure a ⇒ step ob(p1, p2, o1, o2, o3) {a, {save, 0, fail , 0}} b C ′ ⇒
b = {b2s p2, {b2s o2, b2s o3},or{fail , b2s(xor o1 o2)}} ∧ C ′ = ob((s2b a), p1, (s2b a), o1, o2)
It states that, if the data input a of an output buffer is not corrupted by an SET (predicate
pure a), it will be latched by the cells o and p as (s2b a). The values p1, o1, and o2 are
propagated and latched by the following cells p′, o′, and o′′ respectively. The value of the
outgoing fail signal is defined by the expression or {fail , b2s(xor o1 o2)} which formalizes
the error detection mechanism in the output buffer (Figure 4.26). The data primary outputs
poA, poB, and poC (Figure 4.26) return the values of the memory cells p′, o′, and o′′ and
are respectively equal to b2s p2, b2s o2, and b2s o3.
In the case of an SET during even cycles, the following lemma describes the behavior of
an output buffer:
Lemma 5.12.
stepg ob(b, b′, b, b′, b′) {b2s b, {1, 0, b2s f, 0}} o C ′ ⇒
(∃ x, o = {x, {b2s b′, b2s b′}, } ∨ o = {b2s b′, {x, b2s b′}, } ∨ o = {b2s b′, {b2s b′, x}, })
∧(∃ z, C ′ = ob(b, z, b, b, b′) ∨ C ′ = ob(b, b, b, z, b′) ∨ C ′ = ob(b, b, b, b, z))
The initial values of the cells o′, o′′, and p′ are the same and equal to b′ according to the
output buffers functionality. If an SET occurs in an output buffer (stepg reduction), there
are three possible corruption scenarios for the outputs and for the internal state. According
to this lemma, only one of three data outputs can be corrupted by an SET (stepg reduction),
the other two are correct and equal to b2s b′.
Since during even cycles the fail signal can be ignored, the property does not specify
what value the returned fail signal should have (denoted by ′ ′).
There are three cases of possible internal state corruption: C ′ = ob(b, z, b, b, b′), C ′ =
ob(b, b, b, z, b′), or C ′ = ob(b, b, b, b, z). Only one of the cells {o′, o′′, p′} may take
an unknown possibly corrupted value z as a result of an SET. The cells o and p cannot be
corrupted in this case. Their corruption can be caused only by a glitch on the input data
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wire which can be introduced only by the circuit providing this data wire (e.g., a glitch on
the memory block output wire so, see Figure 4.24).
The main advantage of reflection-based proofs is their automatization. In the case of
stepg, all possible SET insertion cases are generated and the correctness of the implication
is checked in an automatic manner.
The properties for the input bank dtri (resp. output bank dtro) are proved by induction
on its type and rely on the corresponding lemmas for the individual input ib (resp. output
ob) buffer. The previous property for an output bank dtro can be written as:
Lemma 5.13.
stepg (dtro v v′ v v′ v′) {v, {1, 0, f, 0}} o C ′ ⇒
(∃ x, o = {x, {v′, v′}, } ∨ o = {v′, {x, v′}, } ∨ o = {v′, {v′, x}, })∧
(∃ z, pure z ∧ ((C ′ = dtro v z v v v′) ∨ (C ′ = dtro v v v z v′) ∨ (C ′ = dtro v v v v z)))
5.4.5.3 Lemmas for the control block
The properties of the triplicated control block, ctr3(a, b, c), can be classified into two cate-
gories:
1. the states of its three redundant modules are equal;
2. there is one redundant module whose state differs from the states of two others.
The properties of the first group are proven by reflection due to the simplicity of this proof
strategy. Alternatively, they could be proven using properties of the TMR transformation
and the lemmas about the reduction step of its one redundant copy, called ctrFSM(a, b, c)
(see Section 5.4.1).
The lemmas in the second category make a critical use of the main properties proved
for the TMR transformation. They show how the control block ctr3(a, b, c) recovers from a
corrupted state or, vice versa, how it can be corrupted.
As an example, consider the control block where one redundant copy of its triplicated
FSM is corrupted. This sort of corruption is described by the next relation:
ctrFSM(false, false, true)
c∼ ctrTMR (see Section 5.3.2 for details)
It can be read as: “the triplicated FSM ctrTMR contains two modules in the state (false,
false, true) while its third module has an unknown state”. In this case, the whole control
block with its output voters is expressed as the circuit ctrTMR -◦-vot5. The next lemma
shows that this corrupted control block is reduced in one step to the correct circuit state
ctr3(false, false, false) and the correct output ttt:
Lemma 5.14.
ctrFSM(false, false, true)
c∼ ctrTMR ⇒ step (ctrTMR -◦-voter5) {0, 0, 0} ttt C ′ ⇒
ttt = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0} ∧ C ′ = ctr3(false, false, false)
This property is proven thanks to the Lemma 5.2 (Section 5.3.3) which describes the
general characteristic of the TMR transformation, in particular: “if one redundant copy of
the TMR circuit is corrupted, the next circuit state of this TMR design will be correct as
well as its outputs”.
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5.5 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to certify automatic circuit transformations
for fault-tolerance. If some works prove fault-tolerance for known circuits using ITPs [133,
134], our approach can show fault-tolerance for any resulting transformed circuit “once and
for all”. Contrary to most of the verification works which specify particular circuits within
the logic of the prover, we use a gate-level HDL, called lddl. This approach allows us to
model SETs in the semantics of lddl. Our DTR technique is easily specified by program
transformations on the syntax of lddl. Furthermore, its variable-less nature allowed a simple
semantics (without environments) that facilitated formalization and proofs.
Our approach is general and applicable to many fault-tolerant transformations. In this
dissertation, we used it to prove the correctness of the DTR transformation whose correctness
was far from obvious. While we relied on many manual checks to design the transformation
(Section 4.4), only Coq allowed us to get a complete assurance. The formalization of DTR
did not reveal real errors but a few imprecisions. For instance, we stated in [20] that the
control block was protected using TMR without making it clear how it was connected to the
rest of the circuit. We had to introduce three cells f1, f2, f3 in front of the triplicated control
FSM (Figure 4.23) to record the value of the fail signal. These three cells prevent a glitch
from propagating simultaneously to the three redundant modules of the FSM. If these cells
were not introduced, the glitch would put the three redundant FSMs into three different
states which would prohibit proper recovery. The introduction of these cells required to
slightly change the definition of the internal FSM.
Our proof approach makes an essential use of two features of Coq: dependent types and
reflection. Dependent types provided an elegant solution to ensure that all circuits were well-
formed. Such types are often presented as tricky to use but, in our case, that complexity
remained confined to the writing of libraries for the equality and decomposition of buses and
circuits. Reflection was very useful to prove properties of known sub-circuits; it would had
been much harder without it.
The size of the specifications and proofs for DTR is 7000 lines of Coq. Checking all
the proofs takes around 45 min on an average laptop. Completing the proof of DTR took
roughly 4 or 5 man-months. The Coq files for these proofs are available online [156].

Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary
In this dissertation, we have shown how to design, optimize, and verify circuit fault-tolerance
techniques using formal methods. Formal methods guarantee functional correctness and the
absence of failures w.r.t. a fault-model. Such assurance is more than needed when circuits
are used in safety-critical domains such as aerospace, defense, and nuclear industries where
the cost of design mistakes is really high.
We have demonstrated how static analyses can be used for optimization of fault-tolerant
designs. In particular, we investigated how majority voters can be removed from TMR
circuits without violating fault-tolerance properties [15]. We extended the standard two-
value logic domain in order to represent faults and encoded a circuit and its input/output
interface specification as a single transition system. Our static, BDD-based, symbolic analysis
demonstrated that, in practice, many voters can be safely removed. While we ran into the
expected state explosion problem, we have explicitly shown that the optimization is effective
for average size circuits (< 100 memory cells).
We proposed flexible alternatives to TMR that require less hardware resources and could
be easily applied and integrated in EDA tools. Proposing the TTR transformation and
improving it, we have designed a whole family of time-redundant circuit transformations
for fault-tolerance. We introduced a novel principle, called dynamic time redundancy, that
allows the transformed circuit to change the order of time-redundancy “on-the-fly” with-
out interrupting the computation [19]. The transformed circuit can dynamically adapt the
throughput/fault-tolerance trade-off by changing its redundancy level. Therefore, time-
redundancy can be used only in critical situations, during the processing of crucial data,
or critical processes. Merging this principle with a micro-checkpointing mechanism, we have
created a double-time redundant technique capable to mask faults with a fast and transparent
recovery procedure [20]. The corresponding circuit transformation, called DTR, makes any
circuit tolerant to the fault-model SET (1, 10). The throughput of a DTR circuit is 50-55% of
the corresponding TMR circuit alternative. However, other time-redundant error-correcting
techniques like TTR have even higher throughput loss. According to our experiments, DTR
circuits are 1.9 to 2.5 times smaller than their TMR counterparts. DTR is an interesting
alternative to TMR in applications where hardware size constraints are more stringent than
high-performance constraints.
We have checked the properties of TTR, dynamic time redundancy transformations, and
DTR manually investigating each fault scenario. Nevertheless, due to the complexity of DTR
and the great number of possible fault cases, such checks could not provide full assurance.
The only way to resolve this issue was to use formal proofs.
We have proposed a language-based approach to formally certify the functional and
fault-tolerance properties of circuit transformations using the Coq proof assistant [21]. We
introduce the syntax and semantics of a simple gate-level functional HDL, called lddl, to
describe circuits. The fault-model (e.g., SET (1,K)) is formalized in lddl semantics. An
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automatic fault-tolerance transformation, like DTR, is easily specified as recursive functions
on the syntax of lddl. The correctness proof shows the relations between the output stream
of a transformed circuit that experiences faults and the output stream of its original circuit
without faults. Around 7000 Coq lines and 5 man-months were required to show DTR
correctness. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to certify automatic circuit
transformations for fault-tolerance.
6.2 Future Work
Hereafter, we discuss further research directions that have been inspired by the results ob-
tained in this dissertation.
Voter-minimization for higher frequency. In our verification-based approach for vot-
ers suppression, we had to choose the order in which voters are analyzed (Section 3.3.2).
This order could also take into account other optimization criteria than voter minimization.
Another useful optimization is to increase the maximum synthesizable frequency by remov-
ing first the voters on the critical path. However, removing a voter from the critical path
may make another path critical. Thus, the choice of the next voter to remove depends not
only on the existing ordering but also on the current critical path. However, the critical path
strategy may not lead to a minimal number of voters. In this sense, the two criteria “number
of voters” and “synthesizable frequency” are orthogonal, and bi-criteria optimization must
be studied.
Modularity of voter-minimization analysis. Applying our analysis in a modular man-
ner would increase its scalability and, consequently, the applicability of the proposed tech-
nique to larger circuits. The hierarchical compositional design of today’s circuits makes it
natural to decompose a circuit to the IPs of its block-by-block structure. Such structural
partitioning requires a deep understanding of the design. It has already been used in the
model checking of Intel CPUs [159]. In our case, the presented analysis can be applied to
circuit sub-components after the decomposition. After the minimization of internal voters
in each sub-circuit, the components should be interconnected again to rebuild the whole
design. However, the interconnection wires should include voters to guarantee the fault-
tolerance property of the final optimized circuit. Such an approach is not optimal even if
the local input/output specifications are precise, because some of the interconnection voters
may be redundant. Only a global analysis can safely remove such voters.
If a decomposition in sub-circuits is not known, the circuit netlist has to be automatically
divided and the input-output specifications of its parts have to be figured out. These steps are
by themselves complex and require deep investigation. Here, we just sketch some preliminary
ideas. First, a circuit netlist can be separated according to some syntactic criteria. For
example, the circuit cuts could be performed at wires that are included in the largest number
of sequential loops. Such an approach eliminates as many sequential loops as possible by
reducing the number of sequential loops in each sub-component. It limits the number of
potential points where the voters have to be inserted.
After the circuit decomposition, our semantic analysis can be applied to each of its sub-
parts. The main difficulty lies in the identification of input/output specification of each
sub-circuit to perform the local semantic analyses. Figure 6.1 presents three cases of circuit
separation:
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Figure 6.1: a) Sequential, b) parallel, and c) feedback circuit decomposition.
While the input/output specification for c1 and c2 sub-circuits can easily be extracted
from the global specification for the parallel decomposition (case b, Fig. 6.1), the sequential
and feedback decompositions (cases a and c) create unknown internal specifications (marked
in red). They have to be computed or approximated for each sub-part. Consider, for instance,
the unknown input specification i2 for the sequential decomposition (case a). The signals in i2
are the outputs o1. Since the netlist c1 and its input specification i1 fully describe the behavior
of c1, o1 and i2 can be described by the same NBA. In the worst case, such NBA could be
as big as c1 multiplied by the size of i1, which can be prohibitive for the following semantic
analysis of c2 sub-circuit. Consequently, the extracted NBA should be over-approximated
to lower the complexity. The feedback decomposition is even more complex because of the
mutual dependency between sub-components c1 and c2.
These modularity issues are complex but important and valuable since many other static
analyses of circuits could benefit from them.
Time-redundancy techniques frequency optimization. Chapter 4 introduced the
family of time-redundant techniques that trade circuit throughput off for small hardware
overhead. A possible research direction is to increase the maximum synthesizable frequency
of the transformed circuits to partially compensate the throughput loss. All presented tech-
niques have pipelined structures in their memory blocks, which may allow optimizations
using retiming. Moving the pipeline memory cells into the combinational circuit could break
the critical path and increase the synthesizable frequency. For instance in DTR, the memory
cells r and d might be moved into the combinatorial circuit; the same can be done with the
cells d and d′ in TTR.
Transient faults on the clock line. Throughout the dissertation, we assume that tran-
sient faults can happen only on data wires. We did not consider glitches on the clock line,
while they may present a danger and lead to simultaneous multi-bit data corruptions. Sev-
eral independent but synchronous clocks lines could be used to prevent non-recoverable bits
corruption. For instance, in the DTR scheme, the memory cells (d, d′) could use two differ-
ent clocks to avoid their simultaneous corruption by an SET on their common clock line that
would prohibit any error-detection (Figure 4.24). It is necessary to consider all combinations
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of simultaneous memory cells corruption to propose solutions that minimize the number of
clock lines but, at the same time, guarantee fault-tolerance.
Tolerances to multiple faults. Another research direction lies in the extension of the
presented transformations to deal with several simultaneous soft-errors. While it is necessary
to increase the order of redundancy to be able to detect/mask simultaneous faults, the
combination of time-redundancy with checkpointing/rollback mechanisms may allow us to
reduce the throughput loss. For instance, using triple-time redundancy with the check-
pointing/rollback scheme inspired from DTR, it could be possible to mask two simultaneous
SETs. Since triple-time redundancy allows us to detect up to two simultaneous errors,
the normal mode will be triple-time redundant. If an error is detected, the rollback will be
performed to the previous correct state. Note that the circuit cannot decide if it has detected
one or two errors in redundant bits-triples. Thus, to be on a safe side, the re-computation
after the rollback will be done in double-time redundant mode that offers error-detection
capabilities. If no errors have been detected during this double-time redundant recovery
phase, the circuit will eventually return to its normal state that it would have had if no error
had been detected. If another error is detected during this double-time redundant recovery
phase, another rollback will be needed after which time-redundancy can be switched-off for
the following recovery because two faults have already happened and been detected. Thus,
we could obtain stronger fault-tolerance properties than what TTR provides, but with the
same throughput loss. Further investigation and checks remain necessary.
Techniques combination. Further research could consider the combination of different
circuit transformations for fault-tolerance, such as TMR and DTR. We believe that the circuit
transformations could be adjusted so that their consecutive applications will lead to stronger
fault-tolerance properties than the properties of individual transformations. Unfortunately,
their straightforward application does not lead to this desired result. If we apply TMR to
a DTR circuit, then we obtain the properties of the latest transformation losing all benefits
of the checkpointing/rollback mechanism. Similarly, DTR can be applied to TMR circuits
but the resulting fault-tolerance properties will not be better than the properties of DTR.
Further studies may lead to new fault-tolerant solutions with unique characteristics.
Automatization of formal proofs. We believe that additional user-defined Coq tactics
could make the proofs of circuit transformations in lddl (Chapter 5) automatic and much
shorter. Indeed, the key parts are to define the predicates relating the source and transformed
circuits and to state the lemmas. The proofs themselves are, for the most part, straightfor-
ward inductions. The proposed framework could also be used to prove other fault-tolerance
mechanisms, such as the transformations for dynamic time-redundancy that we presented in
Section 4.3 or well-known techniques used in circuit synthesis such as FSM-encoding.
While this dissertation reveals only a small part of how fault-tolerance techniques can be
designed, optimized, and formally verified, we have a strong belief that further integration
of formal methods in the design flow and circuit analysis will lead to new fault-tolerance
techniques. Such integration eliminates all doubts about the correctness of the techniques,
which, hopefully, will increase the speed of their introduction into industrial safety-critical
projects and tools. We hope that this dissertation can inspire others people to pay attention
to such promising multi-disciplinary domain as formally verified fault-tolerant circuit design.
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